The ISIS organization’s announcement of its leader Abu Al-Hussein Al-Husaini Al-Qurashi being killed in the Idlib countryside comes less than a year after he took over, succeeding “Abu Al-Hasan Al-Hashimi Al-Qurashi.” The organization denies any involvement from Turkey in his targeting, instead highlighting “Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s” responsibility. The official spokesperson, “Abu Omar Al-Muhajir,” and several women affiliated with the organization have been arrested, with an intention to extract information about the organization from them by “Tahrir Al-Sham.” However, for the second time, the United States has not participated in targeting a leader of the organization. The multi-faceted nature of the targeting operation suggests various implications. These include the continued waning of the leader’s influence, especially given the delay in announcing his death. Additionally, internal concerns arise regarding the organization’s unity due to the recurring targeting operations and the limited choices for a new leader’s appointment.

The selection of “Abu Hafs Al-Hashimi Al-Qurashi,” a relatively unknown figure, underscores the competitive landscape for targeting the organization’s leadership among different parties within Syria. If “Tahrir Al-Sham” indeed played a role in this operation, regardless of its extent, it aligns with Turkey’s interests and indirectly seeks to reach understandings with the United States.

On August 3, 2023, the ISIS organization issued an audio statement through its new official spokesperson, “Abu Hudhaifa Al-Ansari,” confirming the demise of the organization’s leader, “Abu Al-Hussein Al-Husaini Al-Qurashi,” in Syria. This announcement comes around eight months after he took the reins of leadership on November 30, 2022.

Despite introducing the new leader of the organization, referred to as “Abu Hafs Al-Hashimi Al-Qurashi,” the new spokesperson refrained from offering any details about him. The spokesperson merely indicated that his selection was carried out by what the organization terms as the “people of consultation and consensus,” in line with the organization’s vision.

Key Observations

Although the new spokesperson’s statement on behalf of ISIS lasted for approximately half an hour, it provided only limited information about the circumstances and details of the organization leader’s death. However, several observations can be highlighted in this context, especially considering the presentation of unprecedented testimonies, as follows:

1. Signs of ISIS Leader’s April Demise: While the spokesperson of ISIS refrained from offering exact details about the timing of “Abu Al-Hussein Al-Qurashi’s” death, there are indications pointing to his demise occurring in the preceding month of April. More precisely, it is suggested that his death transpired before the culmination of that month, particularly prior to the 30th day. This date is significant as it aligns with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s announcement of the organization leader’s death, following an operation executed by Turkish intelligence within Syria.

Since that date, there have been ongoing speculations regarding the accuracy of the Turkish announcement. This is especially notable as the announcement preceded the scheduled presidential election. This timing raised suspicions about the potential exploitation of the event for Erdogan’s benefit, particularly in light of the skepticism surrounding the reliability of the Turkish narrative. This doubt emerged following a previous announcement of the capture of the organization’s leader, “Abu Al-Hasan Al-Qurashi,” in May 2022. However, it was subsequently unveiled that he had been killed in the final quarter of the preceding year, specifically during the month of October in southern Syria.

Moreover, what bolsters the assertion of “Abu Al-Hussein Al-Qurashi’s” death prior to the end of April is the spokesperson’s connection of this event with the Turkish account. The spokesperson openly acknowledged this link, albeit within the context of denying Ankara’s and Turkish intelligence’s participation in the operation.

2. Shedding Light on Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s Involvement: In contrast to the organization’s prior avoidance of attributing responsibility for the death of its leader Abu Al-Hasan Al-Qurashi in Daraa towards the close of the previous year, the spokesperson of ISIS emphasized the role played by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in the demise of Abu Al-Hussein Al-Qurashi This marked a direct confrontation with the elements of the organization in a town within the Idlib countryside. According to the narrative presented by “ISIS,” Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham independently executed the targeting operation, countering the assertions made by the Turkish account.

