President Erdogan secured his victory in Turkey’s second round of elections, winning 52.43 per cent of votes, against 45.57 per cent for the Table of Six candidate. The result carries several implications, most notably the affirmation of trust in the incumbent and traditionalist views, as well as the rise of nationalism in the face of face of economic decline. It also points to the rejection of Klejdaroglu’s racist rhetoric that increased anger at the Table of Six’s alliance with the People’s Democratic Party. All in all, Erdogan’s victory has several repercussions, including the continued Eastern orientation in Turkish foreign policy, pacification in the Middle East, minimizing differences with Western powers, pursuing less stringent refugee policies, and exercising tougher policies towards the Kurds.

In contrast to the polls conducted in recent months, in the final results of Turkey’s second presidential election, held on May 28, Turkey’s election board declared Erdogan’s win over Kılıçdaroğlu, with Erdogan receiving 52.43 per cent of total votes against 47.57 per cent received by the opposition’s candidate. This win underscores the dominance of the AKP coalition, which was further illustrated as the People’s Alliance garnered a majority of 322 seats against 212 seats by the opposition in parliament. 

Erdogan managed to capture more than 50 of Turkey’s 81 provinces, with the Table of Six candidate Kamal Klejdaroglu claiming second place. The second runoff was particularly tense when, according to Anadolu Agency, participation reached 83.99 per cent of 60,607,098 voters – a record-breaking voter turnout worldwide. The high level of participation is partly linked to the stark polarization among the political rivals, and the country’s political turmoil in the months preceding the elections.

Suggestive Indications 

The second round of Turkey’s presidential elections implied the following takeaways:

1. Asserting trust in the traditional regime: President Erdogan’s victory over the Table of Six rival revealed the people’s support for President Erdogan and the ruling People’s Alliance. The election results confirm the growing hypothesis that the Turkish President, despite recent criticism, remains popular on Turkish streets. This may be due to the fact that many of Turkey’s achievements in multiple sectors, particularly the defense industry, and its growing regional and international role, both of which have been associated with the person of President Erdogan who has been in power for about 20 years.

2. The growing nationalist movement: The results of Turkey’s presidential election showed the deepening of the country’s transformations in recent years, and led to the rise of Turkish anti-Kurdish and anti-refugee nationalism. This is illustrated by Erdogan’s rivalry with the Table of Six opponent and the losing national candidate Sinan Ogan. The Turkish president secured Ogan’s endorsement which succeeded in ensuring the significant support of the nationalist voices, and maintaining his alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party, as well as gaining the support of the Great Unity Party.

3. Worsening economic conditions: Economic decline that led to deteriorating standards of living and declining purchasing power, had a significant impact on voting trends in the second round of the presidential elections. Economic wellbeing is one of the key concerns under which Erdogan’s narrow victory could be understood. The Turkish economy has seen an unprecedented rise in inflation (above the 85 per cent mark), not to mention the worsening unemployment rate and the currency devaluation. Indeed, the Turkish Lira lost more than a third of its value against the US Dollar means, indicating that many Turks voted punitively against Erdogan, who himself has been leading the country’s monetary policy in recent years.

4. The Turkish voter rejected the racist rhetoric of the Table of Six candidate: it cannot be overlooked that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s second-round victory demonstrates, in one way or another, the rejection by a number of its own supporters, particularly the Party of Happiness, of racist rhetoric promoted by Klejdaroglu against Syrian refugees and conservatives. 

5. Employing and investing anger from the Table of Six alliance with democratic peoples: Erdogan managed to capitalize on the People’s Democratic Party (the political wing of the Kurds) declaration for of its support of the Table of Six candidate in justifying his attack on the Kurds on the one hand, and mobilizing nationalist and conservative voter blocs on the other, to tip the balance of scale in his favor in the second round. During the second round of elections, Erdogan embraced anti-Kurdish rhetoric, as demonstrated in his announcement that Turkish military operations against Kurdistan fighters continue in northern Syria and Iraq in an effort to dismantle the issue of Kurdish sovereignty that posed a threat to Turkey’s national security.

Potential implications

Erdogan’s victory is expected to alter Turkey’s foreign policy and affect its political landscape in the following manner: 

1. Continuing to turn East in Turkish foreign policy: Ankara was one of the first to adopt a neutral attitude towards Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, as reflected by Turkey’s opposition to the EU’s sanctions against Russia, as well as President Erdogan’s mediation between parties to the crisis, and Turkey’s success in resolving the Ukrainian grain export crisis.

