The video appearance of Al Qaeda leader Khalid Batarfi’s , which was broadcast by Al Qaeda’s media arm, the Al-Malahem Foundation, last November, reveals the dire state of the organization in Yemen, after it was once considered Al Qaeda’s strongest and most active branch. At 59 minutes and 34 seconds, it is a longer appearance compared to previous ones, the most prominent of which was in last February, lasting about 20 minutes, which sought to respond to a United Nations report regarding Batarfi’s arrest in Al-Mahra Governorate in October 2020, and touched on some regional issues, before addressing the internal situation in Yemen.
It is important to note that Al-Qaeda in Yemen has been experiencing noticeable decline, specifically over the past three years, after a dramatic rise following the outbreak of protests against former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011. The organization took advantage of the turbulent situation to expand and control areas in the country’s south, as well as areas in Abyan and Shabwa. Al Qaeda found in the 2014 Houthi coup a new opportunity to escalate the armed rebellion, and to control new areas in the south and center of the country, achieving a significant presence in Marib, Al-Bayda, Hadramout, and Al-Mahra starting in 2015. Its operations escalated in 2016 and 2017 to preserve the areas under its control, before a gradual decline, whereby its presence is now confined to small geographic areas in Abyan, Shabwa, and Al-Bayda.
Factors leading to Al Qaeda’s decline
The most important factors behind the decline in Al Qaeda’s influence and control in Yemen can be identified as follows:
Defections to ISIS: Elements of Al-Qaeda in Yemen defected to join ISIS in late 2014 and early 2015. While this led to some internal disruption, the organization continued to advance on the ground, until clashes began with ISIS for control over areas in central Yemen, specifically in Al-Bayda, in 2018, in which some Qaeda members were killed. This further weakened the group.
Continued US targeting of Al Qaeda leaders: The United States conducted air strikes to target top leaders of the organization. In 2015, it was able to kill Nasir Al-Wuhayshi, the leader of the group at the time, then Ibrahim Al-Rubaysh, and Ibrahim Al-Asiri. In 2020, it was able to kill Qassem al-Raymi, who had succeeded al-Wuhayshi. The strikes reached their apex in 2017, with the US conducting 131 air strikes, not only targeting leaders, but also military seconds- in- command.
The complexities of the Yemen conflict: The situation on the ground in Yemen is complex, and includes multiple parties: the Yemeni army, known as the Legitimacy Forces, which have the support of Arab coalition forces, the Houthis in the north, the Southern Transitional Council and the Security Belt Forces. All of these parties have entered, at one time or another, into clashes with Al Qaeda, in view of the Saudi and Emirati goal to eradicate the organization during the war. Legitimacy forces and the Arab coalition expelled the organization from its areas of control in Hadramout, specifically Mukalla in 2016. Likewise, there were confrontations with the Houthis at several points in Shabwa, Abyan, and Al-Bayda, some of which continued into this year.
Declining support from tribes: The support of some tribes in southern Yemen can be considered part of the equation of the group’s survival, considering it was established through a merger of the two branches in Yemen and Saudi Arabia in southern Yemen by Nasser al-Wuhayshi in 2009. Leaders and youth from southern tribes joined the group. This proved to be a turning point for Al Qaeda, as it changed its focus from foreign targets, especially American interests, such as the American destroyer Cole in 2000 in the port of Aden, to prioritizing local issues. The decline of tribal support in more than one governorate therefore represented a blow to the organization. some Western reports, including from Associated Press in 2018, indicated that it was the Arab Coalition Forces which persuaded Yemeni tribes to abandon support for Al Qaeda.
