Iran does not have a clear vision regarding the potential outcomes of the Turkish presidential elections. It perceives a mix of opportunities and challenges in the event of any candidate winning in the runoff. These include the potential for maintaining a positive relationship with Erdogan based on their previous understanding. There is also the possibility of Kilicdaroglu showing an inclination towards enhancing relations with Western countries, although there are indications that he is still interested in further developing ties with Iran and China. Additionally, there is the potential decline of Erdogan’s Sunni Islamist model.

Iran closely monitored the recent presidential and legislative elections in Turkey, which took place on May 14th. The outcome of these elections led to a runoff between the current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the candidate from the Hexagonal Alliance, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who is the leader of the Republican People’s Party. Iran’s primary concern revolves around the potential impact that the victory of either Erdogan or Kilicdaroglu in the upcoming runoff elections, scheduled for the 28th of the same month, may have on Turkish foreign policy.

Iran went beyond expressing its support for the progress of the electoral process in Turkey. Nasser Kanaani, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasized that the “significant participation of the Turkish people in the presidential and parliamentary elections, and the successful conduct of these elections, signify the triumph of democracy in our neighboring Muslim country.” Additionally, various research centers and media outlets have started discussing the potential opportunities and challenges that may arise from the victory of either candidate in the upcoming second round of the presidential elections, which is scheduled to take place in two weeks.

However, what is remarkable in this context is the clear overlap in Iran’s various perspectives regarding these opportunities and challenges. While Iran acknowledges that Erdogan’s re-election would align with its interests, it does not consider Kilicdaroglu potentially overthrowing Erdogan as a complete loss for itself.

Multiple Considerations 

There are several considerations that can explain Iran’s increasing interest in the Turkish presidential elections and their eventual outcomes. The most prominent considerations include:

1. Despite lingering disputes between Turkey and Iran on various regional issues, the two countries have managed to maintain continuous engagement and understanding since President Erdogan assumed office in 2014. This engagement has played a crucial role in mitigating tensions and preventing escalations that could have negatively impacted bilateral relations. Notably, the Syrian conflict has been a significant focal point. Initially, Turkey supported armed factions and terrorist organizations seeking to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while Iran strongly backed Assad and facilitated his retention of power. However, both countries were eager to participate in the “Astana process,” leading to agreements on numerous security and political arrangements within Syria. Furthermore, Iran is currently involved in efforts to foster relations between Turkey and the Syrian regime, following a period of estrangement lasting over a decade.

Even in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, where Turkey provided significant support to Azerbaijan against Armenia, which in turn received backing from Iran, tensions between the two countries did not escalate. Tehran was cautious not to openly address Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan, despite the fact that this escalation became a prominent factor in its relationship with Azerbaijan, driven by various considerations. Iran does not actively focus on Ankara’s influence in what is referred to as the “Turkish world,” although there are still cautious voices within Tehran that highlight the potential consequences of this expanding influence, which could potentially diminish Iran’s presence in the Central Asian and Caucasus regions.

2. In light of Kilicdaroglu’s relations with the West, Iran expresses concern that he may prioritize the re-establishment of relations with Western countries by alleviating tensions with European nations. These tensions revolve around various issues, including refugees, human rights, the Kurdish question, and the United States’ military cooperation with Russia. Iran perceives a potential outcome where Kilicdaroglu, if elected, could align more closely with these countries regarding their stance towards Iran.

The significance of this is growing, particularly due to the persistent pattern of tension and escalation in Iran’s relations with these countries for various reasons, such as the nuclear program, regional involvement, and human rights violations. Throughout Erdogan’s tenure, Iran has consistently relied on its relations with Turkey to alleviate the impacts of American sanctions, as they have cooperated in this regard. This cooperation has even become a point of contention with the United States, which has accused Turkish banks, including Halkbank, of facilitating Iranian efforts to evade sanctions.

The role that Turkey has played during Erdogan’s tenure may not be guaranteed if Kilicdaroglu emerges victorious. This is due to Kilicdaroglu’s emphasis on revitalizing Turkey’s relations with Western countries and his focus on addressing the various crises caused by Erdogan’s policies.

3. Kilicdaroglu’s pursuit of broadening foreign policy options: In contrast to the aforementioned perspective, alternative viewpoints in Tehran suggest that Kilicdaroglu will not solely rely on Turkey’s relations with the West. In other words, he will not “put all his eggs in the Western basket.” Instead, he will aim to expand the array of available options on the international stage.

In this context, Kilicdaroglu may pursue a dual approach. Firstly, he seeks to uphold strong relations with Iran, asserting ethnic ties through his alleged ancestral roots in Khorasan, Iran, and his religious affiliation as an Alevi. In the event of his victory, he may rely on the alignment of their views concerning the Syrian regime and endeavor to enhance relations with Iran.

Secondly, Kilicdaroglu places importance on strengthening relations with China, as evidenced by his endorsement of revitalizing the ancient Silk Road. This historic trade route traverses Turkey, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and ultimately reaches China.

4. The increasing significance of Iran for Russia: If Kilicdaroglu emerges victorious, it could potentially strain relations with Russia. In response, Russia may seek to strengthen its cooperation with Iran, especially given the harsh sanctions imposed on both countries by Western powers. Ukraine and the nuclear program are the main factors behind these sanctions, respectively. Such a development would align with Iran’s current policy of pursuing a more balanced approach in its relations with Russia and China. This is particularly relevant amidst the intense criticism faced by President Ibrahim Raisi’s government for heavily relying on strong ties with China, which could potentially grant China influence within Iran’s decision-making circles.

5. The decline of the Turkish Sunni model: The Turkish Sunni model gained prominence with the ascent of the Justice and Development Party to power in 2002, a position it has held until the present time. However, during the phase of Arab revolutions and protests, it found itself entangled in a competition between the revolutionary Shiite Iranian model and the Turkish Sunni model influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. This competition was particularly notable in countries where the Muslim Brotherhood held influence, such as Tunisia. In the case of Tunisia, for instance, Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of the Ennahda Movement, remarked after his party received a license in early March 2011 that “Tunisian society sees Turkey as an exemplary model to follow.”

However, alternative viewpoints in Tehran suggest that if Kılıçdaroğlu emerges as the victor in the elections, his emphasis on “secularism” could potentially influence relations with Iran. It is believed that he may have certain motivations that could, at the very least, prevent him from overlooking Iran’s involvement in certain ideologically-driven activities in the region, such as “exporting the revolution” and “supporting the oppressed.”

Priority to Cooperate

Ultimately, Iran is unlikely to place excessive emphasis on the evident policy differences between Erdogan and Kılıçdaroğlu. Its primary focus will be to sustain a cooperative relationship with Turkey in the post-presidential election phase, regardless of who assumes the presidency after the May 28th elections. The existing sanctions imposed on Iran, coupled with its endeavors to enhance relations with regional countries like Egypt and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, demonstrate Iran’s intent to strengthen its ties with Ankara in the foreseeable future.