Here, two possibilities come to the fore. Firstly, the organization may be refraining from attributing the operation to Turkey, particularly in light of the recent arrests of its members and leaders within Turkey over the past few years. There might be an intention to promote the notion that the Turkish President aimed to exploit the killing of the ISIS leader for electoral propaganda. Secondly, this could indicate an escalation in the assault on Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, considering the pronounced enmity between the two entities. This animosity has intensified following the detachment of “Abu Muhammad al-Jolani,” the group’s leader, from ISIS during the leadership of “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.” Implicit accusations have also been leveled at Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, suggesting that they passed along information about ISIS leadership to facilitate their targeting.

Possibly, by intensifying the assault on Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the organization aims to elicit sympathy from “jihadists” within Syria, in an effort to attract them. This intent becomes particularly noteworthy given reports that have indicated al-Jolani’s aspiration to expel foreign elements from the country. In fact, a number of these elements have already departed, with certain individuals joining the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, particularly those hailing from the Caucasus region. This maneuver occurs as the organization propagates the idea that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is actively furthering Turkey’s interests within Syria.

3. Uncertainty Regarding Former Spokesperson’s Arrest: Importantly, within the context of exploring the circumstances surrounding the demise of the ISIS leader, emphasis was placed on the arrest of the organization’s former spokesperson, “Abu Omar Al-Muhajir.” He was apprehended as a result of surveillance, along with several members of the organization, who were found in close proximity to him while they were involved in their designated activities, ultimately leading to his successful capture.

The speech delivered by the new spokesperson on behalf of the organization raises a notable point of ambiguity concerning the timing of “Al-Muhajir’s” arrest. Was it executed before or after the demise of the ISIS leader? It’s worth noting that his most recent appearance was in November 2022 through an audio statement.

Despite the revelation of the deceased organization leader’s location in the Idlib countryside, the new spokesperson’s statement omits any mention of “Al-Muhajir’s” whereabouts. However, there is a general presumption that he was situated within the Idlib province. This could be attributed to two possible reasons: firstly, the intent to place responsibility for his arrest on Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which holds control over the province, and secondly, the spokesperson’s probable proximity to the organization leader’s residence. This inference is supported by the frequent turnover of spokespersons for the organization within brief intervals, occasionally aligning with the timing of the leader’s demise.

4. Efforts to Gather Information about ISIS: The account put forth by the spokesperson of ISIS regarding the apprehension of numerous women associated with the organization prompts inquiries about the specific timing of their arrests. Did this occur during the operation aimed at the organization’s leader, or was it connected to the former spokesperson’s detainment?

However, what stands out is the new spokesperson’s reference to the potential use of these women as sources for revealing specific files and organization-related secrets. This suggests the likelihood of them divulging certain information. Furthermore, this extends to the former spokesperson and certain individuals apprehended in conjunction with him. Their arrests might have caused considerable adverse impacts on the organization’s arrangements, particularly regarding the whereabouts of specific leaders or specifics about organizational frameworks and logistical support endeavors.

Nevertheless, the most pressing question lingers: Were “Al-Muhajir” and the women associated with the organization apprehended prior to the demise of the ISIS leader? If their arrest occurred before the leader’s death, it hints at the possibility of gleaning information about him and his whereabouts through the information extracted from the detainees.

5. Second Instance of Limited U.S. Involvement: Given the prominent leadership of the United States within the international coalition against “ISIS,” alongside their years-long field operations in Syria and Iraq aimed at pursuing the organization’s leadership and active members—especially its key figures like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi—an interesting trend emerges. However, for the second consecutive occasion, there is a noticeable lack of substantial American involvement in the targeted operation against the recent leader of the organization, Abu Al-Hussein Al-Qurashi

The United States also held a limited role in the demise of the organization’s leader, “Abu Al-Hasan Al-Qurashi,” who was killed in clashes within Daraa province, presumably in the prior month of October.

Despite the heightened intensity of U.S. military operations in Syria, designed to target prominent leaders and operatives of the organization, they have encountered difficulty in identifying and eliminating the organization’s last two leaders. This could be attributed to an absence of comprehensive knowledge concerning the true identities of these leaders. It’s plausible that “Abu Al-Hasan” was eliminated without proper recognition of his leadership role within “ISIS.” Alternatively, leaks of sensitive information may have contributed to the exposure of his location, without widespread awareness of his actual identity within the organization.

