The Arab region would appear to be on the verge of a new phase of escalation, especially in countries undergoing domestic crises, which could in fact undermine efforts to achieve regional settlements regarding these crises. This escalation stems from the fact that interests of major regional players intersect in these countries, while differences between them are growing over other, equally important, issues. Exchanged attacks between the US and Iraqi militias may be considered an example of escalation. Iraqi militias loyal to Iran launched missile attacks near the US embassy ​​on July 29. 

This coincided with the return of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi from the United States, where he reached an agreement with US President Joe Biden to schedule US military withdrawal, ending US forces combat missions  while continuing their advisory and logistical tasks. The attack was seen as retaliation for US strikes on a Popular Mobilization Forces convoy on the Syrian-Iraqi border on July 19th. 

It is worth noting that  recurring missile attacks by Iraqi militias  against American interests in Iraq, occur in the context of avowed refusal by the militias responsible “ to bow” to pressure from Tehran, in the form of calls by the commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, Ismail Qaani , to stop the attacks and engage in a truce with the US, in light of continued efforts to reach a new nuclear deal in Vienna.

It can be argued that such claims to not appear consistent with facts on the ground, which indicates that, in light of Iranian control, the militias could only launch such attacks with a green light from Tehran. This means that attempts by the militias to deflect responsibility away from Tehran may be deliberate, and coordinated with Tehran. The aim would be to allow Tehran to escalate against Washington in Iraq, in line with its interests and calculations, while trying to avoid the consequences. 

In other words, Iran is adopting a dual policy regarding the continued escalation against US interests in Iraq. It tries to imply that the groups carrying out the attacks are not under its control, while being fully aware that these attacks strengthen its own position, and confounds the calculations of other parties, be it the US administration or the Iraqi government.

Motives driving escalation

This new escalation between Tehran and Washington can be explained in light of several motives, the most prominent of which are:

1- Rejection of the American approach: The recent missile attacks on the American embassy in Baghdad coincided with the statements made by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during his meeting with the outgoing President Hassan Rouhani and his government. Khamenei expressed his rejection of what he described as some of the American demands in the Vienna talks regarding the nuclear agreement, especially with regard to expanding the scope of negotiation to include other files, particularly regional interventions and the ballistic missile program.
Following the meeting, Khamenei’s website was keen to publish statements by Iranian permanent representative at the International Atomic Energy Agency Kazem Gharibabadi, in which he revealed some points of disagreement between Iran and the US, especially with regard to what he sees as Washington linking delisting the Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization with the inclusion of regional issues and the ballistic missile program in the talks.

2- Preparing for the worst: Iran is no longer ruling out the possibility of the failure of the Vienna negotiations, which halted on June 20, pending the inauguration of incoming Iranian president Ibrahim Raisi on August 5. Raisi is currently working on forming his government and engaging other institutions in determining whether the Supreme Council for National Security or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will manage the Vienna talks.

Failure to reach a consensus in the previous six rounds suggests that the differences between the two sides may not be resolved, especially in light of mutual distrust. Tehran is seeking to obtain guarantees that Washington will not withdraw from the agreement again, a request rejected by the US administration. Washington, on its part, seeks to expand the scope of negotiations, including other controversial files and removing Iran’s bargaining chips, especially regarding the most advanced centrifuges. Washington also seeks to prolong restrictions on some of its nuclear activities. The failure of the current negotiations, a possibility that cannot be ruled out, could have a heavy impact on escalation in the region, with each side wishing to demonstrate what it considers to be “red lines”.

3- Enhancing deterrence: The US administration’s use of preemptive strikes against Iran-affiliated militias illustrates a strategy of sending direct deterrent messages to both Iran and the Iraqi militias. The US wishes to demonstrate that continued commitment to reaching a deal in Vienna does not mean that Washington will overlook threats on the ground to US interests by these militias, at the behest of Tehran, whether in Iraq, Syria, or anywhere else.
In other words, the Biden administration has begun to realize that its keenness to open channels of communication with Tehran and its indirect participation in the Vienna negotiations appears to have been misinterpreted by Iran, leading it to believe it had wider options available to it, allowing it to escalate through attacks on American interests in Syria and Iraq. The US has therefore started to retaliate by strikes against these militias in Syria and Iraq.

4- Challenging the strategic dialogue: The continued escalation after the end of Al-Kadhimi’s visit to Washington reveals that the militias loyal to Iran have sought to confirm their rejection of the outcomes of the fourth round of the strategic dialogue between the US and Iraq, especially with regard to continued US advisory and logistical support, as they believe this will secure Washington a role in future security arrangements. They also do not wish to strengthen Al-Kadhimi’s position in the upcoming parliamentary elections on October 10, especially after the US administration demonstrated its support.

It may be expected that Iraq and Syria, and perhaps other countries, will become arenas for renewed escalation between Washington and Tehran, in anticipation of the outcome of the Vienna negotiations and awaiting Raisi’s inauguration on August 5.