The organization known as “Al-Qaeda” is currently grappling with a turbulent reality, 22 years after the events of September 11 in the United States. This turbulence arises from several factors: a leadership crisis at the highest level following the American president’s announcement of the death of the organization’s leader, the absence of a new generation of ideological leaders, shifts in ideology from targeting the West to focusing on local issues, a diminishing operational role for the central leadership, and the possibility of rebuilding networks after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Furthermore, there is a notable disparity between the activities of the organization’s branches and affiliated groups, an ongoing violent conflict between “Al-Qaeda” and “ISIS,” and a shift towards rebuilding networks in the West, often exploiting incidents like the burning of the Quran in Sweden and Denmark.

Despite the passage of 22 years since the September 11 events, the most pressing question for the United States and European countries remains: Does “Al-Qaeda” still pose a threat? This question extends beyond the organization’s capacity to carry out terrorist operations within the United States and Western countries, regardless of their scale and impact; it also pertains to the threat it poses to the interests of these foreign nations.

In general, the past decade has witnessed a significant decline in the organization’s operations in Western countries, with a few exceptions tied to the organization, such as the attack on the offices of the “Charlie Hebdo” newspaper in 2015 following the publication of offensive cartoons of the Prophet, and an incident at a military base in Florida in 2019, both linked to the organization’s branch known as “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.”

Navigating the Complex Realities of Al-Qaeda

The current state of the “Al-Qaeda” organization can be better understood by examining various dimensions that have evolved over the past two decades of counter-terrorism efforts. These dimensions encompass:

1. Leadership Crisis Following Al-Zawahiri’s Death: The organization is grappling with a significant leadership vacuum at its highest echelon, specifically the position of its leader, after Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in a U.S. drone strike targeting his residence in Kabul. This announcement came from U.S. President Joe Biden in early August 2022. The organization has neither confirmed nor denied this account.

The absence of any clarification or announcement regarding al-Zawahiri’s successor after more than a year underscores a profound crisis within the organization. It suggests the possibility of a lack of consensus on the new leader’s identity, particularly with the emergence of the name “Saif al-Adl,” believed to be under house arrest in Iran. This raises questions about his leadership and Tehran’s potential influence on the organization’s direction and decision-making.

Furthermore, the organization is grappling with the absence of prominent figures from its older generation, many of whom were involved in opposing Soviet and later American forces. Most of these figures have been eliminated in various conflict zones, notably in Syria and Yemen in recent years. Some of these losses might be linked to internal disputes within the organization, particularly at the branch level.

2. Limited Activity of the “Central Leadership” in Afghanistan: Concerns have grown following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan about the potential resurgence of the “Central Leadership” historically concentrated between Afghanistan and Pakistan, coinciding with the targeting of al-Zawahiri in the Afghan capital.

While debates persist regarding the impact of the American withdrawal on the growing threats associated with “Al-Qaeda,” it is unlikely to lead to operational activities by the organization under the purview of the “Central Leadership.” Nonetheless, this development grants the organization and its leaders greater freedom of movement, evident through increased media activity, including the release of numerous statements attributed to al-Zawahiri in the period leading up to the American withdrawal.

In this context, the organization can capitalize on reduced pressure to rebuild and strengthen its networks emanating from Afghanistan, without direct involvement in Afghan affairs or interference with the operational activities of the “Taliban” movement in Pakistan. The “Taliban” movement has regained its momentum following its assumption of power in Afghanistan. Notably, historical links exist between the organization and certain violent Islamist groups in the Afghan and Pakistani regions, particularly in India. Additionally, there are efforts to exploit the Kashmir crisis and the Uighur crisis in China.

3. Shortage of a New Generation of Ideologues: The crisis facing the “Al-Qaeda” organization extends beyond the demise of its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and one of its founders. It also grapples with the challenge of nurturing a new generation of ideologues, both at the strategic and ideological levels. This dilemma arises from the loss of prominent ideologue leaders associated with the “Salafi-jihadist” ideology, such as Abu Yahya al-Libi and Anwar al-Awlaki. These figures contributed significantly to shaping the ideological framework of violent Islamist movements, akin to the contributions of Abu Musab al-Suri. Their ideas continue to reverberate within the broader landscape of “global jihad” projects.

Nevertheless, there have been emerging leaders willing to shoulder this role, exemplified by figures like Ibrahim al-Qosi, a leader in the organization’s Yemeni branch, who dedicates some of his communications to ideological orientations.

Extremist terrorist organizations depend on ideologues to propagate the organization’s ideals, attract fresh recruits, and foster internal cohesion, particularly given the challenges “Al-Qaeda” faces and the sustained Western pressure to target the organization’s leaders in certain active theaters.

4. Ideological Evolution in “Al-Qaeda’s” Focus: Although “Al-Qaeda” has reduced its emphasis on targeting the West in its rhetoric, this remains a fundamental element of the organization’s ideology and a cornerstone of its founding principles. This stance is evident through its commitment to confronting what some of its proponents view as the “distant enemy,” represented by the United States and Western nations, seen as the principal hindrance to implementing Islamic Sharia law according to their vision. Concurrently, they support the governing regimes in countries where Muslims constitute the majority.

