Tensions between Washington and Ankara continue to rise following President Erdogan’s suggestion he is open to other international powers, including Moscow, in the field of armaments. Ankara has also expressed great concern about the future of the relationship with Washington in light of the widening disputes over domestic Turkish issues, in addition to various regional files, especially the condemnation of the Turkish policy towards the Kurds in northern Syria, and the Turkish behavior towards Greece in the Aegean Sea. Ankara and Washington have been exchanging messages, aimed at exerting pressure and strengthening their respective positions.
President Erdogan confirmed on September 9th his country’s ability to secure warplanes from other countries, including Russia, Britain, and France, if it could not obtain the American F-16. He added in his statements, “I hope the United States will not lead us to other ways regarding the F-16 issue, as it is not the only place that sells warplanes’. This tension over military cooperation between the two countries is not unprecedented, as President Erdogan had previously declared his country would recover the USD 1.4 billion it paid for the purchase of the F-35 fighter jets it was denied access to.
The Biden administration has continued to criticize President Erdogan’s authoritarian practices in Turkey, and his attempt to restrict the public sphere and basic liberties. On August 29th, Washington voiced its concern over Turkish censorship of freedom of expression, against the backdrop of the arrest of Turkish pop star Gulshan over her comments on the İmam Hatip schools, which the Turkish government described as “incitement to hatred.” State Department spokesman Ned Price said in a statement on August 27th that, “the United States remains concerned about widespread efforts in Turkey to restrict freedom of expression through censorship and judicial harassment.”
In parallel, the US Treasury warned Turkish banks on August 25th against being subjected to sanctions because of dealings with Russia, which allows it to circumvent Western sanctions. Washington is increasingly concerned that the Russian government and Russian companies are using Turkey to circumvent Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine. It is of note that large sectors of the American elite have come to consider Ankara an unreliable ally; for example, in July, the US Congress set conditions for providing Turkey with F-16 fighters, including guarantees that aircraft would not be used against Greece. The US House of Representatives adopted an amendment to the defense budget, restricting the supply of warplanes to Turkey, with 244 members voting in favor of the amendment, 179 voting against it.
There are many considerations behind the escalation of tensions between Ankara and Washington at the current stage, which include:
American objection to Turkish-Russian closeness: The tension between Turkey and the US is related to the former’s efforts to strengthen ties with Moscow. Of note here is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval, on the eve of his meeting with his Turkish counterpart in Sochi on August 5th , of selling a portion of Russian gas to Turkey in rubles. For his part, the Turkish president has been leaning closer to Moscow than Europe recently, accusing the West of “provoking” Russia by insisting on providing Ukraine with weapons, and blaming Europe’s energy crisis on the sanctions imposed by the European Union on Moscow.
Over the past few months, Ankara and Moscow have worked to develop economic cooperation , trade ties, and to turn Turkey into a transit point for Russian exports of energy and food. This is in addition to Ankara’s support of opportunities for military cooperation with Russia, after Washington excluded Turkey from the F35 fighter jet production program, and Congress opposed the completion of the F16 fighter deal.
In response, President Erdogan recently hinted at buying alternatives from other sources, including Russia, triggering Washington’s concern, especially since Ankara had previously threatened to buy Russian Su-57 fighters should the US position remain unchanged. Last year, the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation confirmed that Moscow was ready for negotiations with Ankara on the supply of fifth-generation Su-57 and fourth-generation Su-35 fighters, as well as to cooperate in the development of the latest Turkish combat aircraft.
Washington’s support for Greece against Turkey: With the rising tensions between Ankara and Athens after the former accused the latter of arming the Aegean islands, and targeting Turkish fighters over the Aegean Sea, the US showed marked support for Greece against Turkey. On September 6th, the US State Department stated that the President Erdogan’s warnings to Greece regarding the maritime disputes were “unhelpful”. “At a time when Russia has once again invaded a sovereign European country, statements that could provoke differences between NATO allies are unhelpful,” the State Department spokesman added.
Moreover, on October 14th, 2021, the United States and Greece signed a military agreement that allows expansion of bilateral defense cooperation, grants American forces broader use of Greek military bases, and allows American forces to train and work with an “extended capacity” in four additional bases in Greece.
On a related note, the US Congress has responded to Greek concerns about the United States supplying F-16 fighters to Turkey, and therefore a large sector within the US Congress is still objecting to the sale of aircraft to Ankara. Congress confirmed its concerns in early September about President Biden’s pledge at the NATO summit in Spain last August to sell dozens of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey.
Disagreements between Washington and Ankara on regional and international issues: Disagreements between Ankara and Washington on a number of regional and international issues have grown recently. At the forefront of these issues is Turkey’s threat that it may veto NATO plans to accept Sweden and Finland as members in the coming months, a move that would embarrass the Biden administration, which is mobilizing allies to confront Russia. Tensions also increased after the Turkish president attended the Tehran summit on July 25th and announced his country’s keenness to strengthen the relationship with Tehran. Tensions have also risen against the backdrop of Washington’s opposition to Turkish threats to launch a military operation in northern Syria against Kurdish fighters backed by the United States.
US-Kurdish maneuvers in strategic border areas: At a time when Turkey seeks to mobilize international and regional powers to ratify its military intervention in northern Syria to confront its Kurdish opponents, the international coalition led by the United States and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched a joint military exercise on September 7th for the first time in a strategic border area. The military exercises, which served as a political and security warning message to Turkey, were held in a village belonging to the city of Derik, very close to the Syrian-Turkish-Iraqi border, in the far northeast of the Syrian province of Hasaka. It is noteworthy that Ankara criticized the exercises and considered them an American alignment with terrorist elements.
Controlling Tensions
It can be said that there are many challenges to the relationship between Ankara and Washington, and they may be exacerbated by the development in the relationship between Moscow and Ankara on the one hand, and Washington’s continued support for Turkey’s opponents on the other. However, the tense rhetorical exchanges between the two countries at this time does not necessarily mean a break in ties, as there remain common interests that bind the two countries. Erdogan and Biden’s pragmatism may push for flexibility to contain differences and limit the tensions in view of complex and intertwined interests on a number of vital issues.