On May 10, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced the establishment of a new air base Zahedan for the force’s helicopter fleet, in the provincial capital of Sistan and Baluchestan, to support the IRGC’s land force. This announcement comes in the context of internal and external developments, including local protests against the Iranian military, diminishing US and Israel threats of military force, and escalating tensions with neighbouring countries to the east.

Fares News Agency: Opening of the Ground Forces Base in Zahedan

In the presence of IRGC Commander Hussein Salami, Iran announced on May 10 the establishment of the new Martyr Ali Arabi air base in Zahedan, the provincial capital of Sistan and Baluchestan. According to Iranian media reports, the new base is fit to accommodate the landing and takeoff of combat and support helicopters, in different categories such as 205, 206, 214, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Commander of the Guards’ ground forces Mohammed Pakpour, said the aim of establishing the new air base was to strengthen the capacity to carry out security and defense tasks and provide services to citizens.

Several Objectives

The establishment of the new air base, achieves several of the IRGC’s objectives, most notably:

1. Reinforcing military presence in Zahedan: Zahedan was a major focus of recent protests in Iran that started mid-September and lasted for over five months, despite the repressive measures adopted by Iranian authorities. Protests in Zahedan gained particular momentum, with most of its population being Iranian Sunni. By establishing the new base, the IRGC is strengthening its military presence in the province, especially since the Iranian regime continues to insist that recent protests were supported by external forces to undermine the regime and spread chaos and instability in Iran. The establishment of this base is also a warning message for the locals, by demonstrating the military capabilities to meet any challenges that Iran may face during the next phase, whether internally, such as protests, or external threats, such as a military attack.

2. Countering the Iranian military: The IRGC announced their new airbase three months after the Iranian military established the Aqaba 44 underground airbase for fighter planes and drones on 7 February. Although the Iranian regime is constantly keen to demonstrate a high level of coordination between the army and the IRGC, there remains an ongoing rivalry to maintain a power balance between the two military entities, particularly after several army commanders filed complaints of power imbalances within the IRGC. The announcement of the new base therefore suggests that, at the current stage, the Guard is trying to stay on par with the army and close any gaps pertaining to military capabilities between the two forces.

3. Sending a warning message to neighboring states: This announcement is targeted at Azerbaijan and the Taliban in Afghanistan in particular. The former has recently engaged in diplomatic escalation with Iran, following the mutual expulsions of several members of the diplomatic mission, after Azerbaijan accused Iran of overlooking the secure protection of its embassy in Tehran, leading to its intrusion on 27 January, and the killing of its security director. Of course, the strengthening of political relations between Azerbaijan and Israel played a key role in this tension, especially after Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Tel Aviv on March 29.

Despite the ongoing communication between Iran and the Taliban since the latter’s regain of control in Kabul in August 2021, continuing tensions persist given the marked divergence across both countries’ policies on many issues. Hence, although Iran is keen to maintain stable relations with Iran, this does not rule out renewed concerns, as was the case in 1998 when such tensions almost led to a war, which is why both countries have maintained and continue to strengthen military and armaments in areas adjacent to the border.

4. Intimidating Israel: By building this airbase, Iran hopes to intimidate Israel, especially as it expects the latter to continue its security and intelligence operations that aim to attack Iran’s nuclear and military facilities given the continued escalation between the two countries. To this end, the new base expands Iran’s options to attack targets in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, areas where Israeli vessels have already been attacked for which Tel Aviv has made direct accusations against Tehran, through which it attempts to raise the cost of Israel’s intelligence operations at home.

5. Diminish the implications of any possible military attack: Iran no longer rules out the possibility of a military attack either by the US or Israel due to ongoing differences between the countries over many issues. This was evident, for example, in statements made by U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, on May 4, in which he said, “The United States has made it clear to Tehran that it will not allow it to possess nuclear weapons, and that it will do all necessary to prevent them, including recognizing Israel’s freedom to take the necessary action.”

Hence, Iran is currently improving its forces to withstand the repercussions of any military attack through the distribution of its military bases throughout Iran, as well as establishing several underground bases.

Constant pressure

In light of this, it can finally be said that the actions taken by Iran at the current stage imply the following:

First, Iran still believes that external forces are plotting a strategy to undermine and overthrow the current regime even after the protests that erupted in mid-September receded.

Second, the threats to Iran are no longer engendered by Western powers alone through US military presence in the Gulf and Iraq, but also, from its Eastern forces through Israel’s expanding presence in Central Asia. This is illustrated by Israel’s success in opening its embassy in Turkmenistan on April 20, after improving its relations with Azerbaijan.

Third, Iran will not retreat when it comes to developing its nuclear and missile program, even if it concludes a new deal with international powers. This runs in parallel with expanding Iran’s sphere of influence among neighboring states, making “tension” as a key feature of Iran’s relations with the United States and Israel in the near future.