Following the events of September 11, 2001, and a series of operations in European nations, “Al-Qaeda” shifted its focus away from targeting the West in favor of engaging with local issues in select countries. This transformation gained momentum after the waves of protests that swept through the Arab region in 2011 and the subsequent rise of various Islamist currents. These developments led “Al-Qaeda” to adopt an agenda grounded in local concerns, adapting to evolving dynamics. Consequently, the organization adopted a more decentralized approach in its relationship between the “Central Leadership” and various branch leaders while maintaining the flexibility to issue general directives.

The ideology of the “Al-Qaeda” organization is now characterized by a dual approach. It leverages each of these approaches within the context of specific issues, allowing the organization to simultaneously pursue both orientations while continuing to prioritize local matters, as various branches remain preoccupied with domestic challenges.

5. Efforts to Reestablish Networks in the West: In the latter part of the previous year, it became evident that the “Al-Qaeda” organization was making attempts to exploit the incidents involving the burning of the Quran in Sweden and Denmark. They did so by issuing a statement that called for retribution within the realm of propaganda. The organization continued to release statements addressing recent events relevant to Muslims. However, the statement from August 13, 2023, marked a shift in the organization’s approach. It not only called for revenge but explicitly urged Muslims residing in Western countries to establish cells for the execution of terrorist operations.

In this statement, the organization laid out several general guidelines, with each cell comprised of three individuals as part of what they termed a “general mobilization” aimed at launching significant jihadist operations. Notably, this call was not restricted to Muslims in Sweden and Denmark but encompassed Muslims residing in various Western nations. This signifies “Al-Qaeda’s” endeavors to rebuild its networks within Western countries, which have been a target since the preceding decade following a series of terrorist attacks in various European nations after the events of September 11.

Additionally, within the context of this call, “Al-Qaeda” expressed a desire to establish multiple cells, both within individual countries to evade detection and dismantling by security agencies, and to prevent the exposure of all cells in case one of them is discovered, while also seeking to extract information from its members.

6. Disparities in the Activities of Affiliated Groups: Beyond the “Central Leadership” of the “Al-Qaeda” organization, there are variations in the levels of operational activity among its branches and affiliated groups, which can be categorized as follows:

Most Active: Al-Nusra Front in the Sahel region and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Somalia and the Sahel region are among the African areas with the highest recorded levels of violent activities attributed to terrorist organizations.

Moderately Active: The organization’s branch in Yemen, which has been making efforts to restructure its ranks and initiate a new phase of violence with a focus on military components in southern Yemen over the past year.

Less Active: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, an affiliate of the organization, faces dual pressures from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the airstrikes carried out by the international coalition against “ISIS,” led by the United States. Additionally, the “Al-Qaeda” branch in the Indian Subcontinent, officially established in 2014, has limited operational capacity.

7. Ongoing Conflict with ISIS: Since 2013, Al-Qaeda has been engaged in a conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), stemming from a crisis involving the group known as Jabhat al-Nusra. Initially, Jabhat al-Nusra had pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, but Al-Qaeda refused to endorse al-Zawahiri’s directives. Disagreements and tensions escalated between Al-Qaeda and ISIS in 2014 after ISIS declared the establishment of what it referred to as the “caliphate.”

This dispute between Al-Qaeda and ISIS extended beyond the borders of Syria, encompassing multiple countries with ongoing terrorist activities, particularly as some organizations and groups loyal to Al-Qaeda shifted their allegiance to ISIS. Despite differing strategies and tactics, ISIS sought to broaden its influence and assume leadership of the “global jihad” project.

Although ISIS lost the territories it controlled in Iraq and Syria by 2017 and 2019, respectively, and experienced the death of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in late 2019, it remained a formidable competitor to Al-Qaeda, especially in Africa. The African continent witnessed intense conflicts between groups affiliated with both organizations, particularly in the Sahel region. This rivalry escalated further after ISIS restructured its branch, known as “Wilayat al-Sahel,” in 2022, and managed to expand its areas of control during 2023. This expansion was achieved by specifically targeting regions under the influence of the Al-Qaeda branch known as “Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam.” A report by United Nations experts confirmed these developments in the Sahel region.

The Capability Controversy

Despite a marked decline in Al-Qaeda’s operations targeting the United States and Western countries, the organization still presents a threat through the potential for limited operations conducted by individuals who are loyal to it or influenced by its propaganda, leveraging grievances to further its cause. Although these operations in the West remain limited in scope, there exists an ongoing debate regarding the organization’s capacity to execute such actions or whether it refrains from doing so to avoid rekindling hostilities with Western nations. This debate persists in light of the significant losses it has endured over the past two decades, following the 9/11 attacks.

Nonetheless, the threat continues to hold significance for the interests of Western countries. Responses to addressing the organization’s branches exhibit variation, with a concentration on operations against its branches in Syria, Yemen, and Somalia, in contrast to reduced engagement with other branches, particularly in Africa.