Interconnected Implications

The circumstances surrounding the killing of the ISIS leader, the arrest of the organization’s spokesperson, and the various parties pursuing ISIS leadership, along with the messages conveyed by the new spokesperson’s statement, carry several intertwined implications. The most prominent of these are:

1. Persistence of Declining Authority in ISIS Leadership: An observable trend emerges when examining the timelines of each ISIS leader, characterized by their relatively brief tenures within the organization. Since the passing of “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” in October 2019, who steered the organization prior to the declaration of the purported caliphate in 2014, this pattern persists through “Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.” He maintained his role for approximately two years and about three months, until the organization proclaimed his demise in March 2022.

The tenure of ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi dwindled to around 9 months before his death was proclaimed by ISIS in November 2022. A similar trend of diminishing leadership duration persisted for the former organization leader, “Abu Al-Hussein Al-Husaini al-Qurashi,” for approximately 8 months until his demise was announced on August 3, 2023.

Moreover, there is a noticeable gap between the leader’s actual passing at the hands of the responsible party and the organization’s formal declaration of their death, followed by the subsequent installment of a new leader. In the case of the most recent leader, this interval extended to about 3 months or potentially longer, if the accuracy of the Turkish narrative concerning his demise in early April of the previous year holds true.

Overall, this pattern highlights an ongoing reduction in the impact of the ISIS leader on the organization’s plans and strategies, accentuating their symbolic role over substantial participation in shaping the organization’s tactics. It accentuates the idea that there could potentially be a managing “structure or entity” within the organization, where the absence of the ISIS leader yields minimal effects.

2. Scarcity of Leadership Options within ISIS: Aligned with the postponed unveiling of a fresh leader for ISIS and the emblematic essence of this role within the organization and its various factions, a notable facet emerges. This involves the limited awareness of the actual identity of the leader, even subsequent to their passing, apart from “Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi,” who held a prominent command position within the organization. This scenario unfolds due to the organization’s experience of decline within Iraq and Syria, leading to the expulsion of its members from territories it had previously held.

It’s apparent that the organization is encountering constraints in identifying suitable candidates from its leadership ranks to step into the role of the organization’s leader. This predicament is compounded by the apprehension and elimination of top-tier leaders along with a significant portion of second-tier leaders. Consequently, it is plausible that the organization has redirected its attention towards certain second-tier leaders and extended its considerations to encompass third-tier leaders. These individuals likely occupied positions of influence within the regions under the organization’s control. This shift is especially remarkable since the organization underscores the significance of the leader belonging to the “Qurashi” lineage.

It’s evident that there has been a diminishing in the effectiveness of the organization’s last two leaders. This becomes evident through the remarks made by the organization’s official spokespersons concerning them, as well as the absence of extensive discussions regarding their symbolic roles within the organization. This mirrors the situation when “Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi” was introduced as the successor to “al-Baghdadi.”

In the recent statement provided by the new spokesperson, there was limited elaboration on the newly appointed leader, “Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.” Instead, only a brief reference was made, situated within the context of a gathering known as “Ahlu al-Haqq wa al-Aqd” within “ISIS,” which was responsible for the selection of the new leader.

3. Apprehensions Regarding Organizational Cohesion: In light of the new spokesperson’s approximately 30-minute speech and an examination of the key messages, particularly among the organization’s members across different branches, notable apprehensions about internal cohesion within the organization come to the fore. These concerns stem from the consecutive targeting of its leaders within a brief timeframe. This is in contrast to the situations surrounding “al-Baghdadi” and “Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi.” There persists a consistent reliance on the approach of keeping the identity of the new leader concealed, solely dependent on a pseudonym.

Hence, the new spokesperson of “Daesh” urged the organization’s members to pledge allegiance to the new leader on multiple occasions, employing phrases designed to inspire them to uphold their connection with the organization, given his role as the embodiment of the “caliphate.” He underscored the significance of this allegiance by employing specific narratives that underscored the notion that “a Muslim should not pass away except with allegiance around his neck.”

