The recent visit by Major General Mohammad Bagheri, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Army, to Iraq on December 3rd has highlighted Iran’s four primary objectives: the consolidation of Iranian military influence in Iraq, intensifying pressure on the US presence there, sending a message to Israel, and enhancing coordination with Iraq to oppose Iranian opposition.
The significance of the visit is underscored by its timing, coinciding with emergent circumstances and developments in the relationship between Iran and Iraq, and their respective relations with the United States and Israel. It could be posited that Iran, through this visit, where Bagheri has thus far engaged with the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior, and the Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, endeavored to convey messages both domestically and internationally. These messages pertain to its efforts to consolidate its influence in Iraq amidst escalating tensions with Washington and Tel Aviv, fueled by the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip. Concurrently, it seeks to balance the roles undertaken by the Revolutionary Guard within nations in crisis, most notably Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
Multiple Objectives
Through this visit, Iran seeks to achieve several objectives, the most prominent of which are:
1- Consolidating Iran’s influence in Iraq: The visit coincides with a period of increased assaults on US bases in Iraq by Shiite militias aligned with Iran. This occurred after the cessation of the truce period in the Gaza Strip and the recommencement of Israeli military operations. The timing of Bagheri’s visit implies that Iran is attempting to expand its significant influence within Iraq, an influence that has facilitated its management of a portion of its indirect escalation with both Israel and the US via this platform and these militias. Nevertheless, Iran continues to maintain a stance of denial regarding its involvement in these attacks, asserting that these actions are the result of decisions made independently by the militias.
2- Targeting US presence in the region: The scope of this strategic targeting extends beyond mere military confrontations, as evidenced by the assaults on American bases in Iraq and Syria, with the most recent incident occurring at the Kharab al-Jir base in northeastern Syria on December 3. This strategy also encompasses a political dimension, marked by a renewed campaign against the United States and its regional policies. Iran has shifted its focus towards highlighting the potential losses for the United States due to recent regional developments, while simultaneously emphasizing the strategic advantages that Iran and its allies stand to gain, a feat that appears to be nontrivial.
The specific strategy was evidently reflected in the declarations of the Supreme Leader of the Republic, Ali Khamenei, during his assembly with the Basij militia members on November 29. He articulated that the Al-Aqsa Flood operations, while ostensibly aimed at Israel, were in fact designed to eliminate America. He further stated that these operations have successfully disrupted the American policy framework in the region and are expected to persist, contingent on divine will.
3- Raising the level of coordination in confronting the opposition: Iran demonstrates a distinct inclination towards enhancing security collaboration with Iraq, to mitigate the intensity of risks engendered by the existence of certain Iranian militarized dissent factions within Iraqi territories. These groups have been explicitly implicated by Iran as the catalysts of the demonstrations that erupted in mid-September 2022 and persisted until early 2023, through the illicit importation of armaments into the nation and the deployment of specific operatives to amplify discord between civilians and security personnel.
Consequently, Iran, utilizing the Revolutionary Guard and military forces, orchestrated military offensives against the opposition’s strongholds within Iraq during the final phase. This action mirrors the missile assault initiated by the Revolutionary Guard within Iraqi territory on November 20, 2022. This event coincided with an escalation in domestic protests within Iran, fueled by the outcry against the murder of Mahsa Amini, a Kurdish woman in her twenties. Amini was apprehended by the so-called “moral police” on charges of non-compliance with hijab regulations.
Furthermore, Iran issued explicit warnings that such attacks might recur if the Iraqi authorities failed to relocate these groups from the shared border regions. On March 19, Iran formalized a security pact with Iraq to collaborate specifically on this matter. Subsequently, on September 23, Iran delineated a deadline for the Iraqi authorities to act before it would intervene militarily under the guise of “safeguarding Iranian national security.”
In the given context, it is significant to note that Bagheri, who is presently on a visit to Iraq, was the individual who issued the ultimatum. He stated, “The armed separatist terrorist forces must be entirely disarmed and evicted from all regions of Iraq.” He further added, “These groups were expected to be disarmed by September 19. However, the actual outcome during the six-month deadline was a slight retreat of these groups from the border. President Ibrahim Raisi urged for patience and extended a grace period of a few days, for which we will wait.”
4- Preparing to escalate with the US and Israel: The forthcoming escalation may be characterized by heightened tensions between Iran, the US, and Israel. The nuclear accord continues to teeter on a precipice, primarily due to the unabated escalation of Iranian nuclear activities. Presently, Iran has amassed a quantity of fissile material sufficient to manufacture three nuclear warheads, contingent on a political resolution and the needed technological advancements.
Simultaneously, Israel, without neglecting its engagement in Gaza, persists in its efforts to instigate an armed confrontation. Iran’s dearth of nuclear and regional aspirations is underscored by its continual assaults, particularly those targeting its presence in Syria. The most recent attack was in the vicinity of the Syrian capital Damascus, on December 2, which culminated in the demise of two members of the Revolutionary Guard.
Hence, Iran wants to direct threats to Israel and the US showing how the current escalation may be an option if the attacks on its sites in Syria and Iraq continue, and if the US takes other punitive measures against it, such as obstructing its receipt of the six billion dollars that represent its dues to South Korea for oil exports. These funds were transferred to accounts in Qatar under the prisoner exchange deal concluded between the US and Iran, the first part of which was implemented by exchanging the release of prisoners on September 18.
The ongoing exchange of blows
Concurrent with Bagheri’s sojourn to Iraq, a noteworthy escalation was observed in both Iraq and Syria, characterized by reciprocal strikes between pro-Iranian militias and the combined forces of Israel and the United States. This coincided with an Israeli offensive that led to the demise of two Revolutionary Guard members and a procession targeting an Iranian militia stronghold in Syria’s Albukamal region at the onset of December.
This suggests that Iran, the US, and Israel are employing these overlapping maneuvers as a means of conveying mixed messages. This strategic communication anticipates the potential trajectories of the ongoing Israeli conflict, which continues to intensify in the Gaza Strip, and the potential ramifications that may occur.