On June 7, 2022, the Arab World Center for Research and Advanced Studies in Cairo organized a panel discussion on the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on Arab food security. The keynote speaker for the panel was Nader Nour El-din, Professor at the Faculty of Agriculture in Cairo University, and former Adviser to the Minister of Supply. Participating in the discussion were Dr Mohamed Ezz Al Arab, Dr Mohamed Abbas Nagi, Expert in regional affairs Ahmed Eleiba, expert in international affairs Amr Abdul Atty,  Dr Hamdi Bashir, Karam Saeed, Mohammed Al Feky, Dr Haitham Imran, Dr Mervat Zakaria, Ali Atef and Nadine Mohamed. 

In his keynote speech, Professor Nour El-din identified the multiple factors which have served to exacerbate the impact of the war in Ukraine on the Arab World, which include:

Water scarcity: Arab countries are home to 5 percent of the world’s population, but receive only one percent of global rainfall, creating a major shortage in the region’s water resources. Climatic conditions of high temperatures and drought means that food production further depletes already scarce water reserves. In comparison, cooler climates are more water efficient and enjoy larger amounts of rain, and fuller flowing rivers. Rivers in Arab countries such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria are impacted by the effect of dams built upstream by other countries, including Turkey as well as the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which means they receive reduced water flows.

Import dependency: Arab countries import about 65 percent of basic food requirements including all their grains and oils, excluding fruits and vegetables. Arab countries import approximately 25 food staples that are necessary for daily use. The region is considered one of the largest net importers of food worldwide, due to a combination water scarcity, decline in agricultural productivity, and outdated agricultural and irrigation technologies. In contrast, there are many countries adopting modern technologies and equipment in agriculture, as well as smart farming methods that rely on drones. 

Rising global energy prices: As a result of the Russian-Ukrainian War, and the US and European sanctions on Russia, global energy prices have risen dramatically, and consequently, so has the cost of shipping foodstuffs. By extension, poultry and meat prices have increased, exacerbating already spiking prices of strategic food commodities caused by the war. It is worth noting that food prices rose significantly in 2010, after some countries began to allocate a portion of their agricultural produce towards the production of biofuels as part of a Western strategy to reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

Russia and Ukraine are critical to the world’s food supply chain: Russia and Ukraine are the world’s leading food producers. The conflict between the two countries has had a significant impact on the world’s food supply chains, especially in the Arab region that relies on 80 to 90 percent of its grain imports from Russia, and 32 percent of its total food requirements from Russia and the Ukraine. Worldwide, Russia and the Ukraine account for 32 percent and 37 percent of wheat and barley trade, respectively; 17 percent of maize trade; and 73 percent of sunflower oil trade.

Russia and Ukraine control fertilizer production: an important dimension of the crisis relates to the large contribution of the two countries to global fertilizer production. Together, Russia and Ukraine account for 15 percent of nitrogen fertilizer trade, an important nutrient for plants; and 17 percent of the potassium fertilizer trade, which plays an important role in increasing crop yields and overall quality. Given the imposition of sanctions and the disruption to global shipping, this means that the crisis extends beyond the food supply chain to the fertilizer industry, which is critical should some Arab countries such as Egypt decide to increase their area of reclaimed land for cultivation. It is also important to take into account Russia’s significant share in global gas trade, particularly within Europe, given that gas is a main input in the production of fertilizers, pesticides, and food- based industries.

Professor Nour El-din outlined the main effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on Arab food security as follows:

The “politicization” of food: The global crisis following the Russian-Ukrainian war intensified the politicization of food security, which could be part of the explanation of Arab countries’ reticence to take an official political stance on the war.  Russia announced that it will export food to its allies only, meaning that political polarization will now extend to this crucial issue. In the same vein, Kuwait has recently expressed its objection to the US redirecting wheat shipments originally intended for Kuwait to European countries, meaning that Europe will be prioritized, while Arab countries will fall to a lower position.

Disruption of food supply chains from alternative sources:  Securing food supplies from alternative sources to Russia and Ukraine is also problematic for several reasons. These alternative sources are geographically distant from the Arab region. Food shipments take 24 days to arrive from the US and Canada, 28 days from Argentina, and only 10 days from Russia or Ukraine. There is also the additional burden of rising oil prices, which make these shipments more expensive. Together, these factors will have a negative effect on the strategic reserve of key commodities in several Arab countries. Moreover, other wheat-producing countries such as China and India, retain most of their production to feed their large populations. Some wheat shipments from India, for example, have proven to be not fit for consumption. 

Potential domestic upheavals: Higher prices of food in Arab countries, in light of the aforementioned conditions, could lead to domestic instability in some cases. In Lebanon, for example, the main cause of popular discontent is high food prices; even though food is available, it remains inaccessible. Price inflation has made access to food a growing concern.  

 It is important to point out that the issue of food security affects Arab countries differently. Countries experiencing prolonged crises are likely to fare worse. In Yemen, for instance, where the political situation is complex and conflict has been prolonged, it is expected that the World Food Program will need to continue to offer food assistance to alleviate the dire situation for its people. Countries experiencing decelerated growth rates may need to reassess development plans given the severe pressures caused by higher energy and food prices. Oil-producing states have been better able to weather the food crisis caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war, since they have made gains from the global rise in energy prices results. 

Professor Nour El-din proposed several recommendations to address the food crisis and price inflation caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war:

Diversifying food sources. Arab States should go back to diversifying sources of food imports. Food exporting countries include, Australia, France, Romania, Hungary, Canada, the US, Argentina, Brazil and India. Diversification is a sound strategy in light of the current war, but it also hedges against climatic disruptions such as that experienced in 2011 when Russia was hit by a drought and forest fires that undermined its ability to fulfill supply agreements.

Prioritize manufacturing. Before embarking on a strategy of expanding investment in agricultural production, careful feasibility studies should be conducted. Returns on investments in agriculture are very low compared to return on investments in manufacturing industry. Higher returns from industrial investments could enable countries to better afford to purchase their needs, while trying to expand agricultural production in some Arab countries will be a drain on both finances and water resources. 

Modernizing agricultural practices. Arab countries must raise expenditure on research and development in the agricultural sphere, for example, improving available seeds to increase output, and employing modern methods of irrigation. Annual labor productivity amounts to USD500 per worker in Egypt, in contrast to USD5000 per worker in Saudi Arabia and USD23,000 in the US. The vast difference in productivity stems from investments in methods that improve efficiency.

Reallocating cultivated land. Cultivated areas assigned for growing vegetables, fruits, or export crops (as in Egypt) should be reallocated to the growth of strategic crops. It is illogical, for example, to allocate large areas of  agricultural land to plant animal feed rather than a strategic staple for the population such as wheat. 

Changing food consumption patterns. It has in general proven difficult to change the consumption patterns of populations when it comes to food. So while Egyptians will continue to regard bread as their primary staple, it will be necessary to focus efforts on encouraging Egyptians to reduce their consumption. This is likely happen due to rising costs. 

In conclusion, Professor Nour El-din suggests the need for a coordinated and unified Arab stance in addressing food security, to avoid confronting such a crisis once more in the future.  A cohesive could build resilience and eliminate food dependencies that could have political ramifications. Arab states could either depend on global exchanges or invest in agricultural production in other countries  such as Canada. He pointed out that any future confrontations of global significance, such as between China and the US over Taiwan, could instigate another  global food crisis, as political tension will increase energy prices and, by extension, food prices as well.