In recent years, managing the relationship with allies has become equally, if not more, important than managing conflict with opposing forces in the Middle East. Alliances have become less stable and prone to weakness, impeding the ability of their members to pursue their interests, making use of available opportunities or deterring imminent threats. There has consequently been a rising trend in Arab and Western literature labelling such alliances as “flexible or partial alliances”, “single issue alliances”, “soft alliances”, “temporary coalitions”, and “hybrid partnerships”, which in turn has impacts what is known as the alliance life cycle. Questions have therefore arisen regarding the reasons the life cycle of solid alliances in the region has been faltering.
Multiple interpretations
Although these types of fluid alliances have been around for nearly a decade, they have increased in importance and visibility in recent years, especially with the rising number of threat sources as well as adversaries. It is important to note that one of the most pressing objectives in alliances is to deter, confront, and defeat aggression without military intervention. This was explained by renowned researcher Pascal Boniface, who stated that the main motive behind the establishment of alliances is to deter threats, especially when faced with common enemy. This explanation falls in line with the rule in international relations that posits that there can be no alliance where there is no common enemy.
It can be argued that there are several explanations for faltering strategic alliances in the Middle East. The region cannot be said to witness stable alliance formulas, but rather quasi-alliances, as some regional powers, such as Iran, prefer them for not limiting their options the international arena. Oman, on the other hand, adopts several stances in dealing with issues such as the crisis in Yemen, the Syrian crisis, the relationship with Tehran, that are at a variance with other Gulf countries, while at the same time maintaining its presence within the Gulf Cooperation Council. This has led some to refer to Oman as the Norway of the Gulf or the Switzerland of the Middle East. In this context, five factors appear to impede the formation of solid alliances in the region.
Regional Chaos
The first explanation for faltering solid alliances is the complex and fluid regional context, resulting from two waves of violent revolutionary transformations in 2011 and 2019. These have led to the disintegration of some nation states, the collapse of political systems, the rise of parallel armed forces, and an increased threat from terrorist organizations. This created a ripe environment for continued flare-ups of internal armed conflicts with regional consequences, an escalation in polarization, leading to continuous reevaluations of regional axes. The region has witnessed the emergence of armed non-state actors, especially in hotbeds of armed conflicts, and an increase in their external ties. This explains the political and media support, and military armaments they receive from some regional power, as is the case with the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.
Countries are accordingly resorting to entering multiple alliances simultaneously. This may explain, for example, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in two prominent multi-party alliances, namely the Arab coalition within the framework of Operation Decisive Storm to restore legitimacy in Yemen (March 2015), and the Islamic Coalition Against Terrorism (December 2015).
The Leadership Variable
The second factor leading to the faltering of alliances relates to changes in the political power structure. The rise of new leaders to power results in changes in perception as to what are the sources of threats when it comes to national security, the methods of dealing with these threats, the revision of existing alliances and, the formation of new ones. These new formations help distribute the burden within the alliance and fulfill obligations on the one hand and increase opportunities on the other. This may be applied to the examples of Prince Muhammad bin Salman assuming the position of heir to the throne in Saudi Arabia, and Mustafa Al-Kazemi assuming the position of prime minister in Iraq. The latter expressed interest in “opening up” to the Arab world in order to counterbalance Tehran’s influence, while avoiding open hostility to Iran. He has clearly expressed that the new Cairo- Baghdad- Amman configuration is not directed against any particular country.
Similarly, Sudan’s openness to Egypt intensified after the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, which was supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood in April 2019, especially given Cairo and Khartoum’s common interest in negotiations with Ethiopia, which have faltered. To counter, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed worked to neutralize Addis Ababa’s differences with Eritrea over the past years, even signing a peace agreement. Ethiopia has also attempted to sour Egyptian-Sudanese relations while moving to strengthen ties with African nations, within the framework of Ahmed’s anti-Cairo policy. In other words, changes at the top of the leadership pyramid lead to significant changes to alliances throughout the region.
Allies at odds
The third explanation involves the internal differences between allied parties. Differences between allies in the Middle East is one of the factors that can explain the lack of solidity of the alliances within the context of a troubled region, among leaders that hold different perspectives. This can push one of the parties to pursue alternative or complementary alliances, which can complicate the map of alliances. In a worst-case scenario, this can lead to the stagnation, fragmentation, or complete disintegration of existing alliances. The process of forming regional alliances can be linked to maintaining cohesion between ruling systems in the face of internal challenges and preserving the state’s position on a regional scale.
It should also be noted that the United States, in the post 2011 period, was perceived as both ally and opponent by many countries in the Middle East. This was a period when the United States supported the rise of political Islam, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia, and continued to do so following the June 30th, 2013 revolution in Egypt. This led to a perception of Washington as an unstable ally, which can under certain circumstances be considered a threat, although this perception remained undeclared to allies.
Changing Opponents
The fourth factor is concerned with the extent to which the parties to regional alliances are affected by possible changes in the foreign policies of other regional powers. An example is what appear to be Turkey’s change of stance lately towards several countries including Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Greece, and France, with whom its relationship had deteriorated in recent years. The next period will test of the extent of alliance members’ commitment, and whether their participation in activities required for the effective continuity of the alliance will continue or decrease, after the neutralization of the common threat. This emphasis here is on the “perception” of threat, especially as some regional powers can opt for tactical rather than strategic maneuvers with adversaries.
Accordingly, it is important for members of an alliance to continuously renew the mechanisms of their alliance to maintain its coherence and efficiency. Members must also be open to continuous adaptation to remain in harmony with the developments occurring in the region, bearing in mind that alliances are established to defend the national interests of the parties, meaning aligned visions between the parties strengthen the alliance. Through their foreign policies, states aim to first and foremost protect their own interests, and their decision to enter an alliance stems from this.
Shortage of Resources
The fifth and final factor centers on regional powers’ focus on reaping the benefits of alliances in the event of diminished resources. Consequently, many countries in the Middle East and other regions enter alliances when they become aware that their resources are insufficient to face their problems or achieve their goals, or they are in need of protection from external threats. The purpose of the alliance therefore is to achieve common goals, face common opponents, or both. Issues begin to arise within alliances when there are numerous goals that need to be achieved but the allied parties’ priorities do not align, causing the alliance to become less effective and impactful.
In conclusion, managing alliances in the region has become similar to managing conflict, requiring pragmatic policies by the involved nations. The existence of alliance does not equate congruent visions on regional issues, but rather requires the acceptance of what can be called incomplete interests, imposed by rapid transformations that have occurred over the last decade. These changes include the rapid rise and fall of militias, terrorist organizations, leaders, and political movements, as seen during the 2011 revolutions across the Arab world. It has become evident that differences within alliances in the region have become common. The real challenge when it comes to shaking the foundations of alliances is one party switching their stance from ally to opponent or vice- versa, in relation to an issue which is of vital interest to another member of the alliance. This leads an alliance to become inoperative, and the interests within it are no longer balanced, which gives rise to a serious reconsideration by its members of whether to remain in the alliance or not.