The escalation of discontent in Iran is due to Iran’s decreased share in the reconstruction efforts in Syria, which can be attributed to several factors. These factors include Iran’s diminishing position compared to its competitors, criticism of the policies implemented by the Rouhani government, the increasing impact of US sanctions on both Syria and Iran, the sluggish progress in rebuilding efforts, and doubts surrounding the intentions of the Syrian regime.
Iran and Syria: Policy partners, but not in economics
Iran has increasingly prioritized its involvement in reconstruction efforts in Syria, recognizing the potential economic gains and opportunities to further solidify its influence within the Syria. This shift in focus comes after Iran successfully altered the balance of power in Syria in favor of the Syrian regime. The recent improvement in relations between Syria and several Arab nations, notably the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia from the Gulf Cooperation Council, has further intensified Iran’s interest in this matter. Many in Iran believe that this positive development will pave the way for these countries to participate in the reconstruction operations as well.
In this particular context, it is worth highlighting that there are significant developments in Iran’s engagement in Syria, particularly in the operations linked to infrastructure development. On April 26, 2023, Mahdi Bazarbash, the Minister of Roads and Cities Building Iran, visited Syria where he had a meeting with President Bashar al-Assad. During this meeting, an agreement was reached between Iranian and Syrian officials, stipulating that Iran would annually send 50 thousand tourists to Syria and actively contribute to the completion of the “Shalamjah-Basra” railway project. This railway project aims to connect Iran to the port of Latakia in Syria. Furthermore, plans were made to establish three Iranian free trade zones in Syria during the subsequent phase. As part of the visit, a joint Syrian-Iranian Economic Committee convened to discuss various projects, with the participation of officials from both nations. The agenda of the meeting primarily focused on sectors such as the economy, oil, housing, industry, electricity, and insurance.
The visit of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi to Syria on May 3 marked a significant milestone in enhancing bilateral relations. During this visit, Syria and Iran solidified their commitment to cooperation by signing 15 agreements. These agreements encompassed various sectors, such as agriculture, railways, marine certificates, free trade zones, and oil. Notably, a memorandum of understanding was established to foster collaboration in the agricultural sector, while another memorandum focused on the recognition model in marine certificates. Additionally, the two countries agreed to cooperate in the development of railways, free zones, and the oil industry. This visit and the subsequent agreements signed between Iran and Syria have played a pivotal role in strengthening their partnership.
However, there is growing discontent within Iran regarding the limited benefits it receives from its involvement in the reconstruction efforts in Syria. Despite the significant financial burden Iran has shouldered to support President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and tilt the balance of power in his favor, the returns on this investment have been meager. In an interview with the newspaper “Istaqa” (Al-Thiqa), a member of the Iranian Islamic Shura Council’s Foreign Policy and National Security Committee, Hashamallah Allah, expressed his criticism of the exorbitant amount of money Iran has spent in Syria, estimated at $30 billion. He referred to this expenditure as “outstanding debts” owed by Syria to Iran, and it remains uncertain how the Iranian government plans to resolve this issue.
On September 8, Hussein Ali Haji Dlegani, a member of the Judicial Committee in Parliament, dismissed the significance of Iran’s involvement in the reconstruction efforts in Syria. He emphasized that the countries responsible for instigating and fueling the Syrian war now hold the reins in the country’s reconstruction.
The Considerations in Syria
Rising resentment in Iran is due to the reduced share of Iran share in the reconstruction operations as a result of several variables, most prominently is:
1- Iran’s prospects in other nations are diminishing: Multiple factions in Iran note that Iran has been unsuccessful in bolstering its military and cultural presence in Syria over the past twelve years. This failure has hindered Iran’s ability to expand its economic influence and secure a larger portion of the reconstruction efforts. Essentially, these factions argue that Iran’s focus on strengthening its military presence in Syria, whether to support the Syrian regime or to maintain influence, has come at the expense of maximizing economic gains. This is particularly significant considering Iran’s recent economic recovery, driven by increased production and oil exports.
