The Implications of the New Wave of ISIS Violence – The Arab Wall
The Implications of the New Wave of  ISIS Violence

The Implications of the New Wave of ISIS Violence



In revenge for the killing of two of its leading members, ISIS significantly escalated its operations during the month of April, with its branch in Iraq, ranking first in the number of attacks launched, followed by the West Africa branch, Syria, then Afghanistan. An analysis of the operations carried out by these organizations in the period between the 18th and 24th of April 2022, reveals the increased targeting of civilians, and the use of different approaches and weapons. It appears that the organization’s new leadership is testing the loyalty of various branches, who in turn display this continued loyalty by increasing the number of their operations. This new wave is also linked to an effort to disrupt security arrangements, especially in countries where the organization is undergoing intense confrontations with the police and the army. Moreover, the organization is seeking to attract new members, and to revitalize some branches whose influence has declined. Increasing competition between the organizations various branches has led to an increase in the number of attacks they undertake.

 The escalation in ISIS activity followed the announcement by its spokesman Abu Omar Al-Muhajir of the launching of a campaign to revenge the killing of the group’s former leader Abu Ibrahim Al-Hashemi Al-Qurashi and former media spokesman Abu Hamza Al-Qurashi. The announcement came during the speech broadcast on April 17th. It was expected that the group would seek revenge, as is routine when a leader or prominent figure is killed, such as the campaign which followed the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019. It is worth noting that the delay in the the announcement of its new leader following Al-Qurashi’s plunged ISIS into a significant crisis. The announcement of the new leader took 35 days, and even then, his true identity was not revealed. This raised questions on whether the various branches would pledge allegiance to the new leadership, and the extent to which they would comply with its directives. The announcement of this campaign of revenge was the first demand to these branches following their pledge of allegiance to the new leader.

 According to data from the Amaq Agency, which is affiliated to ISIS, regarding the period from 18-22 April, the branch in Iraq undertook 30 operations, 29 operations by the West Africa branch, Syria 14, Afghanistan 13, Central Africa 4, Somalia 4, Libya 1, India 1, and Pakistan 1. These operations reflect a number of factors, including:

The eagerness of some branches to restore activity:  This is reflected in the quick response of the top performing branches, listed above, to the call for escalation, with operations taking place within a few days of the call.  The Iraq branch displayed its eagerness by launching the highest number of attacks during this period, although it ranked second in terms of the overall number of operations this year. The Afghanistan branch, known as “Welayet Khorasan” also intensified operations, which had declined in number over the past few months. This reflects a desire to restore the state of operational activity, within the framework of responsiveness to the directives of the new leadership.

The weakened capabilities of some branches: In contrast to the noticeable response on the part of some branches, there are those whose response was limited, such as the branches of Central Africa, Somalia, Libya, India, and Pakistan, which carried out 4, 4, 1, 1, and 1 operation, respectively. This reflects their weak capabilities, preventing them from escalating their level of operations. This is consistent with the rate of operations of these branches during the past few months.

The focus on targeting civilians: An analysis of the operations of ISIS branches during the specified time period reveals a focus on targeting civilians to amplify the effects of operations, and achieve ISIS propaganda goals, especially after some branches’ operations declined in February and March, as a reflection of the state of confusion in  anticipation of the emergence of a  new leader. The focus on targeting civilians was demonstrated in the attacks launched by the branches in Central and West Africa. focus on targeting civilians was prominent in three of four operations. The latter had been undergoing a widescale confrontation with the Joint Task Force of the countries of the Lake Chad region, which launched a major military operation in late March. Despite this, it targeted a civilian gathering in the Taraba region in central Nigeria, which resulted in dozens of deaths and injuries. In general, an increase in the rate of targeting of civilians by West Africa can be observed over the past few months. The Afghanistan branch followed the same approach, bombing a Shiite Mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif. This reflects the directives of ISIS spokesman to target civilians, and his incitement of the targeting of Christians and Shiites.

The use of multiple methods: There is a marked diversity in the current wave of ISIS operations, in terms of the targets chosen and the methods used in the attacks. They have included civilians, military installations and patrols, as well as police checkpoints. A variety of weapons have been deployed, including mortar shells, car bombs, and improvised explosive devices. These operations aim to disrupt military and police operations in various countries, to undermine their ability to combat terrorist activity, through attacking multiple types of targets, including “soft” targets, which requires wide deployment of security forces. Countering this wave of ISIS attacks will require significant mobilization of security efforts. 

Important Indications

The current wave of ISIS violence has a number of significant implications, including:

  1.  This wave of operations appears to indicate that ISIS remains cohesive on an organizational level, and that the various branches have pledged, and demonstrated, their allegiance to its new leadership.
  2.  The new leadership appears intent on revitalizing its various branches, with varying degrees of success. Some branches were able to significantly increase their operations after a marked decline, such as branches in Syria and Afghanistan, others had limited capabilities, such as branches in India, Pakistan Libya and Somalia. There was also a marked absence of participation from in Yemen and Mozambique in this new campaign.  
  3.  The new leadership also appears intent on raising the level of competition between various ISIS branches. In his last speech, the ISIS spokesman praised the West Africa branch for being the most active branch, ahead of Iraq, having contributed 33% of ISIS operations from the first of January to April 21st. This reflects an effort to motivate a rise in activity through unleashing competitiveness between the various branches. This also indicates ISIS is intent on reestablishing its presence and activity in several countries. 
  4.  ISIS seeks to attract new members to compensate for its losses due to confrontations with security forces in several countries. In this effort, ISIS seeks to establish its position as a leader of “jihad”, proving it has maintained its strength and cohesion despite  challenges and the killing of its former leader. This is consistent with calls by the media spokesperson to elements of the organization that have defected, to reengage with the cause of “jihad”. ISIS is also attempting to exploit both domestic conditions in some countries, as well as regional developments, to convince new recruits to join its ranks.
  5.  The current wave of ISIS operations appears aimed at sowing confusion and disrupting both domestic and regional security arrangements. For example, the firing of Katyusha rockets by the Afghanistan branch at forces in Uzbekistan, as well the bombing of a Shiite Mosque, indicate a desire to upset the Taliban’s understandings with neighboring countries. In Iraq, the intensification of operations aims to reduce the pressure on the organization there, after a series of military and security operations since last November, which necessitated Iraq’s launching of the second phase of Operation Hard Will in the western region.

In sum, the containment of this wave of operations by a large number of ISIS branches in the Middle East, Africa as well as Asia necessitates a strong security response, and counterterrorism efforts, against the leaders and bases of the organization in their various locations, in order to contain this new surge of violence, and prevent ISIS from reestablishing its influence and operational capabilities.