The indefinite postponement of presidential elections in Libya shows the difficulty of implementing political roadmaps of transition in crisis countries. The postponement raises the question of how the date of 24 December 2021 was determined in the first place, and according to which criteria. The situation in Libya bears similarities to precarious circumstances in Iraq where, although elections were in fact held, many critical questions are left unanswered. Regional experience shows that a reoccurring pitfall of political recovery is the ‘single bet’ strategy. This approach persists despite past experiences that underscore the fragility of transitions, including demanding security requirements, as well as political and economic hurdles. Such obstacles cannot be overcome through inflexible one-size-fits-all propositions, that do not offer possible alternatives along what is often a faltering road to recovery. 

Shared responsibility
In most cases of political transition in the Arab World, there seems to be a shared responsibility across four key stakeholders in political transitions: the United Nations, the national parliament, domestic political forces, and the electoral commission. Some observers consider it important to add external players who can also exert a significant impact on the transition process. These main stakeholders play different roles and have varying levels of impact and participation in different cases. For example, the UN plays a key role in Libya as it remains under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Iraq emerged from under this chapter in 2017 with respect to the oil-for-food program, however, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) continues to provide political and humanitarian assistance at the behest of the Iraqi government. In Libya, parliament is responsible for providing the legislative framework for elections, whereas in Iraq, the parliament is in charge of setting the date for elections at the conclusion of its legislative term. Electoral commissions are responsible for procedural aspects of the elections process, while the role of political forces is to effectively influence and align stakeholders towards consensus.

Although all these stakeholders are jointly responsible for implementing the roadmap to recovery, they often indulge in behavior that has unforeseen consequences. Political transitions that have started on a promising note, tend to end abruptly for various reasons, including a failure to meet the demands of different political groups, as well as vested interests. Parliamentary blocs in Iraq reflect the interests of certain groups in regaining political favor and reestablishing political power. In Libya, most of the entities who participated in designing the roadmap to political reform are direct stakeholders and benefactors of the rebuilding process. For example, although Article 12 prevents the nomination of the prime minister in parliamentary elections, the law does not elaborate on the governing electoral rules in the case of his retirement. Moreover, the law does not prevent the head of parliament from standing for election, despite the conflict of interest rising from the fact that he is charged with overseeing the administration of the legislative process. Established legal precedent in fact designates the head of parliament as the best suited to assume provisional leadership under compelling circumstances in political transitions, such as the absence of an elected president.

Major obstacles
Unravelling political transitions raise an important question: does the crux of the matter lie in the blueprints for state building? Or is it poor conduct by vying stakeholders that leads to stalled political results? It can be argued that both issues impinge on one another as opposed to being mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, it is certainly the blueprint that sets the rules of the game, in which different interest groups operate based upon the institutionalized foundations of political engagement. Thus, the terms laid by the political roadmap represent a transitional constitution of sorts, that ought to be clear and decisive in terms of scope and mode of the institutional mechanisms in place – although this has mostly not been the case. For instance, the Berlin Conference provides the principles and foundations governing political transition in Libya, but the agreements reached in the Geneva meetings serve as the main political reference. As such, large gaps arise when implementing the transition process, the most notable of which are:

Selective priorities: This relates to the sequencing of major issues in the political process where the focus is on elections as the ‘end-all’ goal of transition, as opposed to addressing other equally important concerns. These include the disarmament of militias, the termination of foreign military presence and interference, as well as changing the conditions conducive to the rise of terrorist activities.

The absence of mechanisms to punish disruption: In practice, political transitions often face disruption from various parties. While the US and the EU announced penalties on those who partake in obstructing Libyan elections, for example, concrete punitive measures against these obstructors remain largely absent.

Exclusion from the planning process: In some cases, key parties may be excluded or overlooked in the development of the roadmap to political transition. This is evident in Iraq, where although political change was triggered by the April uprisings, its proponents were not invited to provide input on the development of the methods and mechanisms of the transition process.

Referencing several political authorities: Putting in place several authorities to govern the transitional phase leads to complications. It is difficult in such a context to discern responsibility. Libya is a case in point, whereby a ceasefire was pivotal in advancing the transition process, however, the Joint Military Commission has only a coordinating capacity. It has no executive capabilities on issues such as establishing a unitary military force, the extradition of foreign mercenaries, or regarding establishing security in general. In fact, these critical responsibilities are the purview of different bodies whose approaches are largely non-aligned. 

Differing perspectives of political administrations: During the transition period in Iraq, the opposition warned the prime minister against engaging in public affairs, urging him to focus solely on electoral responsibilities. By contrast in Libya, the prime minister sought to use his executive accomplishments to bolster his nomination for elections, although he had pledged not to run. The fact that this pledge did not have a clear legal basis proved to be another point of contention.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the failure to put in place a precise outline for political transition usually results in disappointing outcomes. Political transitions also need to recognize the distinction between  theory and practice, whereby there must be plans and alternatives in place to deal with obstacles encountered when implementing the roadmap, so that the process is not derailed for lack of flexible alternatives.