The acquisition of the “Yak-130” aircraft by Iran from Russia can be attributed to several motives, with the most prominent ones including preparations for a potential “Su-35” deal, diplomatic understandings between Iran and Ukraine, the balancing of a prisoner exchange agreement between Tehran and Washington, and the expansion of defense cooperation between Moscow and Tehran beyond the realm of the air force.
On September 2nd of this year, Iran officially announced the receipt of Russian “Yak-130” aircraft. Reports concerning the exact number of aircraft received have varied, ranging from two to a group of them. However, the specific quantity may not be of great significance, as the primary objective of this development is to train Iranian pilots in the operation of fourth-generation Russian fighters. This training had already commenced when Russia reportedly hosted a delegation of Iranian pilots for a similar mission.
This development has sparked controversy and raised questions, particularly among Western countries and several regional states, regarding the potential extent of military cooperation between Russia and Iran in the upcoming phase. This controversy primarily arises from conflicting signals in this context. While Iran initially announced on March 11th of the preceding year its intention to acquire a number of “Su-35” fighters from Russia and disclosed the establishment of an underground military base for receiving these fighters, designed to withstand potential bunker-busting bomb attacks, it later indicated on July 21st that the deal might be on hold. Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani commented, “Sometimes a decision is made to make a purchase, but as your capabilities improve, you can produce what you originally intended to buy. However, we are still evaluating the matter.”
Multiple Motives
Irrespective of the circumstances surrounding the limited number of “Yak-130” aircraft received by Iran, whether it be two or several aircraft, it is evident that their primary role is for training purposes rather than engagement in offensive operations, despite their inherent capabilities. While numerous reports suggest these aircraft can conduct light attack operations, this raises several implications:
- Preparation for a Significant Air Force Deal: This strongly implies that Russia and Iran are working to facilitate a substantial military agreement within the air force sector, specifically concerning the acquisition of “Su-35” fighter jets. This signifies Tehran and Moscow’s determination to defy mounting international and regional pressures, particularly after Iran’s announcement of the imminent receipt of these fighters. For example, Israel has exerted pressure on Russia to withhold the delivery of these fighters to Iran, viewing it as a disruption to the strategic balance between the two nations. There have even been hints of Israel potentially offering military support to Ukraine, a departure from its prior stance to avoid negatively impacting its agreements with Russia in Syria.
- Expanding the Horizons of Defense Cooperation: Military cooperation between Russia and Iran might extend beyond the confines of the air force sector, potentially encompassing other areas requiring development within the Iranian armed forces. This was evident in the visit of a high-level Iranian military delegation led by General Kioumarth Heidari, the commander of the Ground Forces, to Moscow on August 21st of the previous year. During this visit, discussions were held with a Russian delegation led by General Oleg Salyukov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, regarding military cooperation aimed at enhancing the military readiness of both countries’ armed forces. This suggests Iran’s interest in not limiting its collaboration with Russia to the air force alone but rather expanding the scope of this cooperation to include other sectors in the future.
- Anticipating Iranian-Ukrainian Agreements: Russia may currently be making efforts to preempt potential agreements being negotiated between Iran and Ukraine. Talks between military delegations from both countries were conducted in Oman with the aim of addressing allegations that Iran had provided military support to Russia, specifically in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles used by Russia in its military operations in Ukraine, particularly targeting Ukrainian infrastructure.
In this context, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian stated on August 10th of the previous year, “Around seven months ago, military talks were held between Iranian and Ukrainian delegations in Oman. However, the Ukrainian side did not provide any conclusive documents to substantiate their claims regarding Iranian military support to Russia.” What Moscow may fear extends beyond these potential Iranian-Ukrainian understandings; it also includes concerns about possible Iranian-American agreements related to the nuclear deal. Russia perceives that the United States, along with Western countries in general, will not agree to a new nuclear deal without addressing the issue of Iranian military support to Russia. Notably, Abdollahian linked these two issues in his interview with the “Ettelaat” newspaper on September 3rd of the current year when he referred to the “September Document” related to the nuclear deal, which could serve as the basis for a new agreement. He did this alongside repeating denials of Iranian involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian war in favor of Moscow.
- Containing Iranian Discontent Regarding the Emirates Islands Issue: Tensions between Russia and Iran escalated following the statement issued after the meeting of Russian Foreign Ministers and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries held in Moscow on July 10th of the past year. The statement expressed Moscow’s support for the Emirati approach regarding the three Emirati islands occupied by Iran.
Iran’s reaction went beyond summoning the Russian ambassador to protest Tehran’s dissatisfaction with this statement. Strong Iranian reactions toward Russia emerged, and warnings about relying on Russia to confront the West began to increase. This coincided with mounting criticism of the “Eastern Orientation” policy adopted by President Ebrahim Raisi’s government.
As a result, Russia took several conciliatory steps toward Iran, including hosting the Iranian military delegation in Moscow on August 21st of the past year, supporting Iran’s membership in the BRICS group on the same day, and ultimately delivering the Yak-130 aircraft to Iran.
- Balancing the Prisoner Exchange Deal: Russia’s recent move may be an attempt to balance the prisoner exchange deal announced by Iran and the United States on August 10th of the previous year. This deal involves Iran releasing five American prisoners in exchange for the release of $6 billion in its frozen funds in South Korea and the release of Iranian prisoners in the United States. This implies that Russia aims to establish boundaries for potential Iranian-American agreements that may evolve in the post-execution phase of this deal in the near future.
Interim Step
While Iran’s delivery of Yak-130 aircraft suggests that both countries are gearing up for a larger deal, which has raised concerns in the West and Israel, especially regarding the acquisition of “Su-35” fighter jets, it doesn’t rule out the possibility of various variables influencing the trajectory of this process. In this context, Iran and Russia may be using this recent step to gauge the reactions of Western countries, Israel, and potentially several Arab nations, particularly those in the Gulf region.
Russia, on its part, can leverage this issue to bolster its position against Western countries, especially those imposing pressure and sanctions due to the conflict in Ukraine. Iran, on the other hand, is seeking to gain more leverage through this matter, which it can utilize in its negotiations with Western countries, including the United States, concerning the nuclear deal. It’s essential to acknowledge that Russian-Iranian military cooperation will play a significant role in the dialogue and negotiations between Tehran and Washington, at least with regards to achieving nuclear and regional de-escalation. Some reports suggest that this could involve a halt in the increase of enriched uranium at various levels, notably 60%, in exchange for the easing of U.S. sanctions on Iran, particularly in the field of oil exports.