UNIMTAS envoy, Fady Elqady, announced on June 11^th the suspension of the National Dialogue in Sudan, which had been launched only a few days earlier, on the 8^th of June. No date was given for the resumption of the dialogue, and the suspension was attributed to ongoing differences between its military and civilian components. The dialogue had included representatives from the civilan revolutionary front, such as Gabriel Ibrahim, representatives from a number of other civilian factions, including “Al Wefak El Watany”, “Al Ithiday”, as well as “ Al Motamer Al Sha’by”, an Islamist organization  which was founded by Hassan Eltorabi. Also participating were representatives of the current regime, representatives of the former Al Bashir regime. The military was represented by Vice President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council Mohamed Daqlo, Shams Eldin Kabashi and Ibrahim Gaber, members of the Council, with the three forming the “Military Committee” participating in the dialogue.

The announcement from UNIMTAS postponing the dialogue that was due to take place on the 12th of June came in response to a number of factors that led the organizing committee, composed of representatives of the UN, IGAD, and the African Union, to come to this decision. The most important factor was the announcement by the “Freedom and Change” alliance that it would not participate in the dialogue.  Representatives of the alliance rejected the idea of participating in the dialogue after an unofficial meeting with representatives of the military on June 9^th. They explained their view that this would only serve to legitimize the military takeover of the government and does not provide a genuine political resolution of the crisis. It would appear that the meeting convinced them that the military was adamant in executing its own vision of remaining in control of the transitionary period. 

The alliance, on its part, is calling for an end to military rule, handing over power completely to a civilian government, and for the military to return to their barracks. The alliance accused the military of not sticking to its promises regarding trust-building measures, such as ceasing attacks against protestors, releasing the remaining political prisoners. The alliance is also calling for a sufficient timeframe for all the political parties in Sudan to prepare and be able to participate in any upcoming elections, previously scheduled by the military to take place in July 2023.

As a result of the alliances’ stance, the UN, in consultation with IGAD and the AU, came to the conclusion that it would be useless to hold a new round of dialogue without the participation of this important faction, as it is a primary player, and has significant weight in terms of the domestic balance of power. There could be no serious dialogue regarding the country’s political future in its absence. The international sponsors of the dialogue also concluded there is a need for direct dialogue between Sudan’s civilian political forces and the military to reach an understanding on how to proceed in the context of Sudan’s domestic situation.

Moreover, there is disagreement over the choice of the factions chosen to participate in the dialogue. Some of the parties chosen to participate are not viewed to be representative of a wide segment of the Sudanese population, which led to calls for widening the scope of participation  to include more popular organizations, such as labor and professional unions. Islamist organizations that were active under the Bashir Regime protested their exclusion from the dialogue, as did that regime’s disbanded ruling party. 

Both the civilian political forces and the military in Sudan have been unresponsive to regional and international initiatives aimed at resolving the current crisis. Saudi Arabia, in coordination with the US has brokered negotiations between these factions, succeeding in arranging a meeting, but this did not prevent “Liberty and Change” from announcing its refusal to take part in the dialogue. The military has also resisted international calls to hand over power to a civilian government, including pressure from the US, conveyed by the Assistant Secretary of State during a visit from the 5^th to the 9^th of June.

It is likely that regional and international actors will continue to press the alliance to take part in the dialogue. The sponsors (The UN, AU, and IGAD) have in fact announced their intention to do so. All parties to the initial round of dialogue also affirmed the importance of its participation for the national dialogue to succeed and expressed their support for the role played by Saudi Arabia in mediating between the military and the civilians in Sudan. While this suggests continuing pressure to hole the next round of dialogue as soon as possible, these efforts could fail in the face of the steadfast  refusal of the alliance to partake in any national dialogue until the reins of power are handed over to civilians . Moreover, there is growing fragmentation of the civilian political front in Sudan, which precludes forming a cohesive stance regarding important issues, and the ability to compromise and make concessions necessary for the dialogue to proceed and the crisis resolved. 

On the other hand, the military steadfastly upholds the stance that a national consensus must first be reached before handing over power to civilians. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, reaffirmed in recent comments that the army would not withdraw until a dialogue is conducted between all parties, and free and fair parliamentary elections  are held at the end of the current transitional period. The army’s stance is supported by some civilian organizations that have splintered off from the Freedom and Change alliance, and whose primary objective is to prevent parties that held sway under the previous fallen regime from returning to power

In view of these differences, and the inability of the various sides to make concessions and reach common ground regarding important issues, it is likely that the current political crisis in Sudan will continue. It is expected that efforts to overcome these differences will continue, and that the US will continue to pressure the military to hand over power to a civilian government. Progress must be made on reaching a framework  for the transfer of power, through comprehensive national dialogue, before that objective can be achieved.