Turkish involvement in Libya is not limited to the military dimension, or the attempt to influence the dynamics of the Libyan conflict, Turkey also has significant economic interests there, that are linked to competition over eastern Mediterranean energy resources. It is therefore striving to gain control over Libyan ports, with some reports indicating that Turkish companies already have a significant presence in the ports and airports of western Libya.

Enhancing presence

An intelligence report, published last August by Africa Intelligence, revealed that two of the largest Turkish contracting companies, Al-Bairaq and Yildirim, have put in place a strategy to gain control over Libyan ports and airports between Misrata and Tripoli. The report noted that Yildirim is preparing an offer to obtain a concession to manage the port terminal in the Misrata Free Zone, Libya’s main shipping center.

The report also noted that the Turkish Karanfil Group announced in a statement late last June that it had started organizing maritime transport trips from Turkey to Libya, “in order to increase the volume of trade between the two countries”. The company transports containers from the Turkish ports of Istanbul, Kocaeli, Samsun, Izmir, Mersin, and Iskenderun to Misrata.

Similarly, Turkish Albayrak Group submitted an offer in July to obtain the concession to manage operations at the Misurata Free Zone, for a period of 25 years. The offer stipulates the development of the region’s infrastructure, with 10% of the revenue to be used to provide financial assistance to companies wishing to establish their presence in the free zone, a condition that could be used to assist Turkish industrial companies.

It is worth noting that Albayrak Group is affiliated with Turkish of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s son-in-law, while the Yildirim is among a portfolio of companies belonging to former Prime Minister and Vice President of the Justice and Development Party Bin Ali Yildirim and his sons. The two companies’ operations in the Misrata Free Zone reflect how they coordinate to establish control over Libyan air and seaports.

Strategic goals

Turkey’s efforts to control Libyan ports serve to achieve several goals, including:

1. Gaining a foothold in the Mediterranean: Ankara is attempting to turn the ports of western Libya into a rear base for Turkish activities in the eastern Mediterranean. This desire was clearly expressed in August 2020, in the Turkish-Qatari agreement with the former Government of National Accord, to activate a port Misurata as a base for Turkish naval vessels operating in the eastern Mediterranean. The tripartite agreement at that time included the establishment of a joint military coordination center, the renovation of security centers and training headquarters in Tripoli with Qatari funding, in addition to allowing Libya to send students to  Turkish and Qatari military colleges.
   
   Turkey has also tried on a number of occasions to use the Al Khums seaport, located on the Mediterranean and classified as one of the best Libyan ports, to supports its presence in the eastern Mediterranean, in the context of using its footholds in Libya as bargaining chips in the escalation competition  in the eastern Mediterranean.
   
2. Maximizing economic gains: Turkey has broad commercial and economic interests with Libya, which are of great importance to the government in light of the significant influence of the business sector in shaping Turkish foreign policy. In addition to providing Turkish companies with opportunities in the Libyan reconstruction process, Turkey also hopes to address a significant decline in the value of its exports, through opening up the Libyan markets to Turkish products, which will be advanced by its control over ports.
   
3. Strengthening its presence in Africa: Turkey’s moves Libyan ports are not separate from its desire to establish a strong strategic presence in Africa, crowding out other regional and global players. Libya’s important geostrategic position, linking the Middle East, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa, will enhance Turkey’s efforts in this respect, especially that the Port of Misrata, the most important Libyan commercial port  handling trade with Africa.
   
   For Turkey, Africa has become an increasingly important arena, for geostrategic, economic and energy-related reasons, as an alternative to its faltering presence in some traditional areas of influence in the Middle East, and its weak chances of gaining accession to the European Union.
   
4. Competition between international powers: Turkey does not view its presence and influence in Libya only in terms of its direct interests in that country. Rather, it perceives  its influence in Libya and its control  of Libyan ports as a tool that will strengthen its position in a broader international competition that extends beyond Libya, to the wider Middle East, eastern Mediterranean and Africa, especially in view of growing competition between major international players over influence within Libya.

Two approaches

Turkey relies on two main approaches to establish its control over Libyan ports:

1. Relying on domestic allies: To secure its interests in western Libya, Turkey has relied on its local allies, especially the former Government of National Accord.  Turkey attempted to legitimize its presence in Libya through the memoranda of understanding signed by the prime minister of the dissolved Government of National Accord Fayez al-Sarraj and President Erdogan on November 27, 2020, granting Turkey freedom to use Libyan airspace and establish military bases, as well as sharing the exclusive maritime zone.
   
   In return, Ankara supported the Government of National Accord with military advisors, drones, and advanced air defense systems, as well as thousands of Syrian mercenaries allied with Ankara. This enabled the Government of National Accord to re-establish control over the Libyan west, including the port facility.
   
2. Appealing to Turkmen minorities : In an attempt to obtain support for Turkish presence in Libya, President Erdogan drew on the legacy of the historical Turkish presence in Libya, claiming it represented an important part of the Ottoman Empire, and that there are a million Libyans of Turkish origin that deserve his support and intervention. These statements reflected Erdogan’s desire to stir up ethnic loyalties to support Turkish presence in this vital region. It is noteworthy that Libyan reports estimate that the number of Libyans of Turkish origin does not exceed 300,000, of whom about 160,000 are in Misrata, with the remainder distributed in some cities in western Libya such as the capital Tripoli, Zliten, al-Zawiya, al-Khums, Tajoura, and Gharyan.
   

In sum, Turkey hopes to utilize Libya’s ports to augment its efforts to become an energy hub, and the pathway through which gas from the Mediterranean reaches Europe. Control of Libyan ports will not only give it economic and commercial gains, this will also give Turkey more leverage when it comes to settling the conflict in Libya, which is a strategic goal for Ankara.