Despite Turkey’s criticism of the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, the Turkish President generally sees the futility of sanctions against Russia, and the need for dialogue and cooperation with Moscow in order to resolve the crisis. Here, it can be said that, after winning power, Erdogan is likely to maintain his country’s close partnership with Moscow, including Erdogan’s criticism (on May 12) of the opposition’s accusations that Russia interfered in the elections. Turkey has fostered mutually beneficial relations with Moscow. Besides Russia’s contribution to the construction of Turkey’s Akoyo nuclear power plant, the Russian President (in August 2022) approved an agreement through which Turkey can pay for some of its Russian natural gas in roubles.

2. Continuing the process of pacification in the Middle East: President Erdogan’s victory for a third term is likely to enhance stability between Ankara and its neighbors, particularly as Erdogan seeks to overcome contentious issues in the region. Hence, the coming period may see further political breakthroughs with Cairo, Greece, Cyprus and Armenia, and greater harmony with Gulf countries, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Opportunities for normalization between Ankara and Damascus are also expected to increase. Turkey-Israel relations appear to be undergoing a qualitative shift during the next phase, particularly with Turkey adopting a less stringent approach to the repressive practices of the Netanyahu government against Palestinians in Gaza. Indeed, Erdogan’s position and his government simply called for restraint when condemning Israel’s Operation Shield and Arrow on May 9. 

3. Balancing differences with Western powers: Despite the strategic alliance between Ankara and Western powers, including the United States, Erdogan’s victory is likely to cause difficulty in overcoming contentious issues with Europe and Washington. Disputes between the two sides mainly center on Ankara’s refusal to agree to Sweden’s accession to NATO, and its opposition to Western sanctions imposed on Russia. Trends in Turkey’s relations with Western powers, particularly Washington, reflect a change in Turkey’s political strategy, whereby it has sought greater autonomy in acting as a regional force within a multipolar world order.

The West’s approach to Turkish elections has further angered Turkey’s ruling coalition and Erdogan’s conviction that Western powers sought to undermine his prospects for victory. For example, Minister of Interior Suleiman Soylu (May 12) accused Washington of interfering in Turkey’s elections.

However, escalating tensions does not imply a fallout in Turkey’s relations with Western powers. Ankara may adopt a measure of pragmatism that ensures that it benefits from Western Powers, or at least neutralizes Western pressures on controversial issues. Erdogan is aware that the Western alliance, particularly NATO, remains Turkey’s security guarantee, and may therefore seek to leverage its relations with the West in order to support its geopolitical advantages, and attract FDI from Western states in order to buttress Turkey’s suffering economy. It is important to note here that due to the Russian-Ukrainian war, Turkey has become a preferred destination of relocation for many American and European companies that withdrew from Russia after Western sanctions were imposed.

4. Less stringent refugee policy: President Erdogan’s political discourse is based on conservative religious ideology. Erdogan maintains his convictions regarding the rejection of what he describes as “racist policies” against Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, and sees Klejdaroglu’s and the far-right parties’ rhetoric towards this issue as “extremism, violence and against the principles of humanity and brotherhood.” This means that Erdogan and the People’s Alliance will continue to adopt less stringent policies and laws in dealing with the refugees, possibly helping Turkey to make significant strides in dismantling contentious issues with Damascus in preparation for full normalization, which could provide a fertile environment for the voluntary and safe return of Syrian refugees to their homes. Notably, Erdogan is known for his tolerance of refugees, saying in his remarks that he supports the voluntary repatriation of refugees as opposed to deportation. 

5. More stringent policies towards the Kurds: The AKP and its Nationalist Movement Party have assumed a political discourse based on patriotic convictions that consider the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its political associates a threat to the country’s national security. Therefore, Erdogan may uphold the importance of continuing the confrontation with Kurds both within Turkey and in northern Syria and Iraq. This means that Erdogan and the ruling coalition will adopt tighter policies and laws in dealing with the Kurdish issue, which could have a negative impact on the People’s Democratic Party who stood by Klejdaroglu in the second round of elections. Given the history of violence by the PKK, the coming period may see an escalation of violence against Kurdistan bases in northern Syria and Iraq.

In conclusion, it can be argued that Erdogan’s victory could give him more space in the upcoming presidential term t achieve greater dominance over Turkey’s state institutions and decision-making process. Erdogan and his party’s victory will also give him impetus to move forward in his regional and international policy, and to further reform regional relations although it may come at the cost of continued tension with the West, as well as to continue to confront Kurdish threats both at home and beyond borders.