Turkiye appears to be attempting to entrench its influence over Libya’s western region, perhaps in some form repeating the scenario it followed in eastern Cyprus, taking advantage of the current political divisions in Libya. Libya is strategically important to Turkiye, and it has many interests there, including Oil, Gas, and prospects for direct investment, which have all become more important in view of Turkiye’s current economic problems. Hence Turkiye concluded a maritime agreement with the government of Fayez Sarraj, followed by a memorandum of understanding with the government of Abdel Hameed al-Debeibah, but it is unlikely to succeed in imposing the same level of influence in western Libya that it achieved in eastern Cyprus.
On the 3rd of October, the minister of foreign affairs and international Cooperation in the National Unity Government headed by al- Debeibah, whose term has expired, signed a MOU with her Turkish counterpart Mawloud Tshawih Ogulu, related to oil drilling and exploration in Libya’s national waters. The MOU gives the Turkish government additional privileges in Libya’s energy sector, and rights to explore for gas in areas under contention between a number of Mediterranean countries. Several parties within Libya objected to the signing of the MOU, including the Libyan parliament, and approximately two-thirds of the Libyan national council, which is situated in eastern Libya. Moreover, several regional countries also expressed their objection, including Egypt, Greece, and the EU.
The close relations between Turkiye and successive governments in western Libyan, including the Debeibah government, has raised both local and international concerns of the establishment of an exclusive zone of Turkish influence there, in a repeat of the Cyprus scenario, where both Greece and Turkey engaged directly in conflict over the Island in 1976, resulting in the division of the island, with the northern sector coming under Turkish control in 1983.
Turkiye’s bid for entrenching its influence in western Libya appears to be based on taking advantage of a number of factors, including:
Continued Libyan division: The crisis and divisions in Libya seem set to continue for the foreseeable future, with two competing governments, and two legislative councils, based in western and eastern Libya. Political tension between the two sides continue to escalate, and there appear to be no new proposals on the basis of which the new UN envoy to Libya, Abdullah Batili, could launch a new effort to hold elections.
Continued discord between foreign actors: The major European actors in Libya continue to hold differing and confliction policies towards the situations in Libya, with each country trying to maximize its own gains. In addition to its importance to four major European powers -Italy, Britain, Germany, and France- Libya is also important to both the United States and Russia. This has put the Libyan issue in the crosshairs of the escalating international polarization following the war in Ukraine which is playing out in the UN Security Council. As the different international factions, Russia-China on one hand, and the US-UK-France on the other, each attempt to steer this file in the direction of supporting their own interests, this has given Turkiye an opening to further its own.
On- the- ground Turkish presence: Turkiye has adopted a comprehensive approach in Libya, establishing contacts with all the contending parties there. In addition to his close ties in western Libya, President Erdogan also met in Ankara on August 2, with Parliament Speaker Aguila Saleh and Vice President of the Presidential Council Abdullah Al-Lafi, both prominent political figures based in eastern Libya.
It is worth noting that the Turkish government sought and received the approval of the Turkish parliament for extending the presence of Turkish forces in western Libya for another 18 months, starting last July. These Turkish forces coordinate with armed militias in western Libya, which enhances the influence of those militias as well as Turkish presence there.
Turkish interests
The MOU signed between Turkey and Libya declares the aim of enhancing bilateral cooperation on operational, technical, and technological aspects related to energy and trade issues, but Turkiye has several other objectives, including:
Asserting control over Libyan energy resources: In a joint press conference with his Libyan counterpart, Najla Al-Manqoush, the Turkish Foreign Minister stressed that the MOU with Libya will focus on exploration for oil and gas, in the sea and on land, through joint Libyan-Turkish companies. Turkiye appears to believe that a strong presence in Libya’s energy sector, in cooperation with its Libyan allies, is the only way to gain a strong position in any future negotiations over the future of Libya. And that this justifies the tensions this will cause with Libya’s neighbors, Egypt and Greece.
Making economic gains: Libya represents an opportunity for Turkish businesses in construction, energy, and military manufacturing, which could potentially compensate for some of the losses the Turkish economy suffered as a result of Turkey’s incursions into northern Syria and Iraq, and the general economic crisis it is currently facing.
Strategic importance of Libya
Libya is strategically important to Turkiye’s situation in the eastern Mediterranean, and its successive maritime and energy agreements with governments in west Libya are a response to the cooperation between Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, and Israel to extract gas from the Mediterranean seabed and export it through pipelines to European markets. Hence, the Turkish-Libyan maritime deal aims to strengthen Ankara’s influence on developments in the Mediterranean and prevent the construction of the pipeline without Turkey’s permission.
Libya is also pivotal to Turkiye for ideological reasons as well, as part of its competition to represent Sunni Islam. In Libya, Turkiye the former seat of the Ottoman Sunni Caliphate, is competing with Egypt, which became the center of Sunni Islam after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and is also part of a Sunni alliance with the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Moreover, according to Turkiye’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine, it believes it has rights to a front of 600 km along the Mediterranean coast, positing that its continental shelf connects with Libya, crossing between the Greek islands of Crete and Rhodes. The “Blue Homeland” doctrine contends that that every inch of the sea which it considers to be under Turkish sovereignty is equally sacred to all Turkish territories. This doctrine was formulated by Turkish “ultra-nationalist Kemalist” officers in 2006, who became Erdogan’s partners, and the doctrine has become the basis on which Turkiye formulated its geostrategic objectives in the eastern Mediterranean.
It could therefore be argued that what awaits Libya may be more dangerous than the “Cypriot scenario”. Such a scenario is unlikely to succeed because the situation in Libya is completely different, as the conflict between Greece and Turkiye in Cyprus was primarily over a specific land area. The MOU signed between the Debeibah government and Turkiye, on the other hand, could potentially ignite conflict in the entire eastern Mediterranean region. While Turkish-Greek tensions over regional economic waters, dating back to before 2011, originally concerned fishing rights, it has now expanded into a struggle over oil and gas exploration rights. This will therefore also involve other countries that share a coastline with Libya in the eastern Mediterranean, including Greece, Egypt, and Italy. Libya could therefore be a focal point of a regional conflict over resources involving those countries, and may even draw in France, which is also in competition with Italy over the eastern Mediterranean gas pipeline.