The Iranian regime is trying to leverage the terrorist attack in Kerman to accomplish a several objectives. These include consolidating support amongst its population, improving voter turnout in its upcoming elections, rationalizing Iran’s current ongoing foreign interventions, mitigating the severity of domestic pressures, and highlighting the significance of the continuous support it extends to its allies and proxies.
Iranian Newspaper Kahian headlining: The US and Israel Fear the Response by Soleimani’s Troops
In Iran, the aftermath of the operation attributed to IS, executed in the city of Kerman during the commemoration of the assassination of Qassem Soleimani the former Quds Force commander of the Revolutionary Guard on January 3, continues to incite extremist responses and threats of retribution. This operation not only highlighted the significant security vulnerability within Iran but also illuminates the methods employed by IS members to infiltrate the country, establish a base in Kerman, and execute the operation. The Ministry of Security has disclosed that one of the suicide bombers involved in the attack was of Tajik descent. The regime, however, appears to be capitalizing on the attack to further its objectives with regards to several interests, both domestically and internationally.
Several Goals to be attained by Iran as a Result
The Iranian regime is seeking to exploit the terrorist attack that occurred in the city of Kerman to achieve many goals, the most prominent of which are:
1- Raising the level of voter participation in the parliamentary elections: The Iranian regime’s attempt to associate the recent act of terrorism with the forthcoming Islamic Shura Council elections, scheduled for the first of March, is of significant interest. This concern is underscored by the regime’s apprehension about the anticipated low voter turnout, which it interprets as a measure of its popular support and the solidarity of its base against both domestic and international opposition. Some of these opposition forces are actively engaged in combat against the regime, persistently criticizing its policies on a range of issues.
Consequently, in the aftermath of the terrorist attack, the regime consciously propagated a novel narrative. This narrative suggested that the unfolding events were indicative of a strategic plot to instigate disorder within Iran’s borders, thereby impeding the regime’s endeavors to foster political and security stability.
On the very day of the attack, the Supreme Leader of the Republic, Ali Khamenei, prioritized discussing the forthcoming parliamentary elections and the significance of public engagement therein. During a gathering with a faction of laudators—referred to by Iranian media as “those who respond and commemorate the merits of the People of the House”—on January 3, he articulated, “Involvement in the impending elections, scheduled in two months, is an obligation. Any opposition to the elections equates to opposition to the Islamic Republic and Islam.” This proclamation appears to bear resemblance to a “fatwa”, through which the Supreme Leader aims to secure substantial citizen participation in the elections by imparting a distinct religious connotation.
2- Reducing the intensity of internal pressures: The Iranian regime successfully endured the civil unrest that erupted in mid-September 2022 and persisted until early January 2023, following the death of a young Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, at the hands of the morality police. Nevertheless, the repercussions of this crisis persist and it could be posited that the conditions may be ripe for a resurgence should favorable internal circumstances arise.
The potential for such a resurgence is heightened by the regime’s unwavering commitment to a stringent approach towards domestic demands. This was shown by the Islamic Shura Council’s enactment of the “Supporting the Culture of Hijab and Chastity” law on September 21, as well as the execution of several protestors accused of inciting disorder, damaging public property, and fostering corruption.
As a result, one of the strategies employed by the Iranian regime to rationalize its actions is based on the need to preserve internal unity. This is particularly aimed at countering the endeavors of domestic factions that are perceived to further the objectives and interests of foreign entities, specifically those of the US and Israel.
Undoubtedly, the advent of a terrorist attack provides an opportunity for the Iranian regime to leverage it, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of their claims. This is particularly evident in their efforts to establish a connection between IS and the US and Israel, based on the belief that the actions of the IS are directly beneficial to the US and Israeli objectives. This perspective was prominently showcased in the announcements made by the Commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Hossein Salami, on January 6. He noted that the Iran’s adversaries have sought to transform the entirety of Iran into a battlefield, by attacking Iran on the economic level to subtle land invasions, which includes intelligence warfare, assassinations, and unsuccessful attempts at politically isolating Iran.
3- Justifying ongoing foreign interventions: The Iranian regime is unquestionably cognizant of the temporal implications of IS’s operation in Kerman. The fundamental communication the organization endeavored to convey is its intention to target Iran’s international operations, epitomized by Qassem Soleimani. Soleimani was accountable for managing these operations in nations experiencing crises, prior to his termination in a military operation initiated by the United States during the tenure of previous U.S. President, Donald Trump.
Consequently, the Iranian regime endeavors to disseminate an opposing narrative, asserting that its external interventions are aimed at combating terrorist factions, some of which have shifted their focus towards confronting the “Shiites”, a group that Iran epitomizes. This strategy mirrors that which was formerly implemented by the Republic’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in the years 2014 and 2015, when he declared that “Iran is engaging IS in Damascus to prevent a confrontation in Iran.”
Undeniably, certain perspectives may perceive this strategy as unsuccessful, substantiated by IS’s ability to breach Iranian security protocols, infiltrate deep into Iranian territory, and execute terrorist activities therein, targeting its religious, political, and military symbols. The most recent instance being the dual bombings near Soleimani’s grave on January 3. However, the Iranian regime counters this viewpoint by asserting that its external interventions have curtailed the expansion and escalation of these terrorist activities within Iran, thereby inhibiting the organization from fortifying its domestic operations. This assertion is supported by the relatively low number of terrorist activities conducted within Iran, especially when compared to the operations executed in other nations, such as Syria and Iraq.
4- Raising Morale of allies in the region: The Iranian regime is strategically leveraging the event to emphasize the ongoing aid it extends to its regional allies and proxies, a matter that has garnered significant political scrutiny following the initiation of the Israeli conflict in the Gaza Strip. This is in reaction to the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation executed by the “Al-Qassam Brigades” (Hamas’s military division) on October 7th.
In this scenario, the regime’s reliance is predicated on the understanding that such support has insulated Iran from incurring any repercussions, should it choose to retract within its territorial boundaries. This assistance has facilitated Iran’s acquisition of potent leverage, thereby deterring adversaries from initiating attacks on its territory, with particular reference to the United States and Israel.
Iran Seeking to Exploit the Attack
The Iranian regime is seeking to transform the terrorist attack from a challenge into an opportunity, given that it could help it confront the campaigns launched by Iranian opposition forces against it, which accuse it of draining Iranian funds by spending on foreign adventures. The regime however, will face a difficult test in trying to persist in this policy, given that it will be forced to translate some of its threats of “revenge” into procedural steps on the ground, which could impose dire consequences that may not necessarily be part of Iran’s current interests.