In the current conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), growing fears suspect that armed groups will join either side of the conflict to tip the scale one way one or the other, threatening Sudan’s descent into havoc. After the SAF “suspended” its participation in the Jeddah negotiations on 31 May, and although leaders of armed groups have tried to assume neutrality in the face of the conflict, renewed violence in Sudanese states, such as Darfur, raises greater security and political risks than the military had previously calculated when confronting the RSF. With the inability to implement the Juba Peace Agreement, which was aimed at integrating non-state armed groups into the military, the situation is becoming more and more untenable.

Although the presence of militias as arms of governing powers and opposition is historically commonplace in Sudan, thus far, armed groups have remained impartial to confrontations between the SAF and RSF, and abstained from supporting either side.

Reasons for Neutrality 

Whilst neutrality points to the militias’ abstinence from expanding the scope of the conflict, it also illustrates the following: 

1. An attempt to impose a military rule: Confrontation between the SAF and RSF did not erupt sporadically, and is not the result of a transient dispute between the two military components of Sudan. Rather, this conflict was preceded by many factors that contributed to Sudan’s attempts to impose military rule.

The dispute between former allies Burhan and Dagalo, led each General to reinforce and deploy their respective forces. Prior to this dispute, political transition was proceeding smoothly, until it hit the roadblock of security and military reform. This means that military conflict was rather unexpected. Therefore, its sudden outbreak left armed militia in uncertainty over siding with one flank or the other. 

2. Different viewpoints by armed militia: Protracted tensions between the SAF and RSF led to the removal of the civilian-led government in October 2021. Some armed movements have called for the return to civilian-led rule, whilst others sided with military leadership. This disparity had previously occurred when Burhan, and his then deputy Dagalo, exempted civilian members of the Sovereignty Council so that the governing body became mostly composed of military personnel and leaders of the armed rebel movements who signed the Juba Agreement.

It is true that either party to the Sudanese conflict has allies across armed groups, and may therefore ask its supporters to join their flank. However, to date, all militia and armed groups, both signatories and non-signatories to the Juba Agreement, have called for an end to the conflict and for its political resolution.

3. The presence of armed groups in support of the SAF: Several armed groups supported the SAF, and did not reject the actions adopted by the Transitional Sovereignty Council in October 2021, despite the rejection of these actions by the main civilian-led forces, and a number of other armed movements.

The main proponents in support of the army are the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minawi, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim, as well as Mohammed Al-Amin Türk’s High Council for Beja Nazirs. These groups believe that the SAF has dominion over the RSF, and that it is in their best interest to abstain from engaging in confrontation and assume neutrality, whilst politically supporting the SAF and waiting to see how the situation will evolve. 

4. Ensuring inclusitivity: The Transitional Sovereignty Council signed the Juba Peace Agreement with a number of armed movements on 3 October 2020, which was based on five tracks: the Darfur Track, the East Track and the Northern Sudan Track, as well as the Central Sudan Track, the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile Route.

Because many of these armed movements were seeking gains in power and wealth in the period after Bashir’s ousting, ensuring inclusivity was vital to the political process after the revolution. It seems, these armed groups fear that participation in the conflict could lead to the loss of their political gains after the revolution. 

Negative repercussions

Despite the many factors that have helped armed groups to take a neutral stance on the military conflict, there may be several negative repercussions that could affect their interest and influence, which would undermine their impartiality and force their hand. Perhaps the most significant of these are:

1. Armed movements are fragmented and numerous: Sudan is home to numerous and ethnically diverse armed groups. The SAF does not hold a monopoly on the use of force, and historical injustices and disagreements over issues of marginalization, ethnic differences, and power struggles, have led to ongoing instability and conflict. Accordingly, the separatist movement have consistently called and pushed for national unity, which was the primary demand of the December 18, 2018 revolution.

There are more than 87 armed groups in Sudan, 84 of which are in the Darfur region, according to a UN report in February 2020. The fragmentation and proliferation of armed groups raises serious concerns, and casts a grim shadow over the potential success of stabilization efforts in regions of civil conflict which have lasted over three decades.  

2. The existence of a number of armed groups outside the Juba Agreement: Although the Transitional Sovereignty Council signed a peace agreement with a number of armed groups on 3 October 2020, which was updated on Sunday 19 February, the Agreement does not encompass all the existing forces at play. The lack of complete inclusivity may exacerbate tribal and regional conflicts, particularly in Darfur, Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Perhaps one of the most important and major armed groups to reject the Juba Peace Agreement are the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu- and the Sudan Liberation Movement – led by Abdul Wahid Nur. These two groups, amongst others, will look to manipulate their interests and influence when taking a stance on the ongoing RSF-SAF conflict. Given the volatility of the situation, armed groups must review political and military calculations before taking a critical position on either side of the conflict.

3. Lack of a fully functional and legitimate government: The idea of establishing a unified national army in Sudan was one of the goals pursued by the Sudanese who participated in the 2018 revolution. Accordingly, the Juba Peace Agreement has made progress towards this end, including in its framework the integration of armed and paramilitary groups (including the RSF) into the Sudanese military. 

Despite the Agreement, conflict between Sudan’s two most powerful military forces has erupted. This could be because most armed groups lack a strategic vision, and exploit the state’s nascence in exerting unipolar power. Should the current conflict undermine the legitimacy of the state any further, it could lead to the disengagement of many of these armed groups and the return to tribal and ethnic alignments, threatening peace in Sudan. 

4. The dire implications of the military conflict: The security implications of the conflict will contribute to its expansion and the involvement of a number of armed groups. These repercussions are interconnected and include the army’s ability to resolve the chaos that could arise in volatile areas, such as Darfur, where more than 2 million weapons are deployed, and the extent to which the Sudanese political system relies on regional hubs to resolve its problems. Most solutions to previous crises during South Sudan’s civil war, appear to have been dependent on the holding a referendum on secession and then implementing it over limited areas of control. The army’s inability to resolve the chaos, the political system’s dependence on regional axes, as well as the country’s several disputed border regions could potentially trigger Sudan’s descent into violence. 

Going in circles 

For all intents and purposes, it can be said that Sudan is at the cusp of spiraling violence. Security conditions in many of its territories are in jeopardy as non-state powers, rival political elites, and armed groups seek to assert and establish their control by force. In this context, the paramilitary groups remain a threat to peace, a strategic mistake to which all former Sudanese governments and dictatorships that have ruled the Sudan since independence in 1956 have contributed to. The presence of these armed forces and movements can encourage tribal and ethnic polarization, signaling a foreboding future for Sudan.