Why Tunisia is looking eastward to Russia? – The Arab Wall
Why Tunisia is looking eastward to Russia?

Why Tunisia is looking eastward to Russia?



The Tunisian Foreign Minister’s visit to Russia comes at a time when the country is trying to overcome its economic crisis, as well as discuss and advance strategic cooperation. This includes the promotion of investment and the development of trade. The visit implied political messages for Tunisia’s traditional partners, most notably, that Tunisia can diversify its foreign relations eastward to involve Russia and China. This is a step that is consistent with Tunisia’s request to join BRICS, only several months after it entered the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nabil Ammar’s visit to Moscow opened up talks on Tunisia’s traditional relations with the US and the EU, and its need to look east in search of alternatives. Ammar’s visit, although not explicitly marked by Tunisia’s accession to the Russian and Chinese camp, reflected a new and potential relationship, as well as a conspicuous dissociation from the West.  Indeed, the Tunisian Foreign Minister did not miss the opportunity to criticize the IMF by saying, “It must be in the service of countries, not vice versa”, referring to the cessation of negotiations with the Fund for a USD1.9 billion financing loan.

On this visit, Ammar was accompanied by the Head of the Grain Office, in an effort to break out of Tunisia’s grain crisis, as well as move Tunisian diplomacy to increase trade with Moscow. Both these measures would ease Western pressures on Tunisia to back down from the 25 July movement.

Driving Factors

Perhaps moving eastward towards Russia and China was a backup plan should the IMF raise the stakes on Tunisia’s financial package. Indeed, as negotiations stalled, Tunisian President Kais Saeid rejected the fund’s terms. This in addition to multiple other factors have driven Tunisia to reorient towards the east, specifically Russia. Perhaps the most important of these factors appear to be:

1- Finding solutions to the grain crisis: the main objective of the visit was to explore a differential grain purchase agreement and to strengthen the relationship between the two sides. In particular, the Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs was joined by Salwa Ben-Hadid Zouari, Head of the Grain Office, who was appointed by President Kais Saeid last August, given that the Grain Office is the only body authorized to conclude grain purchase and distribution agreements.

The visit comes amidst Tunisia’s grain crisis, caused by a shortage of supplies due to the Russian-Ukrainian war, combined with a decline in domestic production as a result of the drought, which has caused disruptions in the supply of flour to markets. Under pressure to secure its grain needs, 80 per cent of which are imported, Tunisian diplomacy successfully signed an agreement for Russian wheat supplies at reduced prices.

2- Overcoming economic crisis and rejecting IMF terms: The Tunisian President’s refusal to conclude an agreement with the IMF opened questions about the country’s financing alternatives, given its burgeoning budget gap and urgent debts. Thus, Amar’s visit to Moscow comes at a time of increasing repercussions to the country’s economy and complements Tunisia’s first step to reorient towards the East, of joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), to become its 90th member on May 7, 2022. Both Russia and China own shares in AIIB, creating the possibility for funding alternatives to the IMF. Indeed IMF loan negotiations have stalled since Tunisia’s accession to AIIB falls within a “diversification of sources of financing for development projects”, according to Sputnik Arabic, citing the Tunisian Ministry of Economy last February.

3- Increasing the volume of trade with Russia: Tunisia, historically attracting significant Russian tourists, is pushing for enhanced economic cooperation and increased trade with Russia. According to the Russian Ambassador to Tunisia, Alexander Zolotov, in an interview with Sputnik Arabic on February 12, the volume of trade “increased markedly, in 2022 … by 63%, compared to 2021, to reach USD692 million.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in a press conference in Moscow with Tunisian Foreign Minister Nabil Ammar, stated that, “Russia supports Tunisian leadership in its endeavor to strengthen the country’s economy…the level of trade with Tunisia in the six months of this year has reached USD 1.2 billion.” Furthermore, during the first three months of this year, according to Tunisia’s Ministry of Industry Energy and Mines, Tunisia has witnessed a jump in oil supplies from Russia, especially for industrial production, while its domestic energy production is in remarkable decline. Compared to previous years, production shrank by 15 per cent in 2022 from the year before, including a 7 per cent decline in marketed gas and liquefied gas.

4- Growing differences with the EU: Although the EU is Tunisia’s primary partner, with their economic relations dating back to the 1970s upon the signing of the free trade agreement between the two sides. However, their differences have escalated in recent months, against the backdrop of a renewed crisis of illegal immigrants, from Tunisia and Libya, towards the European coasts.

Hence, the disagreement between Tunisia and the European Union is one of the factors driving the Tunisian Foreign Minister’s visit to Russia. Tensions over Tunisia’s relations with the EU have grown significantly, marked by the Tunisian authorities’ refusal to receive a delegation from the European Parliament. A move that reflected the deepening gap between them, although Tunisia’s exports with some European partners rose over the past year, including France (by 9.3 percent), Italy (by 21 percent), and Spain (by 33.6 percent), according to the Ministry of Trade and Export Development, on March 17.

5- Strained relations with the US: despite Tunisia’s recent attempts to reassure its traditional partners in the West of continued relations, the US has reeled in its position in talks with the IMF, which can be tied to the country’s political developments, as well as to Tunisia’s “neutral” attitude towards the Russian-American war. Notably, Nabil Ammar’s criticism of the IMF and his statement that it “must be in the interests of countries, not the other way around” came only hours after the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Senate, Stefania Craxy in Washington stated that “the United States position on Tunisia is very difficult, and there is no way out at the moment.”