There appear to be some indications that China may seek to make use of its good relations with various regional parties to help resolve the crisis in Yemen. China has good relations withIran, which supports the Houthis, as well as with the countries forming the Arab coalition forces, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  Beijing has a variety of tools it may use to bring the crisis to an end, including backing UN and Gulf initiatives to achieve a political settlement; holding talks with the Houthi militia; exerting pressure on Iran to resolve the crisis; and supporting the legitimate government to secure its oil ports and improve security along the Belt and Road Initiative.

Moves by Beijing

China’s growing attention to the situation in Yemen during the past year has taken several forms, including:

Plans to reopen the Chinese Embassy in Aden. lastDecember, a Chinese diplomatic delegation travelled to Yemen’s provisional capital, Aden, in what has beeninterpreted as a prelude for reopening the Chinese Embassy there, as the delegation visited the Chinese Consulate in the Embassy District . Shao Qing, Chargé d ‘Affaires of the Chinese Embassy, alluded to the readiness of the building and headquarters of the former Chinese Embassy in the capital of the South, expressing his gratitude to Yemeni leaders for maintaining the building. The Embassy had been temporarily closed in June 2015, with the outbreak of the war and Houthis toke over of Sana’a, as security conditions deteriorated in Yemen.

Lines of communication with the Houthi militia: China’s former ambassador to Yemen, Kang Yung, held a telephone conversation with the head of the Houthi negotiatingdelegation, Mohammed Abdulsalam on March 24, 2022. The discussion addressed the course of the humanitarian truce that was then on the table by the UN through its ambassador to Yemen, Hans Grodenberg. The truce, signed last April, and renewed for three times, expired last October as the Houthis refused to renew it  a fourth time. Some believe the Chinese reach out to the Houthis in March played a role in convincing the latter to agree to the truce.

Strengthened cooperation with the government: The Chargé d ‘affaires of the Chinese Embassy held a series of diplomatic talks with officials of the Yemeni Government last December, regarding the latest developments. The Chinese Ambassador stressed that his country supported all steps taken by the Yemeni Presidential Council and the legitimate government and supported in all international forums calls to end the war and Houthi escalation. He alsorevealed that the Yemeni crisis was on the agenda of theChina-Arab Summit held in Riyadh in early December. Further discussions were held with Yemen’s Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs for Political Affairs Mansour Bojash, on December 29, which addressed the results of the visit of the Chinese delegation to Aden, and stressed the need to increase cooperation between the two countries in various areas.

Strengthening trade and economic relations: Shao Qing’s discussions with the Chairman of the Aden Free Zone Authority, Hassan Al-Hayad, on December 24 in Aden, addressed the means of strengthening bilateral cooperation, especially  on how to improve  the functionality of the container terminal in the port of Aden, and develop the Free Zone Authority within the framework of China’s Belt and Road project. Yemen’s accession to this project was discussed on April 25, 2019, when the Yemeni Minister of Industry and Trade, Mohammed Al-Maitami, signed a memorandum of understanding with the ViceChairman of China’s National Reform and Development Commission, Mei Ning in Beijing to that end.

The signing was viewed as a new approach to establish a new strategic partnership which encompasses economic, trade, political and cultural spheres, in a revival of thehistoric relationship, as Yemen was one of the oldest countries to be part of what was known as the Silk Road.According to China’s previous ambassador to Yemen, the war prevented Yemen’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, although there were hopes it would play a vital role in this project, as its ports had played in the past.

China’s main concern regarding the conflict in Yemen is the security of oil facilities both inside Yemen and in the Gulf States as it imports about 1.8 million barrels per day of Saudi crude oil. Therefore, when the Houthis attacked Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities in September 2019, the Chinese Ambassador to Yemen, Kang Yong, went to Oman’s capital, Muscat, in October 2019, and held discussions with Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam, and informed him that Beijing’s position was that “the war will not be resolved by an escalation of violence”. 

