Russia expands influence in North Africa – The Arab Wall
Russia expands influence in North Africa

Russia expands influence in North Africa



According to multiple reports, Russia is showing a strong interest in strengthening its relations with countries in North and West Africa, as evidenced by an upcoming visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania. This tour follows a previous one undertaken by Lavrov at the end of January this year. The primary aim of the new tour, which is scheduled for February, is to establish new avenues for trade relations and political cooperation, given the sanctions imposed by Western countries in response to the Russian conflict in Ukraine.

As the American influence in Africa regains its centrality, Moscow is looking to rival Washington’s political influence in its strongholds. This comes after the announcement by US President Joe Biden of a review of American policies towards the African continent, which were previously deemed less strategically significant by decision-makers in Washington.

Main Objectives

Russia has four main objectives through these movements, which include:

  1. To attract Rabat’s support on various issues related to the African continent, especially those related to the security, economic, and social aspects of the West African region, Russia has included Morocco in Lavrov’s second African tour. Russia considers its relationship with Morocco to be particularly important for gaining access to the market in this region and for developing projects there. This is the first objective of Russia’s movements in North and West Africa.

To strengthen its relationship with Morocco and gain its support, Moscow relies on two important aspects. Firstly, it seeks to enhance political cooperation between Moscow and Rabat. In recent years, Moscow has shifted to more neutral positions on the Western Sahara issue, a change that can be attributed to the positive developments in the relationship between the two nations. For instance, Morocco’s decision not to vote against Russia in the Security Council’s condemnation of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine is an example of this. Moscow views Morocco as a “partner” that provides many solutions for Russia, such as agricultural exports and facilitating the passage of Russian planes and ships. This explains Russia’s recent positions on the Western Sahara issue.

Secondly, Moscow seeks to activate economic relations with Morocco. The positive developments in the bilateral political and diplomatic relations between Morocco and Russia have been complemented by positive developments in the economic sphere. In recent years, trade between the two countries has grown significantly, especially after the Moroccan King, Mohammed VI, visited Moscow in 2016. Despite Western sanctions against Moscow, Morocco has granted licenses to ten Russian naval vessels to fish in Moroccan waters in the past three months. Furthermore, Morocco still allows Russian planes to cross its airspace, which Europe has closed off to Russia.

  1. Both Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are competing to win the support of Mauritania to neutralize potential roles in the region. This follows the collapse of the five African Sahel states and Moscow’s efforts to strengthen its position in Mali, expand its operations towards Burkina Faso, and establish a presence on the Atlantic coast in opposition to NATO’s southern wing. Russia aims to secure vital spaces in North Africa and the west to respond to NATO’s attempts to encircle it from the east and west, with the goal of threatening the southern wing of the alliance, whether from Libya or Mauritania.

To achieve this objective, Moscow employs two mechanisms. The first is to distance Mauritania from NATO’s plans, as the increasing visits of American and European military leaders to Nouakchott, especially in the northern and eastern border regions with Algeria and Mali, have raised Russian concerns. This is particularly worrying in light of discussions about NATO’s intention to establish a central military base in Mauritania.

NATO’s objective is not limited to establishing a military base in Mauritania to combat terrorism in the African Sahel region, but also to counter any Russian attempts to expand towards Mauritania and the Atlantic coast, which could pose a threat to the alliance’s southern wing. Lavrov’s visit to Mauritania to discuss the establishment of a military base for NATO on its territory poses a threat to the Russian presence in Mali. Moreover, it represents Russia’s effort to either gain Mauritania’s support or at least neutralize it, in anticipation of any potential conflict with the West in the African Sahel region.

The second approach is to activate military cooperation with Nouakchott. This is particularly important because Mauritania is leveraging its strategic location and global competition to achieve gains on multiple levels, including economic and military benefits.

In this context, it is expected that Moscow will propose to strengthen its military cooperation with Nouakchott. Despite Mauritania’s close cooperation with France and the United States, it signed a military agreement with Moscow in June 2021, providing Russia with an entry point to increase its influence in the country. Mauritania holds a strategic location that connects the Arab Maghreb region with West Africa, making it a valuable partner for Russia. The agreement is seen as a response to France’s failure to fulfill its commitments towards the Sahel Group, whether in Mali or militarily.

  1. In 2015, a “spy network detection” case was discovered in Tunisia that involved individuals working for Russia. Despite this controversy, the relationship between the two countries underwent a sudden transformation in the subsequent period. Tunisia took steps to establish economic cooperation and develop trade exchanges with Russia, including efforts to sign partnership agreements for free trade. Another agreement was made to adopt the Russian ruble and Tunisian dinar in trade exchanges between the two nations. Additionally, a maritime line was established between the port of Sfax and the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea to boost Russian tourism to Tunisia and increase Tunisian exports to Russia.

Russia’s approach towards Tunisia involves two factors. The first is a move away from political caution. While there have been recent developments in the cooperation between the two countries, such as the launch of Tunisia’s first satellite “Challenge 1” in March 2021, it does not hide the challenges in their relationship amid the rapidly changing international environment. Russia, however, remains cautious of Tunisia’s vote in favor of a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, unlike Algeria and Morocco, which abstained from voting.

Despite Tunisia understanding that this position is a response to Western pressure, Tunisian-Russian relations are now at a critical stage. Lavrov’s expected visit to Tunisia is an attempt to abandon political caution towards Tunisia and reactivate political relations. 

The second factor is an attempt to support Tunisia in facing the economic crisis in a way that could bring strategic gains to Russia, especially as some of its traditional allies in European countries are decreasing their support.

  1. Enhancing the range of available international options: Lavrov’s upcoming visit can be interpreted as Moscow’s effort to broaden its scope of action on the global stage. Recently, Russia has concentrated on competing with the United States and European countries, particularly France, in the African coastal region and West Africa in general. This explains its attempts to revive its relationships with Arab countries of North West Africa, given the ongoing war in Ukraine.

New Agenda

Given the recent changes in the international system, particularly after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it can be argued that Russia is seeking to shape a new international and regional agenda through Lavrov’s visits to the African continent. The aim is to present its vision for the new international order and establish strong relationships with strategic countries in the North West African region. This effort is closely tied to the increasing global interest in the continent.