The Syrian regime’s hesitance to directly intervene in the ongoing war in Gaza can be understood through several considerations. Foremost among these is the desire to avoid escalating Israeli and American responses, responding to Hamas’s position on the 2011 crisis, attempting to leverage the war for opening up to the West, and aligning with Russian and Iranian strategies regarding the conflict.

Notably, among all of Iran’s allies, the Syrian regime specifically refrained from any form of involvement in the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas following the latter’s military operation against the former on October 7th. While several attacks were launched from the Golan Heights against Israel, attributed to Palestinian militias present in Syria, the regime did not engage even by issuing supportive statements for Hamas against Israel. Despite Hamas’s continued robust strikes against sites affiliated with Israel, Iran, and pro-Iranian militias inside Syria—such as the recent strike on November 9th targeting Syrian army depots in the southern Sweida province—the Syrian regime has not openly endorsed such actions.

This approach taken by the Syrian regime carries significant implications, suggesting that it permits other militias to directly participate in the war without risking its own direct involvement. Such a decision may be influenced by pressures arising from the sway these militias hold on Syrian territory.

The Syrian regime’s stance can be deciphered in light of several considerations, with the most notable ones being:

1- Avoiding Escalation Beyond Tel Aviv and Washington: The Syrian regime may perceive that direct involvement in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas could expose it to more formidable military strikes, emanating from both Israel and the United States. The concern extends beyond mere “punitive strikes,” akin to Israel’s attacks on Syrian depots and sites due to Syria allowing launches of attacks from its territory. It could potentially lead to strikes capable of weakening the regime itself, posing a direct threat to its future in governance.</li></ol>

While Israel and the United States refrained from actively pursuing the downfall of the Syrian regime post the onset of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, each for its own reasons and acknowledging that toppling the regime would entail “facing the unknown” in Syria, recent developments introduced by Operation “Flood of Al-Aqsa” might have shifted Israeli calculations. This could prompt Tel Aviv to work on increasing the cost of any direct military action by the regime against it, a factor that the regime appears to have taken into account in its assessment of the unfolding events in the Israel-Gaza confrontation.

2- The Impact of ‘Unspoken Contrasts’ with Hamas: The current stance of the Syrian regime regarding the ongoing war in Gaza cannot be divorced from its broader relationship with Hamas. The regime may still take into account the previous position adopted by Hamas after the crisis erupted in March 2011 when the movement aligned itself with opposition factions, influenced by Qatar and Turkey. During that time, Hamas supported efforts to overthrow the regime, closed its offices in Damascus, and relocated to other capitals such as Doha and Ankara.</li></ol>

Despite shifts in power dynamics within Syria favoring the Syrian regime in recent years and changes in policies adopted by various forces towards it, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Hamas has been compelled to alter its policy towards normalizing relations. This shift became evident in the meeting between Khalil al-Hayya, the head of the Arab and Islamic Relations Office in Hamas, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during the visit of Palestinian faction delegations to Damascus on October 19, 2022. However, it does not appear to have prompted the Syrian regime to once again alter its cautious approach towards relations with Hamas. This cautious approach may play a role in shaping the Syrian position on the ongoing war unfolding in the Gaza Strip.

3- Enhancing the Prospect of Reengagement with Washington: With a shift in the power dynamics on the ground favoring the Syrian regime, and no imminent threat to its stability, it has become clear that the regime’s priorities are now centered on reestablishing relations with the external world, be it with regional states or certain international powers, especially the United States.</li></ol>

Syria’s relations have indeed shown signs of improvement with several key Arab nations, as underscored by President Bashar al-Assad’s participation in the Arab Summit held in Riyadh on May 19 of the past year. Nevertheless, Western capitals remain adamant about adopting a stringent policy regarding any openness to the Syrian regime, despite concurrently maintaining security channels with it to address the challenges posed by terrorist organizations and the return of individuals from conflict zones.

In this context, adopting a more neutral stance towards the ongoing war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas could potentially be a strategic move that the Syrian regime might consider exploiting in a later stage to achieve this vital objective. This is especially pertinent given the steadfast support from Western countries to Israel in the current conflict, potentially making them more amenable in the future to taking affirmative steps towards parties that refrained from intervening in favor of Hamas.

4- Iranian and Russian Pressures: The Syrian regime’s stance on the Gaza war is closely tied, predominantly, to the considerations of both Iran and Russia. While both nations have declared support for Hamas and hosted delegations from the group, they have been cautious about direct involvement in the conflict. Iran, in particular, has emphasized on multiple occasions that it was not implicated in planning the ‘Flood of Al-Aqsa’ operation and asserted a lack of influence over what it terms the ‘resistance factions.

In this context, Moscow and Tehran may have reasoned that the Syrian regime’s entry into the current conflict could complicate and entangle the situation in Syria. Moreover, it might provoke robust military responses from Tel Aviv and Washington, potentially disrupting the existing power dynamics.

Additionally, Russia has been careful to avoid escalating tensions with Israel to a degree that could impact the ongoing military coordination between the two within Syria. This coordination has allowed Israel to carry out military strikes against Iranian sites, the Syrian regime, and its allied militias. Russia has also sought to prevent Israel from heightening its military support for Ukraine in the current escalating conflict, in response to Russia’s backing of Hamas.

Deferred Scenarios

In light of these considerations, it can be asserted that the Syrian regime, following a similar approach to Iran, aims to leverage the current war as an opportunity to secure strategic gains that could facilitate what might be termed an ‘international recalibration.’ However, the regime’s calculations will inevitably be intertwined with those of Iran and Hezbollah. While both parties are presently focused on managing the escalation levels with Israel, this will hinge on two pivotal factors: firstly, the new insights stemming from the Gaza war, particularly concerning Hamas’s military capabilities and the extent of its vulnerability amid the ongoing conflict. Secondly, the likelihood of Israel shifting its focus to target other proxies in a subsequent phase, once the current mission in Gaza concludes—a mission that remains uncertain due to the ambiguity surrounding the trajectory of the ongoing Israeli military operation within the sector.