The Arab World Center for Research and Advanced Studies in Cairo organized a panel session entitled ” Enhancing Inter-Arab Relations” on November 9th. The center invited Dr. Ahmed Youssef Ahmed, Professor of Political Science at Cairo University and former Director of the Institute of Arab Research and Studies of the Arab League as a keynote speaker, in addition to the participation of a number of experts and researchers specializing in various fields, including Dr. Mohamed Ezz El Arab, Dr. Mohamed Abbas Nagy, Mr. Ahmed Eleiba, Mr. Amr Abdel Atty, and Mr. Mohamed Bassiouni.
A debilitating context
Dr. Ahmed began by addressing the current state of inter-Arab relations, describing the situation as dire. While a crisis in the Arab order is not a novelty, the current situation can be considered worse because so many factors intermingle and overlap to prolong this crisis and complicate the introduction of measures to bring about a recovery. He attributed the current crisis of the Arab order to several principal factors, including:
1- Threats to the Arab nation state: Since their inception, Arab nation states have been in crisis, described in many cases as fragile, especially in light of the fact that primary affiliations, whether tribal, sectarian, racial, or ethnic in nature, have dominated the political and societal scene in many Arab countries. The wave of Arab popular uprisings, which began in Tunisia at the end of 2010, were directed against already weak entities. Moreover, there have emerged recently trends pushing towards the fragmentation of Arab states, which could be a likely scenario in the near future, as several Arab countries are suffering deep crises, and countries such as Iraq and Libya are facing deep political divisions.
2- A qualitative shift in terrorist threats: Although terrorism is not new to the region, Dr Ahmad perceives certain changes he considers as having qualitatively changed this phenomenon. The first change relates to the political exploitation of terrorism by some countries, while the second concerns terrorist groups’ ability to create entities under their control, as was the case with ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Although ISIS was defeated, terrorism remains prevalent and is capable of promoting its ideology. The third significant change is the willingness to coexistence with terrorism, which was clearly illustrated in the agreement between former US President Donald Trump and the Taliban in February 2020. When the world’s leading superpower wanted to withdraw from Afghanistan, it did not negotiate with the legitimate Afghan government but with a movement that was designated by the US and other Western countries as a terrorist movement and a supporter of other terrorist organizations.
3- The threat to Arab identity: The establishment of the Arab order was based primarily on the idea of Arab nationalism, but this sense of identity met with challenges over time. Some of these challenges emerged within the Arab World, in particular from Sunni Islamist political currents. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, a Shiite Islamist political trend emerged, which represented a significant threat to Arab Nationalism, as it was in clear and comprehensive contradiction to the idea of an Arab identity . While the Sunni Islamist political movements also posed a threat to Arab identity, they may be considered a lesser threat than Shiite movements, in that some of them have tried to incorporate the Arab dimension into their own discourse. There were also external challenges to the issue of Arab identity, related to international powers’ vision of the region, such as the various proposals and initiatives based on a ‘Middle Eastern” perspective.
4- Growing external interference in Arab affairs: Since the end of the 1970s, external interference in the Arab world has grown in a number of ways. The Iranian revolution adopted an expansionary project in the region, succeeding in gaining influence in more than one Arab country. The United States was far more present in the region following its invasion of Iraq and interfered more in regional issues. Turkey also adopted a policy of coercive interference in more than one Arab country, including Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Perhaps Syria represents the clearest example of the extent of foreign intervention in the Aran World, as it appears that negotiations to settle this crisis will take place between three main parties: Russia, Turkey, and Iran, with no Arab representation.
5- The fragility of Arab alliances: This has been a consistent and historical feature of the Arab order. Arab alliances and unification projects have all been short-lived. Even the multilateral institutions that have survived, such as the Arab League, have faced a multitude of problems that undermined their effectiveness and ability to play an important role in the Arab order.
6- Differing definitions of national security: The concept of Arab national security presupposes an agreement regarding what the sources of threat to national security are, and their order of importance. However, Arab countries have, over the last decades, adopted differing views on this issue. There are countries that view Israel as the main threat to national security, while others rank Iran first, not to mention the threats of other regional parties such as Turkey. Accordingly, it can be said that there is no single definition of Arab national security, but several.
The dilemma of a functionalist approach
Dr. Ahmed argued that he does not consider the functional approach, which focuses on economic cooperation as a means of overcoming political differences, as a sure means of achieving Arab integration and cooperation. The European Union’s success in adopting such an approach was due to the existence of a political consensus among European countries in this respect, which motivated them to establish an integrative entity. Thus, the emergence of new political trends weakened the European model, especially after Brexit. The growing influence of right-wing parties in more than one European country could further weaken the European Union.
Therefore, one cannot bet on the success of an EU-like project in the Arab World in the absence of a political consensus among Arab countries, and a functionalist approach cannot succeed as long as political issues continue. This issue became clear with the establishment of the Arab League, in that Arab states adhered to a strict concept of national sovereignty, which had an adverse effect on the ability to achieve consensus. Even when Arab countries attempted to develop formulas for economic cooperation, this approach did not succeed, with a very few exceptions. This was related to problems in Arab states’ economic systems and their decline, as well as the severe disparity between Arab countries.
Reform tools
Dr. Ahmed concluded that reforming the current Arab situation is a complex process but is nevertheless not impossible. To achieve reform, it is necessary to focus on a number of possible tools:
1- Rejecting notions of restructuring regional relations, that imply abandoning the focus on inter-Arab relations in favor of enhancing relations between Arab countries and non-Arab countries in the neighborhood. There is no question that if this later trend becomes entrenched, this will have a profound negative impact on the Arab order.
2- Emphasis on the political approach, not exclusively the economic. The economic approach is governed by a pragmatic vision on the part of states, which may lead some to seek economic interests with non-Arab countries. However, this does not mean excluding the economic approach, as economic tools can be used to achieve a degree of rapprochement between the Arab countries. This can be seen in the recently announced energy projects, especially in the fields of gas and electricity.
3- Re-establishing the Arab idea, which requires the existence of politicians and political parties who believe in the idea and promote it in various Arab countries. Media and culture also play an important role that emphasizes a common Arab identity.
4- Re-establishing the idea of Arab national security through establishing consensus on the sources of the threat. This requires taking into account the fears and concerns of the various Arab countries, and their vision of regional threats.