The Arab region, and the Middle East at large, have felt the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war that has completed its first year. These repercussions were not confined to the countries of the region, but extended to the policies of the powers concerned with, and affected by, this crisis, namely, Russia and the US, as well as the EU and China. Although some indications point to Russia’s faltering in traditional positions of influence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, this does not necessarily suggest a retreat from attempts to develop its influence in what is a strategic region for European and Western powers. On the contrary, there are indications of Russia’s relentless quest for a strong return to the region.
The most important indicators of Russia’s influence in the region relate to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s tours to several Arab states since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. These tours are in preparation for the second Russian-African summit, scheduled for next July in St. Petersburg. It appears that Lavrov has put North African capitals at the center of his tour, from Cairo through Tripoli, Algiers, and Rabat, to Nouakchott, and Khartoum, all of which are strategically located on the African continent, where Europe, Moscow and the US are locked in a fierce geopolitical rivalry.
Multiple effects
The war in Ukraine has reignited interest in the Arab region, and weighed heavily on the intersections of power strategies within the region. This has increased the importance of several Arab and non-Arab regional players in the strategic vision of international powers, namely Russia and the US. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the past year has revealed a number of consequences on Arab states in light of Russian attempts to regain their influence. The following effects are perhaps the most important of these repercussions:
1- The return of American interest to the Arab region: For decades, the Arab region has been at the center of a rivalry for interests and influence between the US and Russia. This rivalry continued until the end of former U.S. President Donald Trump’s term, after which US engagement in the region’s conflicts declined since Biden’s arrival at the White House in January 2021.
However, Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, and the unprecedented rise in oil prices over the past 14 years, prompted the Biden administration to change its foreign policy towards the region, and reprioritize its efforts to counter Russian and Chinese influence in MENA. The presence of competing powers is reflected in Arab countries’ neutral positions, or abstinence from joining international efforts to isolate Russia. The change in the US administration’s position was clearly reflected in Biden’s statement at the Jeddah Security and Development Summit on July 16 that, ” We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran.”
2- Expanding Russian partnerships with Arab countries: Because of escalating Western pressure on Russia, as a result of the war in Ukraine, Russia has amplified its diplomatic activity in the region. Following President Biden’s first visit to the region, last 13-16 July, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Iran on 19 July for a tripartite summit, including Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Russian diplomacy did not stop at Putin’s visit, but was followed by Lavrov’s visit to the region from 24-28 of the same month, including Egypt and some African countries (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Uganda). Lavrov had even delivered a speech at the League of Arab States on 24 July in which he commended the “balanced attitudes taken by the Arab States towards the crisis in Ukraine.”
The amplification of diplomacy is aimed at expanding Russia’s political and economic partnerships with its allies and supporters of its position in Ukraine, particularly MENA states that are either neutral or reject US isolation efforts in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. Russia’s expanded diplomacy therefore attempts to undermine American and European policies aimed at isolating it internationally, particularly in this strategic region of the world.
3- Strengthening Russian influence in the Middle East’s conflict triangle: 2015 could be considered one of the most important milestones in Russian policy towards the region. By entering Syria, Russian military bases in Hamim and Tartus on the Mediterranean coast, came as close as possible to NATO’s southern wing. With the war in Ukraine, Russia will work to ensure that Syria becomes one of its most important anchors in the region indefinitely.
In parallel, Russia’s attempt to provide a logistics base in Port Sudan, as referred to during Lavrov’s visit to Khartoum on Wednesday, February 8th, is an initial phase of a long-term project through which Russia aspires to secure Moscow’s maritime position in Sudan. This helps influence international trade in the Red Sea, which implies Russia’s assumption of a major role in new energy considerations, a large part of which passes through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Additionally, it also allows the possible enhancement of Russian fleets in the Indian Ocean, as nourished by this logistical base, alongside the Tartus base in Syria, allowing Russian vessels to pass through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in order to secure various supplies and logistics.
Russia’s presence in Libya is thus an indication of its role in the vicinity of the Arab crisis triangle. The Kremlin’s announcement of the appointment of a new Russian ambassador to Tripoli at the end of last year, 29 December 2022, could be read as an attempt to preempt possible variables in the resolution of Libya’s decade-long political and security crisis.
4- OPEC Plus and global energy: While European countries are suffering from the decline in Russian energy supplies following the war in Ukraine, some have begun to look to MENA for their energy requirements. Indeed, many states have signed agreements with Arab gas-producing states to promote energy cooperation. For example, Italy signed an agreement with Algeria, making Italy one of the main importers of gas to Europe.
On the other hand, the OPEC Plus will become cornerstone to Russian-Gulf relations, as it proved effective during the war in Ukraine. Indeed, Russia’s massive oil and gas production, in cooperation with the UAE and Saudi Arabia (and Egypt if it so decides), will serve as one of the most important fuel sources in the Middle East, standing close alongside Russia. World energy supplies are now subject to this group’s decisions.
The growing role of the OPEC Plus Alliance, of which Russia is one of the most important members, as well as the major oil-producing countries within OPEC, especially the Gulf Arab states, may guide the course of many crises around the world and constitute a useful leverage for the alliance.
5- Competing Western powers in traditional spheres of influence: In the Gulf, it can be pointed out that the war in Ukraine is not the original catalyst in the course of Russian-Gulf relations and its future. As much as it can be described as an accelerator that stimulates and deepens these relations, that have begun to take shape. Hence, the future of Russian-Gulf relations may become more effective, based on the directives of the Gulf’s position, especially the UAE, vis-a-vis the war in Ukraine.
In the Maghreb region, Moscow is betting on strengthening its relations with its traditional allies, Algeria and Libya. For years, Russia has been launching a pragmatic rapprochement with the Western allied countries, or politically close to them, such as Egypt and Morocco, where Russian relations with the two countries have grown significantly. Russia’s tactics not only compete with Western powers in their traditional positions of influence, but also take into account the tension between North African states in regional conflicts, most notably the Algerian-Moroccan over the Western Sahara.
Possible implications
In this context, the future of Russian influence in MENA, as influenced by the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, is governed by a number of significant determinants, , most notably, Russian efforts to secure its military and political influence over the Mediterranean Sea, and expand across the Red Sea to Port Sudan.
In addition, Russia’s search for strategic cooperation with the Middle East and Gulf states will continue to be one of the most important instruments in which future investments will be maximized, as the war in Ukraine demonstrated the importance of gas and oil as deterrents. In the course of the crisis, given the lacking self-sufficiency of energy-importing countries, Russia has clearly demonstrated the importance of the MENA region. Accordingly, Russia has asserted itself in Syria and Libya, and to some extent Sudan; has fostered good relations with the UAE, Egypt and Algeria, and Turkey; and began a strategic rapprochement with Iran. Russia is thus developing its presence in what is an increasingly strategic region with important geopolitical implications in the navigation of international crisis.