At a time when Turkey is eliminating problems and opening channels with the countries of the region, and when some regional countries are proposing the rehabilitation of the Assad regime, thereby returning Syria to the Arab fold, Turkish media reports indicate that there are possibilities for a Turkish-Syrian rapprochement. At the beginning of April, Turkish media reported discussions within the ruling Justice and Development Party to initiate dialogue with the Syrian regime on a number of issues that negatively impact Turkish national security and interests. The Turkish Hurriyet newspaper, which is close to the presidency, said that the Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s preoccupation with its developments, as well as Ankara’s role in the mediation efforts between Moscow and Kiev, provides an opportunity for normalizing relations with Damascus, or at least easing the tension between the two countries.
Syria, however, appears to have a contradictory stance towards Turkey. On the one hand, the Syrian Foreign Ministry denied on April 7th reports of messages between Ankara and Damascus. and described Turkish presence on Syrian territory as an occupation. On the other hand, Damascus is keen to build good relations with the countries of the region, and there is continuous intelligence cooperation with Turkey. The Syrian Foreign Minister had expressed in February of his country’s conditional readiness to normalize relations with the Turkish government.
Significant Transformations
Although Turkey has since 2011 taken the position that it does not recognize the legitimacy of the Syrian regime, it appears to be taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation in Ukraine to strengthen its influence in Syria, and there are indications it does not wish to reignite tensions with the Syrian regime. It is worth remembering that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared in February 2019, that relations between Turkey and Syria continue at the level of the security services. More recently, in August 2021, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu referred to talks with Damascus on various issues despite the absence of diplomatic relations. Cavusoglu’s statements were preceded by a meeting in January 2020, the first of its kind since 2011, between the head of the National Security Office, Ali Mamlouk, and the head of Turkish intelligence, Hakan Fidan, in Moscow.
Moreover, Turkey displayed flexibility towards Russian attempts to improve relations between Ankara and Damascus in 2019, through reviving the Adana Agreement signed by the two countries in 1998. This came as part of an attempt to grant the Syrian regime legitimacy by the Turkish side, while also easing the Turkish regime’s concerns about Kurdish ambitions in Syria.
Turkish media reports regarding the possibility of a breakthrough in relations between Ankara and the Assad regime come in the context of a set of considerations that have set new priorities for Turkey at the current stage, which include:
Diffusing the domestic repercussions of the refugee crisis: Turkey is aware that communication with the Assad regime has become necessary to ensure the safe return of Syrian refugees, given they have become a burden on the Turkish economy. The Turkish opposition has been successfully exploiting this issue in mobilizing against the ruling party, and was able to attract part of the Turkish president’s traditional base to its side. The refugee issue has become a big problem for Erdogan, which, according to some assessments, may result in him losing the elections if he fails to solve it.
According to statements by the head of Turkish Immigration Agency in late March, about half a million refugees have returned to safe areas in Syria, while 3.7 million Syrians still remain in Turkey. From a Syrian perspective, Damascus may have a better chance of preserving Syrian territorial integrity through improving relations with Turkey. This could help prevent the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Organization from forming a security belt to pressure Turkey, as well as dismantling the Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria.
Turkey’s new regional orientation: Reports regarding improving relations with Syria come in the context of a wider Turkish foreign policy orientation in the region. Significant changes have been noted in Ankara’s relations with Israel, the UAE, Armenia, Egypt, as well as Saudi Arabia, after Turkish courts referred the case of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi to the Saudi judiciary. Accordingly, the change in Ankara’s relationship with Damascus is part of a larger shift aimed at reducing Turkish tensions with regional neighbors.
Countering the impact of regional realignments: Ankara is concerned regarding the impact of changes in the region on its influence and interest. These changes include the normalization of Israeli relations with a number of countries the region, in addition to the warming of relations between the Syrian regime and its Arab neighbors. Perhaps Turkey has come to realize that continued tensions with the Syrian regime may negatively impact Turkish presence in the region.
Taking advantage of the Ukraine crisis to reposition Turkey in Syria: Turkey appears keen to invest heavily in the Ukrainian crisis, in the interest of repositioning itself in Syria, especially given the Turkish conviction that Moscow and Iran played a major role in obstructing previous opportunities to achieve progress with Syria. In this context, Turkey sees an opportunity for a new beginning with Damascus, or at least to overcome some of the contentious issues in light of Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine. This could contribute to resolving the issue of Syrian refugees and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party problem.
A domestic win for the Justice and Development Party: A rapprochement with Syria could provide the Justice and Development Party with a win on the domestic front, allowing it to marginalize its opponents , especially as there have been growing calls by some opposition parties in Turkey to normalize relations with the Syrian regime.
Potential Obstacles
Despite the regional developments and interests pushing Ankara to reduce the state of hostility with the Syrian regime, there are obstacles standing in the way of a major breakthrough in the relationship between the two countries. Ankara has refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Assad regime and insists on maintaining a Turkish military presence on Syrian territories. Damascus, on its part, remains firm in its demand for Erdogan to respect international law, bilateral agreements, and the principle of good neighborliness. Syria will also not back down from its demands for Turkey to withdraw its forces from Syria and stop its support of the Syrian National Army and factions that Damascus classifies as terrorists.