The war between Israel and the Palestinian armed resistance and its effects on regional stability – The Arab Wall
The war between Israel and the Palestinian armed resistance and its effects on regional stability

The war between Israel and the Palestinian armed resistance and its effects on regional stability



On 10 October 2023, the Centre for Arab Research and Advanced Studies organized a panel discussion entitled “War between Israel and the Palestinian Resistance: Implications for Regional Stability.” Attending the were Dr. Samir Ghattas, President of the Middle East Forum for Strategic Studies, and Professor Said Akasha, Associate Expert at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies as keynote speakers. A number of experts and researchers specialized in various areas participated in the session including Dr. Mohammed Ezzz Al Arab, Dr. Mohammed Abbas Naji, Professor Amr Abdulaty, Professor Karam Saeed, Dr. Hamdi Bashir, Professor Ali Atef, Professor Mohammed Omar and Professor Nadine Al Mahdi.

Zero-sum game 

According to Dr. Samir Ghattas, after Hamas’s attack on settlements in the Gaza strip, Israel was subjected to an intelligence breach. He proceeded to discuss the main dimensions of the attack and subsequent Israeli bombardments, most notably:

  1. Underestimating Hamas’ capabilities: Historically, Israel sponsored Hamas in accordance with an Israeli strategy led by Benjamin Netanyahu, to separate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank and allow millions of dollars of money to pass through Tel Aviv. This strategy was seen as a calculated risk, with the Israeli security services under the impression that Hamas simply demands an increase in the number of workers employed in Israel to 20, 000 workers and for an improvement in standards of living, such as an increase in fishing space and the easing of the blockade measures.
  1. Security miscalculation: Prior to the October 7 attack, Israel’s strategy and calculations of Hamas’s capabilities, and its maneuvers with the Jihad resistance, we limited to its ability to fire a series of rockets into the sea. However, the timing of the attack was chosen to restore what happened in 73, and thus, Israel was unable to preempt the attack. Indeed, despite technological capabilities, Israel’s wall failed the test or preventing an attack, which in military affairs is known as a security lapse. 
  1. A greater shock than the ’73 war: Israel was more traumatized in the October 7 attack than in the October 1973 war. Having felt unprecedented humiliation, especially towards the families of Israeli soldiers, and the new generation who view the current landscape as a “new Holocaust.”
  1. A radical change in the equation: The current situation is different from before, as Hamas has reformulated the landscape. Normally, Israel’s responds with bombings, afterwhich it embarks on a truce. However, after Israel’s recent attacks, it seems that Israel is playing a zero-sum game where either Hamas or Israel will be standing. 

This change in dynamics suggests that Israel is preparing to carry out a ground operation and invasion of the Gaza Strip, especially since Israel’s focus in the early days following the Hamas attack was on clearing settlements in the Gaza strip. 

A New Middle East

Ghattas raised a singular question regarding the consequences of the war between Israel and the Palestinian resistance: “What happens after the ceasefire?” Here he suggests a number of transformations:

  1. Forming a new Middle East: The US National Security Adviser’s visit to Saudi Arabia and his meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince, expresses America’s interests to form new relations in the Middle East. One reason for this American trend is what began with former President Barack Obama, whose strategy focused on shifting the American center of gravity to Asia, and gradually withdrawing from the Middle East, because China is the United States’ main threat.

But as China’s economic, technological and military capabilities grew, it started to compete on the Middle Eastern platform, opening up greater tensions with America, especially concerning Saudi Arabia’s financial surpluses, whereby Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, frustrated by the region’s security status, accepted China’s offer to broker agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

In the face of these shifts, the United States has reached a new vision for the Middle East, through the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with the aim of curbing the development of Chinese-Arab relations. Furthermore, Biden’s interest in enhancing his chances for re-election, aims to undermine Russia’s presence in Syria.

