President Biden’s First Visit to the Middle East – The Arab Wall
 President Biden’s First Visit to the Middle East

 President Biden’s First Visit to the Middle East



The Arab World Center for Advanced Research and Studies hosted on the 7th of July 2022 Professor Karim Hagag, Professor of Practice and Head of Middle East Studies at the Global Affairs and Public Policy School, the American University in Cairo, to discuss the issues to be covered in President Biden’s visit to the region. Professor Hagag identified several motives for the US President’s visit, including: 

–  Fallout of the Ukrainian War: This is probably the most important reason for the visit, to address the impact of the war on energy prices, and to reach an agreement with the oil producing countries, especially Saudis Arabia, regarding the level of production. 

Congressional mid-term elections: Midterm congress elections, upcoming in November, are likely to result in significant losses for the Democrats. This is related to domestic political and economic conditions, which are placing immense pressure on the Democratic Party. This is not unusual in US politics, where the party holding the presidency usually experiences losses in the midterm congress elections. President Biden hopes the visit will help lessen these expected losses for the Democratic Party. 

– Changes in US policies regarding the Middle East: There has been profound changes in US policies towards the Middle East. While these changes are more of a redeployment than a full withdrawal, they have had a significant impact, leaving something of a security vacuum.  President Biden is trying to address this situation, which requires some new form of security arrangements in the region, as well as repairing US relations with the GCC, which have been undermined over the past year.

The Israeli Visit and Bilateral Relations:

President Biden’s first stop is Israel, which is undergoing difficult political conditions related to the fall of the Israeli government. Even before the ruling coalition disintegrated, the visit was not expected to make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and as such the focus will be on US – Israeli bilateral relations. There are two main issues to discuss:

1. The first issue concerns Iran and the nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran in Vienna. President Biden wishes to address any potential differences between the US and Israel, and the latter’s concerns regarding the deal, and will seek to allay these fears. He is expected to stress the traditionally strong US stance regarding Israeli security, and to give Israel a free hand in dealing with Iranian threats. 

2. The second issue revolves around Israel’s further integration into the region, with particular focus of linking Israeli air defence system with that of other regional countries, including Saudi Arabia, while giving this integration a political dimension. The President will avoid any pressures on the current government regarding the Palestinian cause, and no breakthroughs are to be expected on this front.

The Symbolic Visit to the West Bank:

The second stop for Biden is to visit the West Bank, in the context of the position of the Democratic party regarding the need reach a fair settlement of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict through the implementation of the two-state solution. It appears that the US administration has concluded that the underlying conditions for the achievement of a two-state solution must be preserved, through maintaining the Palestinian Authority, improving its relations with the US, and repairing the damage of the Trump Years. It should be noted that the Palestinian cause has been gaining traction lately in the Democratic Party, especially its progressive elements, hence, it has become increasingly important in internal party politics. President Biden therefore cannot afford to ignore the Palestinian issue and must make at least symbolic gestures in this respect. 

A bilateral meeting in Beit Lahm therefore has a more symbolic message than say meeting in Ramallah, as does a visit to a Palestinian hospital in East Jerusalem. The steps to raise the level of US representation to the Palestinian authority, the establishment of a Palestinian affairs bureau, which would report directly to the State Department and no longer go through the US Embassy in Jerusalem, are symbolic steps to appease the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. The idea of reopening of the US consulate in East Jerusalem, to restore the pre-Trump status, was met with extreme Israeli opposition.

Visiting Saudi Arabia and Shoring Up Bilateral Relations:

President Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia comes within the context of deep rifts in the bilateral relationship on political and security levels, related to the issue of Khashoggi on the one hand, and US redeployment on the other. There is a perception by Arab Gulf states as a whole that the US security umbrella and US role in the region is in retreat, and that negotiations with Iran will have a direct impact on their future security. This has led to  a loss of trust  in security cooperation with the US, reflected for example in the deepening of  Saudi military cooperation with China. 

 Saudi cooperation with China on Ballistic Missiles, the purchasing of Chinese fighters, and the establishment of a Saudi Nuclear program have been a source of grave concern to the Biden Administration. The Russian – Ukrainian war, and the energy crisis, focused the Biden Administration on the importance of relations with Saudi Arabia, leading it to overcome the Khashoggi issue. This was achieved through announced, and some unannounced meetings between US officials and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, paving the way for a restoration of relations. 