The significance of the video
Al Qaeda in Yemen is trying to restore part of its lost influence. And this video is meant to play a role in this respect in a number of ways:
Confirming Batarfi’s legitimacy: The video represents part of propaganda campaign to confirm Batarfi’s legitimacy, and to diffuse internal tensions and differences that emerged following his assumption of leadership, after the killing of Qassem Al-Rimi in 2020. These tensions are related to accusations against some leaders, particularly Abu Omar al-Nahdi, of having leaked information about the organization that led to the killing of Al-Rimi. The internal crisis had escalated, with accusations of treason, whereby the security committee undertook the killing of a number of members on charges related to leaking information. Some of these charges were related to the targeting of Nasser al-Wuhayshi in 2015. Batarfi’s appearance was unusual in that it took the form of an interview, an hour long, to which there is a second part, not yet released. Video releases by Al Qaeda leaders are usually in a speech-like format.
Regaining tribal Support: In the video interview, Batarfi aims to win over the tribes, as was illustrated by his reference to “the proud tribes of Yemen” numerous times. He also referred to Al Qaeda’s fight alongside the tribes of the south against the Houthis on 11 fronts. It seemed that Batarfi was seeking to maintain the remaining relations with some tribes and avoid clashes, by hinting he would not retaliate against some tribesmen who fought Al Qaeda in Ma’rib , despite his ability to “discipline” them, but that would lead to greater evils. This may also be taken as a message to the tribes, that such a stance should not be repeated.
Outlining a distinct position regarding Iran: The interview also sought to draw a clear line of distinction between the position of Al Qaeda in Yemen, and that of Ayman El Zawahiri, leader of the Central Al Qaeda Organization in Afghanistan, with regard to Iran. Batarfi launched an attack on Iran and its proxies in the Arab region, especially the Houthis in Yemen, in more than one place in the interview. In the first place, he condemned some Palestinian factions for saluting Iran because it supported them. The second reference came in the context of discussing the situation in Yemen, and Iran’s support for the Houthis in order to implement its agenda in the region and empower the Shiite minority. Finally, he spoke of US support for the Shiite project in Yemen, by supporting the Houthis against Al Qaeda and the Sunnis. It appears Batarfi is attempting to distance Al Qaeda in Yemen from the relationship between Al Qaeda’s central leadership and Iran, in order to protect his standing in Yemen. This became necessary following revelations by former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo of some aspects of this ambiguous relationship last January, when he claimed that Iran provides headquarters for Al Qaeda, and the latter operates under the cover of the Iranian regime.
Messages to the Yemeni public: The interview carried a number of messages for Yemenis. Batarfi denied accusations that Al Qaeda had cooperated with the Houthis, specifically in Marib and Al-Bayda, which allowed them to advance towards the south. He sought to undermine the image of the Arab Alliance, through references to normalization with Israel, which is opposed by the Yemenis. Batarfi spoke of the coalition’s efforts to sow corruption in Yemen and separate Muslims from their Islamic identity, claiming violations by the coalition against Muslims’ interests. His aim was to mobilize Yemenis against the Arab coalition and win them over to support his organization.
Raising morale: Batarfi sought to raise the moral of his followers, referring to the Taliban and how it reached “empowerment”, seizing power after two decades of “jihad”, which he argued could be repeated in Yemen. He attacked Islamist political trends that espoused democracy and elections, indicating that this path had failed. Finally, he extolled the virtues of Al Qaeda vision, and its members, who stand steadfast against the enemies of Islam who are fighting the organization.
Signaling a new phase: Batarfi outlined what appears to be a new phase for the organization during the coming period, referring to the adoption of guerrilla war tactics in the Yemeni arena, in the context of the clashes with the Houthis. This reflects an inability to remain stationed on some fronts, perhaps for reorganization purposes, while biding time for an appropriate opportunity to re-expand on the ground, in light of the complex situation. This is consistent with Yemeni press reports indicating that the organization is regrouping, recruiting, and training new elements in some areas, such as Shabwa governorate, and is establishing terrorist cells in Hadramout.
In conclusion, Al Qaeda’s history in Yemen illustrates its ability to adapt to different situations. Despite receiving successive major blows, the group’s ability to once more become active in Yemen cannot be ruled out, especially if it can draw new members from the Yemeni tribes, or it obtains external support from the central organization in Afghanistan, which appears to enjoy freedom of movement under Taliban rule.