The situation in Sudan is unique in nature in comparison to historical precedents, as well as in comparison to other cases across neighboring countries in Africa and the Arab world. Questions arise as to how long this type of system is likely to survive and whether it will be possible to complete the transitional period and reach a stable political system in the future. It is noticeable in Sudan that there are several unique characteristics for joint military-civilian partnership in the transitional period, which carry both benefits and challenges that are represented in the following:
The Context: The protests by civilian forces that took place on the 6th of April 2019 were the pinnacle of anger against the Al Bashir Regime that allowed for the entry of the Armed Forces into the fray and led to his removal from power on the 11th of that same month. Coordination between the civilian and military sides led to the overthrow of the regime, however, disagreements between the two sides emerged after the overthrow of Bashir. Civilian forces refused the statement from the then-Defense Minister Ahmed Awad Bin Ouf, in which he announced his assumption of power. The objections of the civilian forces led to him resigning one day after his statement. The relationship between both sides reached a new heightened level of tension during the months of the transitional military council rule, during which a sit-in near the General Command was forcibly dispersed on the 3rd of June 2019. Eventually, a power-sharing deal between the military and the liberty and change movement was reached in August 2019.
These early interactions revealed that the partnership between the civilian and military powers in the transitional phase in Sudan did not result from a coordinated approach, or an agreement but was in fact circumstantial. Several factors, both internal and external, pushed both sides to accept the power-sharing deal despite both having huge reservations.
This situational nature of the cooperation has led both sides to adopt a pragmatic approach, which has helped them overcome several difficult hurdles. These included the formation of the government of “Abdallah Hamduk”, the first and second one, the launch of the economic reform program as well as peace deals between the government and several armed factions in Sudan, during which both sides practiced flexibility and practicality. However, despite these positive interactions in this partnership, it cannot be considered a long-term solution or a sustainable one.
Structural Fluidity: It is an oversimplification to define this partnership simply as including a military and a civilian component. There is complexity within the military itself. During the rule of Bashir, as several quasi-military formations were integrated into the structure of the national military, without clearly dictating the chain of command or even the nature of the relation between these formations and the military.
This gave rise to the special status of the rapid response forces, of a large size highly equipped, that is deployed in several regions of Sudan. This was reflected politically when it came to sharing the posts allocated to the military in the transitional government The head of the armed forces Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan was given the position of President of the Sovereignty Council, while the head of the rapid response force, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), was chosen as the vice president of the transitional council.
On the other hand, the Movement for Change and Liberty presented itself as an umbrella organization for most Sudanese political movements, as many actors, including traditional parties, leftists, and several other non-political NGOs, joined its ranks. The truth of the matter though, is that this umbrella organization failed to play any effective role since the fall of Bashir. Internal polarization soon emerged, to the extent that some, such as the communist party, became leading voices in opposing the Abdallah Hamdouk government, which was meant to represent the umbrella movement.
Alongside the internal divisions in both the civilian and military partners, there emerged a third party of great strategic importance, adding another layer of complexity to the situation. The Juba Peace Accords, signed in October 2020 led most armed groups to join the transitional government, through membership of the Sovereignty Council and the cabinet of ministers. these groups also maintained an influential share in the membership of the transitional legislative council that is still under creation. This development is significant due to the dual nature of these groups that have both political and military wings.
While this structural fluidity may have helped lessen the polarization between the civilian and military wings, through putting forth a variety of visions and helping to bridge the gap between the two sides, it also resulted in weakening the structural cohesion of the transitional government. There were repeated coup attempts from the military, and divisions appeared from within the civilian camp, such as the schism within the Sudanese professional syndicate.
Overlapping of responsibilities: the power-sharing deal between the civilians and the military in Sudan has led to the creation of three transitional institutes: the Sovereignty Council, the Prime Ministers Cabinet, and the Legislative Councils (which is still not complete). This separation between the two ruling partners has shown several overlapping roles and responsibilities. For instance, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo chairs the economic emergency high council whilst Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdouk was a leading player in the peace negotiations with the armed factions in Sudan.
This pattern of overlapping responsibilities has been useful to some extent as it has allowed for a certain degree of complementation, as well as the division of labor, especially in some foreign policy issues, such as the tensions on the border with Ethiopia, the faltering Renaissance Dam negotiations, as well as some domestic crises such as the acts of violence in West Darfur. However, these overlapping instances on some occasions have led to rivalry and conflict over these responsibilities, sometimes leading to an exchange of public accusations between the head of the government and the head of the sovereignty council with regards to the economic activities for the armed forces.
The Role of External Actors: After years of international isolation that was imposed on Sudan as a result of the policies of the Bashir regime, several international powers saw political change in Sudan as an opportunity to return to the Sudanese scene, given the country’s importance in the Red Sea, East Africa, and the Nile Basin regions.
On that basis, several parties sought to help the Sudanese political parties in overcoming many key disagreements leading to the power-sharing deal in August 2019. This was an important development, especially as an indicator of renewed US interest and activity regarding Sudan, as the American envoy Donald Booth played an important role in concluding the power-sharing deal.
Both civilian and military parties in Sudan have responded positively to international requests, particularly American ones. For example, the military in Sudan accepted the American proposal to have a civilian representative, the prime minister, lead the transitional period, as the cabinet became the seat of power for during the transitional period, as per the arrangements which closely resemble a parliamentary system of rule. In return, the US extended a good deal of assistance to the head of the sovereignty council in adopting a policy of normalization of relations with Israel.
This indicates that there is a good chance of achieving a sustainable working partnership between civilians and the military, as international actors can help mediate the differences between the two sides. On the other hand, this leaves Sudan’s domestic stability dependent on international actors, who could fundamentally change their policies due to various domestic or regional developments.
Future Prospects:
Based on the previous analysis, each feature of the civilian -military partnership in Sudan presents both opportunities and challenges at the same time, which makes assessing its future prospects a difficult task.
Three main factors will determine the future of this partnership, the first of which is the ability of all sides to reach an agreement on completing the objectives of the transitional phase, including the creation of the legislative council, as well as handing the leadership of the Sovereignty Council over to civilians.
The second factor is the ability to deal with the economic crisis in Sudan, which affects large swathes of the population, and could undermine all the fragile arrangements in place for the power-sharing deal. The Third factor will appear on the longer-term, and relates to the degree of commitment by all parties to handing over rule to an elected and permanent body, thereby bringing the transitional period to a successful end.