There are 3 main issues on the table of President Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia

1- The Yemeni Crisis: This is a sensitive issue for the Democratic Party, where there is strong opposition to any US involvement with Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen. There is also grave concern regarding its humanitarian consequences, and a propensity to cut aid to Saudi Arabia related to this issue, as well as concerted efforts to maintain the ceasefire and enable efforts to reach a resolution.

2- Increasing Oil Production: Reports of the meeting between the Saudi Crown Prince and the Director of the CIA suggested an understanding that Saudi Arabia will increase its oil production to deal with the fallout from the Ukraine war. However, the US is to pressure Saudi Arabia further, to exceed the limits on oil production outlined in the OPEC+ agreement. This is a point of contention, as Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE to maintain their relations with Russia.  Saudi Arabia in particular is reluctant to sacrifice its relations with Russia. 

3- Incorporating Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords: There have been  important steps taken in this regard,  including bilateral visits by businessmen from both sides, as well as trade and investment deals. President Biden wishes  to enhance the momentum of the Abraham Accords by incorporating Saudi Arabia, and increasing the scope of Israeli The US  flights over Saudi air space. There may be an establishment of direct flights to transport Israeli Arabs. However, it appears that Saudi Arabia does not wish to rush into this matter, and the US will not exert further pressure in this respect and will accept gradual steps. The most important item is security arrangements in the Red Sea. 

Potential Consequences

Professor Hagag outlined a number of potential consequences of President Biden ‘s visit to the region, the most important of which are the following: 

Regional Defence Cooperation. The region is  not in the process of establishing a new security pact, as this would require a political declaration by the parties, an agreement on who this pact is directed against, all taking an official format, and this is unlikely. What is likely is a much humbler format of regional security arrangements. This would be along the lines of defence cooperation proposed by the Israeli Defence Minister, in terms of a framework for anti- missile defence in the Middle East, sponsored by the US and incorporating Arab states and Israel, to face the threat from Iran. This is an old US proposal, which would cover an existing defence gap in the region. Israel is attempting to give this cooperation a political dimension. On the other hand, the Arab Gulf states have their reservations regarding labelling this cooperation as directed against Iran, as this may provoke it. As the US does not wish to enter into a confrontation with Iran, President Biden may side with the Gulf states on this matter. This arrangement would support reduced US involvement in Middle East security, but it faces the obstacle of reduced regional faith in the US.   

The “I2U2” Group: This grouping is based on a US initiative, including the UAE, Israel, and India, and focuses on the West Asia region. It can be viewed as part of the US push to create new international pacts and alliances to confront Chinese influence, and to reimagine   the borders of the Middle East, along the line of President Bush’s “Greater Middle East”.

Entrenching the Status Quo: President Biden’s visit does not reflect a US desire to re-engage in the Middle East, but to consolidate the current framework. That is, the US seeks to disengage from the region’s security arrangement and encourage local interactions in this respect, maintaining the fight against terrorism to prevent threats against US interests, as well as dealing with the Iranian nuclear file. It is therefore not likely that the US will reengage militarily in regional conflicts.  Biden’s visit will not change the current dynamics regarding the engagement of Arab Gulf states with Iran, as there appears no US intention to enhance its security umbrella.

 A Joint Vision for the Middle East 

Professor Hagag believes that Arab states have not formulated a common vision for dealing with the new situation in the region, which would enable them to coordinate regarding developments in an effective manner. The success of Biden’s visit to the region is contingent on the extent to which countries can obtain concessions, as for instance in Israel obtaining more financial aid to enhance military capabilities. The visit will not reflect a major shift in US policy towards the region during the coming period. Arab states need to create a measure of balance in their relations with the US and other major players such as China. Israel was able to establish an important example in this respect, as it was able to institutionalize its relationship with the US, establishing joint committees on various levels, through which to examine and discuss all issues of concern.

Professor Hagag believes it is not likely that China will play any major security role in the region, that would take up the slack created by US disengagement, as China has reservations in this respect. But China will play a role through more active diplomatic engagement.