Additionally, the new spokesperson symbolically elevated the organization’s leadership by drawing attention to the fact that the most recent leader to fall was the fourth since the declaration of the “professed caliphate.” This comparison was made in parallel with the four Rightly Guided Caliphs who met martyrdom, without detracting from their esteemed stature.

In a different context, the spokesperson of “Daesh” endeavored to offer a legal rationale for withholding the identity of the new leader and the allegiance of the organization’s members to an undisclosed individual. This is an issue lacking a firm foundation for allegiance, and it’s a facet that other organizations critique “Daesh” for. He made reference to specific traditional viewpoints that suggest allegiance from the “people of authority and decision” is sufficient, without necessitating unanimous agreement from all those pledging allegiance. This was an attempt to bestow legitimacy upon the leader’s position, grounded in its acknowledgment by the “people of authority and decision.”

4. A Contest to Neutralize “Daesh” Leaders and Commanders in Syria: The recognition by the “Daesh” organization regarding the passing of its leader in Idlib, Syria, accompanied by the trend of abbreviated tenures of the organization’s leaders, underscores the absence of a secure haven for concealing the organization’s leaders and members within Syria. This is particularly pronounced given the persistent targeting of these leaders, even when their locations of residence differ. Noteworthy is the case of “Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi,” whose demise occurred in the Daraa Governorate, beyond the previously targeted zones in northern Syria.

Amidst the ongoing targeting operations within Syria, the race among diverse entities to eliminate the organization’s leader comes to the forefront. This encompasses leveraging the incident for political advantage by the party responsible for the targeting, alongside the divergent interests among the various parties entangled in the Syrian crisis.

Yet, it’s conspicuous that the organization aspires to retain the “central leadership” within the confines of Syria and Iraq, without extending it beyond these two states. The organization has consistently underscored its intention not to shift this leadership to other regions in the times to come.

5. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s” Bid to Strengthen Its Position: Given the targeted location of the ISIS leader within the province of Idlib, currently under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, there exists the potential for “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” to have been involved in the operation against the organization’s leader.

If “ISIS’s” account regarding the direct engagement of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in the assassination of the organization’s leader holds true, or at the very least, if it played a role in his elimination by collecting information about the movements of ISIS leaders and operatives and subsequently sharing it with Turkey, this maneuver could bolster the position of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.

In either scenario, the assassination of the organization’s leader would likely result in efforts to strengthen ties with Turkey and “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.” This is particularly pertinent given some prevailing tensions due to Ankara’s endeavors to establish reconciliation with the Syrian regime, aimed at resolving specific matters and facilitating the repatriation of Syrian refugees from Turkey to regions in the north that are beyond the control of the Syrian army.

Although President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s announcement does not explicitly address the connection between “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” and the operation against the ISIS leader, it’s plausible that the former played a role in tracking and targeting him. This development could potentially pave the way for future understandings between “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” and the United States, albeit indirectly. This is influenced by shifts in “al-Joulani’s” stance away from jihadist initiatives. These shifts have contributed to his immunity from being targeted, as well as the safeguarding of the leadership of “the organization” by the United States. This perspective was brought forth by the spokesperson of the ISIS organization.

Deepening the Crisis

Even though the effect of eliminating organization leaders on the ongoing operational endeavors of ISIS remains limited, especially at the branch level, as various factors influence it beyond the individual and the leader’s role, this assessment holds true even in the case of the demise of the organization’s leader, “Abu Al-Hussein Al-Husaini Al-Qurashi.” Nonetheless, simultaneously, this situation presents a predicament concerning the organization’s incapacity to extend the life of its leader for more than a year, following the demise of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi in February 2022.

The accelerated rate of targeting organization leaders can be attributed to the mounting pressures that the organization has encountered in Iraq and Syria over the past year. Faced with challenges in augmenting operational activities and a transition towards a “struggle for survival” phase, the organization’s administration is becoming consolidated by a compact cadre of leaders, potentially following a distinct trajectory from the organization’s main leader. This group could conceivably remain localized within the realms of Iraq and Syria. There’s even a possibility that the organization might adopt a model resembling “Al-Qaeda” in the years ahead, wherein the weakening of central leadership bolsters the activities and potency of its branches.