Washington’s Motives in Targeting the Turkish Drone Sector – The Arab Wall
Washington’s Motives in Targeting the Turkish Drone Sector

Washington’s Motives in Targeting the Turkish Drone Sector



  Washington has for the first time moved to take action against the Turkish drone industry, suggesting that Washington aims to raise the level of restrictions on the Turkish military sector, thereby widening the areas of contention with Ankara. The Biden administration, on December 27th of 2021, signed a defense bill that allows the US government to track and assess the national security implications of the expansion of Turkey’s drone program. The law also allows the US State Department and the Pentagon to report on Turkish drone exports since 2018 and whether those drones contain parts or technology made by US companies. 

US members of Congress have been calling on the US administration to intervene to monitor and restrict Turkey’s military programs, especially drones. In August, 27th of last year, members of Congress expressed concerns about the Turkish drone program and called on US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to suspend military export permits to Turkey until it is confirmed that the Turkish drone program is free of any US technology. In parallel, the Chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Bob Menendez, introduced a bill to closely monitor Turkish weapons programs.

In December 2020, former US President Trump’s administration had imposed sanctions on the Turkish Defense Industries Administration, with the consensus of Congress, pursuant to Article 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), due to its acquisition of the Russian S400 missile defense system. The sanctions included a ban on granting US export licenses or permits to the Turkish Defense Industries Administration, and a freeze on the assets of its director and three other associated individuals.

This latest move by the US to monitor Turkish drone exports comes in the context of escalating disputes between the two countries, the latest of which was at the end of October 2021, when Washington refused to respond to a Turkish request for 40 F16 combat aircraft, and for the upgrading of 80 aircraft. It can be said that the Biden administration chose the timing of these moves for several main considerations, including:

Turkey’s supply of arms to conflict zones: The Biden administration’s decision to block Turkey’s drone exports is related to Ankara’s increasing involvement in regional conflicts, and providing military supplies, especially drones, to certain parties in these conflicts. Turkey supported the Libyan Government of National Accord in its confrontations with the forces of eastern Libya in 2019. It provided support to the Azerbaijani government in its 2020 conflict with Armenia, and supplied the Addis Ababa government in November 2021 with drones, enabling it to overcome the Tigray forces in the civil war which erupted in Ethiopia that year.

The use of Turkish drones  successfully changed the trajectory of these conflicts ,  thereby strengthening  Ankara’s position in its disputes with US allies, namely Cyprus and Greece, regarding the exploitation of energy deposits in the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas. Washington’s concerns are understandable, as these successes encouraged Turkey to disregard regulatory restrictions imposed by the US, and to adopt an open-door policy regarding arms sales, whereby it makes them available to any country able to pay for them. US fears were exacerbated by the Turkish president’s confirmation in early 2021 that his country had received requests from European countries to purchase Turkish drones, including the Bayraktar, and Phoenix aircraft.

Improved capabilities of Turkish defense industry: President Biden’s ratification of the bill to monitor, track, and evaluate the potential effects of the Turkish drone program on US national security coincided with president of Turkey’s Defense Industries Administration, Ismail Demiral’s announcement on December 25th,  of last year, that the Turkish Hisar air defense system trials had ended successfully, and that the system is ready to go online. The system has the capability to destroy warplanes, drones, helicopters, and ballistic missiles, and it will be used to protect Turkish strategic facilities. The US bill may therefore be a move towards placing a break on the progress of Turkish defense industries sector. Furthermore, the Biden Administration requested the State Department last December to determine whether Turkey’s exports represent a violation of the Arms Export Control Act.

These efforts to place limits on the Turkish arms industry appear consistent with previous moves by the administration, as it imposed on December 15th, 2021, a series of restrictions on companies in Turkey. The US Department of Commerce placed companies in Turkey, Georgia, and Malaysia on a blacklist, claiming they supply or attempt to supply US-origin products to provide support to the Iranian defense industry. In a statement, the ministry considered these measures in violation of US export control rules.

Failure to overcome contentious bilateral issues: The signing of this latest bill regarding the Turkish drone industry indicates that tensions between the two countries have not abated.  The direct talks  between Erdogan and Biden on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Brussels last June, as well as their meeting last October on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Rome, appear to have failed to achieve a major breakthrough in this respect.

There are major contentious issues between Ankara and Washington, at the forefront of which is Washington’s continued opposition to Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile system and its rejection of repeated Turkish demands to extradite the head of the Hizmet movement Fethullah Gulen, whom President Erdogan accuses of orchestrating the failed coup in Turkey in the summer of 2016. The fraught atmosphere between the two countries continues due to Erdogan’s objection to US support for the Syrian Kurds, especially the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Ankara classifies as a terrorist group and considers an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The tension also reached its peak after Washington aligned with Cyprus and Greece, against Turkey, regarding tensions in the eastern Mediterranean.

Rising domestic tension in Turkey: Washington’s efforts to restrict the Turkish defense sector, cannot be separated from its concerns regarding domestic tension in Turkey, due to the deteriorating TRY exchange and the decline in economic indicators, which have led  the opposition to call for early elections.

It can be argued that the US is  sending a message  that Turkey may witness more tension in its foreign relations, especially with Washington, because of Erdogan’s policies. It also may be signaling openness to Erdogan’s opponents, especially as President Biden had previously criticized Erdogan’s authoritarian practices, and his restriction of freedoms. In an interview with The New York Times in December 2019, President Biden stressed the need to support the Turkish opposition, describing Erdogan as a tyrant.
 President Biden’s signing of the bill regarding the Turkish drone industry may add to the tensions in bilateral relations, but Turkey’s pragmatism may lead it to adopting a flexible stance, to contain the fallout and reduce tensions, in view of its complex and intertwined interests with the US. Such a flexible stance was implied in the statements of the Turkish presidential spokesman, who indicated on December 30th that his country sent a message to Washington regarding the establishment of a mechanism to address contentious issues between the two countries. He stressed that the relationship between the two countries has a long history, and that they are NATO allies.