Multiple Tools

In light of recent developments, it can be said that China in 2023 may play a role in  mediating , or alleviating, the conflict in Yemen. It is of note that since US envoy to Yemen, Tim Linderking, expressed last August, in an interview on CNBC,his country’s willingness to cooperate with Russia and China to reach a political solution in Yemen. He argued that he believed China wants to see progress in Yemen during its presidency of the Security Council, and that this would help in finding common ground between China, Russia, the United States, to work together towards a political solution to the Yemeni conflict. China has at its disposal a number of tools to resolve this crisis, including:

International and regional influence: China’s position asone of the five permanent members of the Security Council allows it to put forth and support initiatives that could have a positive impact on the crisis in Yemen. As China assumed the role of Security Council Chair last August, itsPermanent Representative, Chang Jun, pledged to intensify cooperation with all Security Council members to resolve this crisis. China has been a prominent supporter of establishing a truce, as the only means of reaching a political resolution to the conflict.

China can build on its strong relations with Gulf States toput forth a plan to ease the conflict in Yemen, while preserving its economic interests there as well as the interests of its Saudi ally. It is important to bear in mind that Beijing had initially depended on Yemen as an essential source for the supply of oil, and turned to Saudi Arabia for these supplies when war broke out in Yemen.China supported which the Riyadh Agreement signed between the STC and the legitimate Yemeni government in 2019.

Negotiations with the Houthis: Beijing does not perceive that the crisis in Yemen could be resolved by  military force , and was one of the first countries in 2014 to support UN Security Council Resolution 2201, which called on the Houthis to withdraw their forces immediately and unconditionally from government institutions in the capital Sana ‘a, and to cease their hostilities.  Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lee, in April 2015 declared his country’s hope that the political process would be resumed in Yemen as soon as possible.

A Houthi delegation  made a visit to  China in early December 2016, during which China tried to persuade them to accept a power-sharing agreement with the Hadigovernment, as opposed to their unilateral  declaration of a “National Salvation Government”. China strongly rejectedthis Houthis step, and the latter therefore sent a delegation to Beijing to try and change the Chinese stance, and to demand that China cease its military supplies, especially ofdrones, to Arab forces. However, their attempts were unsuccessful, and Beijing then moved to send its humanitarian assistance to the legitimate Yemeni government based in Aden.

Strong relations with Iran. One of the most important tools that China may use to leverage its mediation power in Yemen and achieve regional stability, is its strong relations with Iran, as the latter is the main supporter of the Houthis. Iran objected to the statement at the end of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia on December 10, which invited Iran to discontinue its interference in the affairs of other states; expressed China’s rejection of attacks on  Saudi territory; and declared Chinese support for the Yemeni Presidential Council. While Iran is confident China will not take significant measures against it, in view of their strategic partnership, it is anxious that growing economic and security cooperation between China and Arab Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, will eventually bring the interests of the two countries into conflict. If China perceives its interest in the region to be endangered by conflict in Yemen, it may seek a more proactive role to bring it to an end, thereby also enhancing China’s standing and influence in the region as a whole. 

Strategic Gains 

There are multifaceted gains for China in post-conflict Yemen, which can be outlined as follows:

Chinese economic interests. If the war in Yemen ends, China will have a great opportunity to contribute to post-war reconstruction projects. Beijing has a long history of undergoing development projects in Yemen, having signed joint agreements with Yemeni governments since bilateralrelations were established in September 1956. Yemen was one of the first Arab countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China and was the second largest exporter of crude oil to China in 1999, as well as being a key hub in the transport of Chinese goods to the Middle East and Europe. The resolution of the Yemeni crisis could thus contribute to the resumption of China’s economic projects interrupted by the Yemeni war. 

Expanding the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing’s main aspiration is to take advantage of the strategic geographical location of Yemen near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the most important international shipping corridors. The war in Yemen was at its peak when China announced extending the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 to Yemen(which provides for the establishment of roads, railways and harbors linking China across Asia and the Middle East to Europe). Beijing has therefore renewed its intentions to include Yemen as this  will help in  establishing regional security framework, facilitating Beijing’s access to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and Yemen’s straits and seaports, therebyexpanding  the maritime corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative. This would also increase the volume of trade and level of economic cooperation between China, Yemen, andother regional states.

Projecting Chinese military strength. Some observers are of the view that Beijing’s desire for a ceasefire and thepolitical settlement of the Yemeni crisis is linked to its wish to expand its military presence in the region through its naval base in Djibouti. Indeed, the main objective of the construction of this base in 2017 was “to counter piracy and terrorism, and to provide support and protection to theChinese maritime sector, and maintain peacekeeping operations off the Yemeni and Somali coasts”.