Iraq has been grappling with a severe electricity crisis for over two decades, marked by persistent disruptions in its infrastructure. This prolonged struggle has made the country increasingly vulnerable to acts of sabotage in recent years. Notably, in July and August 2023, there has been a resurgence of attacks specifically targeting the electricity sector. This has ignited various speculations regarding the motives behind these operations and the individuals or groups responsible.

There are several potential explanations for these attacks. One possibility is that Iran is using them as a means to convey a message to Baghdad. This message could be a warning to halt its efforts to establish closer ties with Gulf states, as Iraq pursues the importation of electricity and liquefied natural gas from these neighboring nations. Another angle to consider is an internal dispute, possibly aimed at encouraging the Kurdistan region to adopt a more flexible approach in its dealings with Baghdad within the energy sector. Additionally, there remains the ominous possibility that these attacks could be orchestrated by ISIS.

In recent times, a series of sabotage operations have taken place across various regions of Iraq, specifically targeting the electricity sector’s infrastructure. The perpetrators responsible for these attacks have not been definitively identified. This information has been disclosed through data released by the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, covering the months of July and August 2023. The incidents are detailed as follows:

On July 22nd, an act of sabotage occurred on the electrical power transmission line connecting power lines in the Khour Al-Zubair district to the Rumaila gas station in the southern Basra province of Iraq. The line was subjected to gunfire, resulting in its disconnection.

On July 24th, sabotage targeted the electrical power transmission line located in northwestern Baghdad, specifically in the Al-Hamamiyat area. Firearms were used in this attack, leading to the line’s disconnection and subsequent power outage.

On July 28th, two power transmission lines, one in northern Samarra – Mulla Abdullah and the other in Dowr – Hawija, were taken out of service due to the targeting of transmission towers with explosive devices in the Rishad district. This action resulted in a decreased power supply in the Kirkuk and Salahuddin provinces.

On August 2nd, a terrorist sabotage act occurred on the high-voltage electrical power transmission line connecting Kirkuk and Diyala. This incident took place in the Wadi Awasaj area near the Anjana checkpoint, causing the line to disconnect from both ends.

On August 3rd, sabotage attacks targeted three high-pressure electrical power transmission lines connecting Diyala and Kirkuk provinces. Additionally, high-voltage lines linking the Doer and Hawija districts in western Iraq were subjected to similar sabotage actions.

It’s important to note that the recent systematic targeting of the Iraqi electricity sector is not an isolated incident. This sector’s infrastructure has experienced numerous acts of sabotage in recent years. Notably, estimates suggest that Iraq suffered a significant loss, with approximately 58% of its electricity generation capacity compromised between 2011 and 2020 (refer to Figure 1).

The targeting of Iraq’s electricity sector ceased when Mohammed Shiaa Al-Sudani assumed the position of Prime Minister on October 27, 2022. During the tenure of his predecessor, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, there was a series of attacks on power transmission lines, particularly during the summers of 2021 and 2022. These attacks exacerbated Iraq’s ongoing electricity crisis. It’s also worth mentioning that these incidents tend to be concentrated during the summer months when temperatures soar.

Speculations Raised

The return of sabotage operations targeting the infrastructure of the Iraqi electricity sector raises several speculations regarding the motives behind these actions and the responsible parties. This can be discussed as follows:

1. It’s important to note that the recent systematic targeting of the Iraqi electricity sector is not an isolated incident. This sector’s infrastructure has experienced numerous acts of sabotage in recent years. Notably, estimates suggest that Iraq suffered a significant loss, with approximately 58% of its electricity generation capacity compromised between 2011 and 2020 (refer to Figure 1).

The targeting of Iraq’s electricity sector ceased when Mohammed Shiaa Al-Sudani assumed the position of Prime Minister on October 27, 2022. During the tenure of his predecessor, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, there was a series of attacks on power transmission lines, particularly during the summers of 2021 and 2022. These attacks exacerbated Iraq’s ongoing electricity crisis. It’s also worth mentioning that these incidents tend to be concentrated during the summer months when temperatures soar.

The establishment of electrical connections with Gulf countries is pivotal in reducing Iraq’s reliance on Iranian power supplies, particularly given the substantial capacity of these newly established connections. These connections are poised to provide Iraq with electricity imports, initially capable of reaching up to 1600 megawatts, with the potential for expansion to 2800 megawatts. This would significantly surpass the agreed-upon supply from Iran, which currently stands at 1200 megawatts through four transmission lines (Khormashahr – Basra, Karkhah – Amara, Kermanshah – Diyala, and Serbil Zahab – Khanaqin).

In this context, it’s noteworthy to mention a statement made by the former Iranian Minister of Energy, Reza Ardakanian, on August 25, 2020. He expressed skepticism about any country’s ability to export electricity to Iraq, deeming it unbelievable due to Iraq’s enduring damage from wars and attacks by terrorist groups. This statement implicitly underscores the vulnerability of Iraq’s energy sector to terrorist operations, potentially hindering cooperation with other countries in this regard.

In a related context, there is a belief that the efforts of Gulf countries to export electricity through Iraq, utilizing the Kurdistan region as a conduit to Turkey, could potentially trigger a crisis for Iran. This is particularly significant given the ongoing tensions between Iran and the Kurdistan region, coupled with Tehran’s ambition to establish itself as a pivotal hub for the transfer and distribution of electricity bridging the East and the West. Hints of this concern were evident in statements made by Iran’s former Minister of Electricity, Majid Namjoo, in June 2012, wherein he expressed Iran’s readiness to engage in electricity exchange and transmission with neighboring countries as a means to reach Europe. Consequently, the active involvement of Gulf countries and Iraq in this endeavor could undermine Tehran’s aspirations to fulfill a similar role.