  1. Saudi Arabia’s normalization with Israel: In the context of the formation of a new Middle East, Saudi Arabia has tended to finance the Palestinian Authority, and appoint an ambassador to the West Bank, as well as to Israel. Saudi Arabia is striving to strike a balance by receiving Israeli ministers in an attempt to normalize relations. 

Normalization with Israel implied that the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority must give in and board the train. With the US pressuring Israel to offer a reasonable price to justify Saudi normalization, especially since Israel owes the US for its support. 

  1. Israeli government change: Israel’s is run by a far-right government and although Biden refused to meet with Netanyahu, he received him on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, telling Netanyahu, that the Palestinian issue can be separated from normalization with Saudi Arabia, and to freeze settlement expansions.

However, this war ended Netanyahu’s political future, protestors have demanded he be held responsible, and call upon a commission to inquire into the Hamas. Indeed, this war is likely to end the right-wing government, which is in America’s interest, in favor of the opposition like Yair Lapid and Gantz. Thus far Gantz has for the first time beat Netanyahu in Israel’s internal polls.

Suicide Mission

Saeed Okasha agreed with Ghattas about the shock to Israel as a result of Hamas’ attack on settlements bordering the Gaza Strip. He outlined some observations on the war between Israel and Palestinian factions, including:

  1. The Hamas offense is a suicide mission: Hamas’s attack was a coordinated suicide mission that has led to a change in vision, especially since Hamas’ maximum onslaught would be rocket fires that did not involve ground operations.
  1. The element of surprise: the attack shocked the Israeli community. The coordination, organization, and scale of the attack cast the Israeli government in a bad light, leading Israeli voters to blame the Shabak party, the number one institution responsible for Gazan matters, as well as the Mossad and Aman.
  1. The end of Netanyahu’s political future: The Hamas attack ended Netanyahu’s political future. Nonetheless Netanyahu formed an emergency government, and is looking to for redemption that will preserve his legacy and satisfy Israel’s thirst for retaliation. Indeed, Netanyahu is wants to demilitarize Hamas and Jihad, and end the resistance completely. 
  1. Prolonged war with a ground operation: A ground operation may be launched within days, especially with the tactic of dividing Gaza into sectors. Despite Hamas’s possession of prisoners, Israel’s ground troops can comb the area. Hamas miscalculated that if it takes Israeli prisoners, Israel will not strike the strip or target Hamas.

However, the equation has changed, especially since Hamas has launched an attack deep inside Israel, not just rocket fire, and according to Israel, war will take time. For the first time, Israeli society does not care about prisoners, which is Hamas’s miscalculation.

While the Israeli street calls for Hamas’s destruction even if at the expense of the prisoner’s death, Netanyahu has leveraged the US to solve the hostage problem. 

Calculated bargaining

Okasha identifies some of the repercussions of the war between Israel and the Palestinian factions, most notably:

  1. The International Community’s Bargaining for Disarmament: Netanyahu may turn to bargaining for an international decision to disarm Gaza by force and dismantle Hamas and Jihad, by likening the Hamas attack to Pearl Harbor and September 11. 
  1. Saudi Arabia proceeding with normalization: Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel threatened Iran, hoping that the Hamas attack will create uproar and undermine normalization. In one day, Hamas exposed Israeli security failure with an insulting strike that matched the October 73 war. Iran has thus employed the Hamas resistance to halt and undermine normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
  1. Changes in the Middle East equation: America thought that by focusing on Asia to confront China, a pivot could be made in the Middle East. Thus the US administration pushed for relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Although US is doubtful about giving leadership to Israel, the region remains under American gaze. Iran rejects this project, and undermined it by supporting Palestinian factions, to remain pertinent in the Middle Eastern equation. 

The two-state solution has failed: Speaking of Netanyahu’s lack of future, Gantz is not with the two-state solution, but a deal could be offered whereby Palestinians would national status where they live. Whoever rules on this will be the Israeli army and the security services, with disarmament in the Gaza Strip.