During a period when the youth movement faces significant pressure from the Somali government, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, as part of their comprehensive counterterrorism efforts that commenced in May 2022, it appears that a parallel conflict has emerged between the movement and the Somali branch of the “ISIS” organization. This particular branch operates primarily in the northeastern regions of the country.

According to the Somali official news agency’s report on May 13th, the “youth” movement has reportedly conducted a series of executions of numerous ISIS members who were held captive in prisons located in Sako, Jilib, and Konya Baro regions within the Lower Shabelle and Middle Jubba provinces. Although the youth movement has not publicly acknowledged these actions, the executions are indicative of the intensifying conflict between various terrorist organizations in the Somali region.

Ongoing Tension

Periodically, Somalia experiences a cycle of escalating tensions and armed conflicts between the “youth” movement and the local ISIS branch. The most recent clash took place in the Bari province of the Puntland state, located in northeastern Somalia. This particular region serves as a stronghold for the ISIS organization within the country, in contrast to the wider geographical areas predominantly controlled or influenced by the “youth” movement.

In late March of the previous year, the Somali official news agency released specific information regarding confrontations that occurred between the terrorist factions of the two organizations, particularly in the mountainous region of Galgala. The clashes resulted in the deaths of approximately 40 militants from both sides, and three high-ranking field commanders of the “youth” movement were also killed during the engagements.

The operational activity of the ISIS branch in Somalia has not experienced a notable surge in the number of operations over the past few months. The recorded tally of operations, as reported by the ISIS organization through its affiliated newspaper, “Al-Naba,” demonstrates that it did not exceed two operations per month. This data encompasses the period from the last quarter of the previous year until May 15th of the present year, as depicted in the following chart:

CHART

During the first quarter of 2023, there has been a notable increase in the number of ISIS operations in Somalia, doubling in comparison to the previous quarter of 2022. However, these operations do not signify a substantial advancement in the capabilities of ISIS. Instead, they indicate an effort to enhance operational activity despite the pressures exerted by the forces of the Puntland state.

The operational focus of ISIS has predominantly centered on two areas: the vicinity of the capital, Mogadishu, and the Puntland state. Their primary method of attack involves the utilization of explosive devices. Their targets primarily consist of military and security forces, as well as government officials.

Different Motives

The recent armed confrontations and the youth movement’s decision to execute ISIS members can be seen as indicators of the escalating tensions between the two factions. These actions can be attributed to the following motives:

1. The primary motive behind the execution of ISIS members by the “youth” movement is to weaken the influence of ISIS itself. The Somali branch of ISIS has relied on defected leaders and members from the “youth” movement who pledged their allegiance to the organization. As a result, the “youth” movement is inclined to exert pressure on ISIS across various levels, aiming to diminish the branch’s impact. Over the past year, the operational activities of the ISIS branch in Somalia have notably declined compared to the levels observed in 2020 and 2021. The execution of ISIS members, as reported by the Somali official news agency, serves as a demonstration of the branch’s inability to protect its own members and highlights its weakened state. This action aims to hinder any potential recruitment of new members and dissuade defectors from joining the ranks of the “youth” movement. Notably, reports of internal disputes within the leadership of the “youth” movement and the management of terrorist operations further contribute to these measures.

2. The execution of ISIS members by the “youth” movement can also be viewed as a response to the confrontations that took place in Puntland. While specific details regarding the identities of the executed ISIS members and their involvement in the recent clashes between the two factions in March are unavailable, it seems that the overall purpose of executing ISIS members is to serve as a form of “revenge” on the part of the “youth” movement against ISIS.

As reported by the official Somali media, the previous confrontations led to the elimination of prominent leaders within the “youth” movement, as well as causing numerous casualties on both sides. This suggests that the executions could be a response to the confrontations, irrespective of which side initiated the attacks against the other.

3. The executions and confrontations between the “youth” movement and ISIS can be understood as part of their ongoing conflict and rivalry for control and influence. Both factions aim to assert their authority within the Somali arena, with a particular focus on the Puntland region. These actions serve as a means for each side to showcase their power and presence in the area.

In Puntland, certain rugged mountainous regions are known to be inhabited by both the “youth” movement and the ISIS organization. Despite Puntland being the primary stronghold and center of influence for these factions in Somalia, the “youth” movement still strives to expand its presence within Puntland and capitalize on the strategic advantage offered by the rugged mountainous terrain.

The “youth” movement is confronted by Somali forces and foreign entities engaged in counter-terrorism operations. As a result, the movement endeavors to strengthen its presence and influence in various regions, particularly considering reports indicating a decrease in their control over extensive areas in central Somalia. Moreover, the movement encounters escalating difficulties in the southern states due to advancing operations and the influx of new recruits into the Somali military.

4. The execution of ISIS elements by the “youth” movement can be understood as an effort to prevent the organization from replenishing its ranks. This action can be seen within the context of apprehensions regarding the impact of counter-terrorism operations on the movement in the southern regions of the country. These regions have become the primary focus and stronghold of the movement following its decline in the central areas. These shifts have been confirmed by official Somali sources and estimates, particularly in light of the comprehensive operations initiated in May 2022.

In the current circumstances, the “youth” movement may perceive the elimination of its detained ISIS members as a top priority. This is especially crucial considering the imminent escalation of counter-terrorism operations targeting the movement’s strongholds. These operations aim to seize control of territories in the southern states, potentially jeopardizing the movement’s hold on its detention facilities. The potential escape of ISIS elements and their subsequent return to the organization’s branch in Puntland poses a significant threat. Such a scenario would bolster the numerical strength of ISIS and disrupt the power dynamics between the two organizations in Somalia. This is particularly concerning given the mounting pressure on the “youth” movement and the overarching objective of weakening it.

Compounded Pressure

In conclusion, the execution of ISIS members by the “youth” movement has the potential to trigger retaliation from ISIS in the near future. If either side provides evidence supporting the reports from the official Somali news agency, there is a likelihood that retaliatory actions or similar measures to detain members of the “youth” movement will be taken. This situation is particularly delicate considering the relationship between the two parties within the Somali arena, characterized by competition and conflict. It is anticipated that any response will occur primarily within Puntland, specifically in the disputed areas.

The response of the ISIS branch to the “youth” movement will depend on its capability to engage in direct confrontation. Currently, the organization is under pressure from the Puntland forces, who are actively conducting operations to pursue and target its members. In January 2023, they successfully eliminated a key leader of the organization named Abu Al-Bara’a Al-Ammani. Both the “youth” movement and ISIS face significant operations conducted by the Somali army in the region, with a particular emphasis on targeting the “youth” movement. In a notable development, the army had previously announced the destruction of bases belonging to the movement in the Ovfin mountainous area of the Bari region in March of the previous year. These events will inevitably impact the escalation between the two organizations in the foreseeable future.