2. Disrupting Iraq’s Collaboration in the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Sector:

In 2021, Iranian LNG exports, in addition to direct electricity imports, constituted approximately 35% of Iraq’s electricity supply, as reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. This statistic underscores Baghdad’s heavy reliance on Tehran and the resulting impact on its ability to make independent decisions. Consequently, Iraq has resurrected a prior plan to collaborate with Qatar in the production and importation of LNG.

On June 15, 2023, both nations formalized this cooperation by signing a memorandum of understanding for LNG supply. Additionally, they agreed to partner with Qatari firms specializing in the construction of LNG receiving stations and the associated storage tanks. According to Ahmed Musa Al-Abadi, the spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, the anticipated Qatari gas supplies could reach as much as 1.5 million tons annually.

Iraq’s collaboration with Qatar to develop infrastructure for receiving and converting liquefied natural gas (LNG) for electricity generation presents a potential threat to Iran’s energy supplies to Iraq. This development also weakens Iran’s influence over Iraq’s domestic energy landscape, prompting questions about the timing of the recent attacks on the Iraqi electricity sector.

Nonetheless, on August 8, 2023, Iraq’s Minister of Electricity, Ziad Ali Fadel, conveyed a clear message to Iran. He confirmed that the Iraqi government had established a joint committee involving the Ministries of Oil and Electricity. This committee was tasked with visiting Qatar to explore the feasibility of supplying Iraq with LNG through one of its Iraqi ports. Such a move could potentially elicit responses from Iran that extend beyond targeting power grids to impact the oil sector itself. This is especially significant considering that, as of 2019, oil accounted for approximately 70% of Iraq’s electricity generation (refer to Figure 3). Although Iraq’s reliance on Iranian gas has increased, oil remains a fundamental component of its electricity generation mix.

3. Exerting Pressure to Quell Tensions in the Kurdistan Region: The recent sabotage operations on the electricity grids align with the initiation of discussions regarding the approval of the draft Oil and Gas Law. This legislation has faced prolonged delays, primarily due to internal disagreements, notably between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region. The core of the dispute revolves around the management of energy resources within the Kurdistan Region.

It’s crucial to acknowledge that certain factions within the coordination framework appear reluctant to make concessions to the Kurdistan Regional Government, as reported by numerous media outlets. This reluctance opens the door to sending messages to the Kurdistan Region that there is resistance to accommodating their aspirations for managing their energy sector, especially oil, independently from the rest of the country. The significance of this message was underscored by the deliberate targeting of power line towers such as (Erbil-Gazia-Makhmour) and (Erbil-Gazia-Qara Jukh), both situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kurdistan Region.

The mentioned developments serve as a warning that Erbil’s pursuit of greater autonomy through its policies and decisions might eventually result in its disconnection from the broader Iraqi electricity network. It’s worth noting that the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity is actively working to interconnect all provinces into a single, unified electrical grid, with the exception of the Kurdistan Region, as outlined by Chairman of the Parliamentary Electricity and Energy Committee, Mohammed Nouri Al-Abd Rabbo.

This move could exert significant pressure on the Kurdistan Region, particularly when considering its electricity production deficit, estimated at approximately 44%. The collective production capacity of all power stations in the region stands at roughly 3900 megawatts, while the demand for electricity has surged to 7000 megawatts, as reported by Omid Ahmed, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Electricity in the Kurdistan Region, in January 2023.

The Kurdistan Region has a vested interest in adopting a flexible approach towards the approval of the new Oil and Gas Law. Such flexibility is essential to secure a stable electricity supply, particularly from anticipated sources such as the Arab Gulf countries. This becomes paramount because the region’s reliance on Turkey for electricity supplies might carry the risk of sparking a fresh legal dispute. A situation akin to the international arbitration case that Baghdad successfully resolved regarding oil exports from the Kurdistan Region to Turkey could emerge.

4. The Potential Role of ISIS in Targeting the Energy Sector: The likelihood of ISIS engaging in sabotage operations against Iraq’s electrical grid remains a valid concern. This is particularly alarming given that previous attacks on Iraq’s electricity sector during Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s tenure were executed using improvised explosive devices. The organization neither disavowed nor denied its involvement in these operations. In fact, certain members of ISIS openly claimed responsibility for these attacks on social media platforms, prompting Iraqi authorities of that period to confirm ISIS’s culpability.

It’s crucial to note that the modus operandi of these attacks appears consistent, often involving the use of explosive devices to target specific power towers. This pattern could potentially be viewed as a retaliatory response, following an increase in the apprehension of ISIS members in recent times.

It’s important to note that a recent statement from the Iraqi Security Media Cell reported the arrest of a terrorist operating in what is referred to as the Salah al-Din Province, as per the Iraqi National News Agency on August 10, 2023. The statement mentioned the discovery of weapons and explosives in his possession, indicating his intention to target electricity transmission towers on the Baiji-Haditha road within the Salah al-Din Governorate.

This incident underscores the ease and impact of targeting electricity transmission towers, which can have direct and significant negative consequences on Iraqi society. It highlights that such operations can be carried out by ISIS members without the need for complex or meticulously planned logistics and financial support.

Extended Implications

In conclusion, the repercussions of targeting Iraq’s electricity sector infrastructure extend far beyond the immediate harm to citizens. They encompass broader political and strategic dimensions, both domestically and internationally. The Iraqi electricity sector, being a vulnerable point, is frequently targeted as a bargaining chip to advance specific interests and convey distinct messages. The effects of such actions propagate swiftly and the time required for mitigation depends on the extent of the damage.

This adverse situation also places significant pressure on the authorities, necessitating proactive measures to prevent such attacks or urgent efforts to rectify the losses resulting from them. This situation poses a genuine test for the government, and its handling of these challenges could influence its popularity in the coming period.