2- Criticism of the former Iranian government: It is noteworthy that certain factions within Iran perceive the current situation as a setback in Iran’s ability to secure a significant share of reconstruction projects in Syria. This perception is attributed to the policies implemented by the administration of former President Hassan Rouhani, which coincided with the escalation of the Syrian crisis between 2013 and 2021. As per the statements made by Ruhullah Latifi, the spokesperson for the International Relations and Foreign Trade Development Committee, on May 3, 2023, Iranian exports to Syria during the previous decade of the Syrian crisis (2001-2011) amounted to $2.476 billion. However, from 2011 to 2021, this figure dropped to $1.281 billion. Latifi further revealed that with the advent of the current administration in 2021, Iranian exports reached $218 million, which subsequently increased to $243 million in 2022.
According to the aforementioned statistics, it can be inferred that the economic cooperation between the governments of President Rouhani and Syria was not prioritized. However, recent trends suggest that Rouhani recognized the need to address this issue in order to mitigate the excessive military dominance of the Revolutionary Guards within Syria throughout the Syrian crisis.
Nevertheless, these figures highlight the inability of both past and present governments to undertake substantial measures aimed at enhancing the level of economic cooperation. The policies implemented by these governments failed to position Iran as Syria’s primary trade partner.
3- The escalating Western sanctions on Iran have had significant implications. Specifically, the sanctions imposed by the United States on both Syria and Iran have directly impacted the ability to conduct financial transfers. This obstruction has hindered the participation of various parties in reconstruction efforts and has allowed other countries to expand their contributions to these operations. Consequently, these countries have been able to secure substantial economic gains by signing significant economic agreements with Syria. It is important to note that the United States imposed sanctions on Iran on August 7, 2018, following its withdrawal from the nuclear agreement on May 8 of the same year. Additionally, the “Caesar” law was implemented on Syria on December 17, 2019.
4- Delay in the Construction of the Road Linking Iran, Iraq, and Syria: Iranian reports suggest that the lack of progress in establishing a land route connecting Iran, Iraq, and Syria has hindered the expansion of economic relations between Iran and Syria. Consequently, Iran’s involvement in reconstruction efforts has been limited. This issue is further exacerbated by the presence of foreign forces near the proposed road, which Iran utilizes for military support transfers. The presence of these foreign forces may impede the construction of the road, thereby creating additional obstacles for Iran’s endeavors to enhance economic cooperation with Syria in the foreseeable future. Iran has placed its hopes on the transformation of the “Shalamjah-Basra” road into a corridor that can provide access to the Mediterranean, thereby facilitating trade through the port of Reconstruction.
5- Skepticism regarding the intentions of the Syrian regime persists. While numerous Syrian officials have acknowledged their desire to enhance Iran’s involvement in the reconstruction efforts, viewing it as one of the key supporters of the regime throughout the crisis years, it is plausible that the Syrian regime also harbors a willingness to grant Iran an expanded presence in the reconstruction domain. Although the Iranian military presence within Syria has played a significant role in altering the balance of power in favor of the Syrian regime, this does not negate the fact that the regime has become increasingly uneasy about the profound social and cultural influence exerted by Iran within Syria. Consequently, the regime’s attempts to broaden its relations with Arab nations can be interpreted as an endeavor to alleviate the mounting pressure imposed by Iran’s presence in Syria. The Syrian regime’s objective is not to withdraw Iran’s military presence from Syria, but rather to diminish the associated costs and burdens.
Constant Changes in Syria
Given the persistent criticisms, President Ibrahim Raisi’s administration is likely to intensify its endeavors to increase Iran’s prospects of securing a larger share in the reconstruction process within Syria in the upcoming phase. This is particularly crucial as President Raisi, akin to his predecessors, aspires to secure a renewed presidential term in the 2025 elections. However, it is important to acknowledge that numerous obstacles may significantly influence the extent to which Iran will be able to acquire a portion of these operations in the subsequent phase.