Dimensions of the Confrontations Between the Army and “Al-Shabaab” in Central Somalia – The Arab Wall
Dimensions of the Confrontations Between the Army and “Al-Shabaab” in Central Somalia

Dimensions of the Confrontations Between the Army and “Al-Shabaab” in Central Somalia



The ongoing conflicts between the Somali army and the terrorist group known as “Al-Shabaab” in the central region of the country persist despite the army’s claims of capturing several key strongholds. Specifically, they declared control over “Eyl Bur” on August 25th of the previous year and “Eyl Lahi” on September 8th of this year. These operations were part of the counterterrorism efforts initiated by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud following his election in May 2022.

Nevertheless, the Somali army has encountered obstacles in its attempts to establish control over the central region since January, delaying the launch of the second phase of counterterrorism operations in the group’s southern strongholds. Consequently, the situation in the central region remains uncertain in the foreseeable future.

Key Developments in Central Somalia

  1. Somali Army’s Seizure of “Eyl Bur”: In late August of the previous year, the Somali army announced its successful takeover of “Eyl Bur,” a significant stronghold of the “Al-Shabaab” movement located in the “Galguduud” region of central Somalia. Leading up to this, government forces, with support from tribal militias formed in the summer of 2022, had made substantial progress in pushing out the militants from areas they controlled between August 2022 and January 2023.

Reports initially suggested that President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud was planning to visit the “Galguduud” region, particularly the areas reclaimed by the army. However, the visit was subsequently canceled due to the intensification of hostilities in these areas, triggered by “Al-Shabaab” operations and the withdrawal of military forces from their newly gained positions. Some media sources have hinted at a setback in retaining control over “Eyl Bur.”

  1. “Al-Shabaab” Counterattacks: In contrast to the Somali army’s assertion of having secured “Eyl Bur” in central Somalia, the “Al-Shabaab” movement claimed to have carried out a series of operations in the same town. They announced their reassertion of control shortly afterward, citing violent activities conducted by “Al-Shabaab” in central Somalia.

The group declared its success in regaining control over several towns and strategic locations within the “Galguduud” region, including “Eyl Bur.” This resurgence was particularly evident with the escalation of coordinated and extensive operations against the army and the militias aligned with it. “Al-Shabaab” also managed to recapture “Masjuway” and the city of “Jalad” following a violent assault on the Somali special forces’ military base in “Ausoweni,” resulting in numerous casualties among the Somali army.

“Al-Shabaab” executed a range of attacks, targeting both Somali army positions and conducting ambushes against military movements. These attacks led to the withdrawal of military forces due to concerns of further losses, as estimated by Western sources.

  1. Priority in Securing Central Areas: Despite the year-long battles in central Somalia, the Somali army has struggled to decisively gain the upper hand in this region. However, there appear to be coordinated efforts with phased objectives aimed at securing areas that have been recaptured by the military and allied militias. This focus is particularly noticeable in the “Hiran” province within the “Hirshabelle” state.

Somali President’s recent visit to “Mahas” in the Hiran province on September 3rd was prompted by intense clashes between the army and “Al-Shabaab,” who had launched attacks from “Tusmeryeb,” a city the President had previously visited. During his visit, he met with military forces and tribal leaders to expedite the launch of the second phase of the counterterrorism efforts.

However, it is apparent that the initiation of this second phase, primarily involving the confrontation of “Al-Shabaab” in its strongholds in the southern region of the country, is encountering field challenges. This is evident in the attempts to expand control over areas in the central region, which face the challenge of sustaining control amid frequent attacks by the insurgent group.

  1. Exposure of the Military Planning Crisis: Military forces engaged in reclaiming control of cities and towns from “Al-Shabaab” in the “Galguduud” state have found themselves in a state of vulnerability. This vulnerability arises from the insufficient response to the insurgent group’s violent attacks, signaling a crisis in response operations aimed at countering the group’s tactics.

The limited reaction of the military forces in the “Galguduud” state is tied to the broader field conditions experienced over the past few months. This situation is exacerbated by the recent change in the Chief of Staff of the Army, initiated at the request of the Ministry of Defense. These developments highlight a crisis in military planning and securing liberated areas from attacks by “Al-Shabaab.” It is anticipated that the insurgent group will not yield easily to the army’s advances in its areas of influence and strongholds, whether in central or southern Somalia.

  1. Constraints on Militia Participation: Within the context of forces engaged in military operations against “Al-Shabaab,” the role of tribal militias becomes evident. These militias were formed to support army operations and regain control over certain central areas. However, there seems to be a challenge when it comes to increasing the involvement of these militias in battles against “Al-Shabaab.”

This challenge is underscored by reports from Western media, citing Somali officials, which suggest shifts in military confrontation strategies against “Al-Shabaab.” There is a growing reliance on these militia elements while the regular army assumes support roles. These militias are being offered monthly salaries as an incentive, with the long-term goal of their integration into the army.

In the coming period, the Somali government may consider reorganizing military affairs at the army level and refining military operation planning. Additionally, efforts might be directed towards restructuring the allied militias and expanding their mobilization before embarking on efforts to retake areas currently under the control of “Al-Shabaab” in the central region.

  1. Limited American Involvement in Operations: In light of the recent intense clashes in the central regions of the country, it is evident that American engagement in these operations has been minimal. The extent of American participation in efforts to advance into areas controlled by “Al-Shabaab” within the “Galguduud” state remains unclear, whether through the leadership of special forces or via airstrikes.

Of particular note is an incident during the conflicts in “Galguduud,” where American forces conducted an airstrike operation in an area located 45 kilometers northwest of “Kismayo” on August 26th of the previous year. This operation targeted “Al-Shabaab” elements amidst clashes between the Somali army and the terrorist organization. It’s worth noting that this area was beyond the scope of the confrontations in the “Galguduud” state.

Moreover, the confirmation within the American statement issued by the United States Africa Command, stating that the airstrike was carried out at the request of the federal government, raises questions about the decision not to employ American forces for conducting airstrikes against the movement in the conflict zones of “Galguduud.”

Tactical Withdrawal

Within the broader context of the fierce confrontations between the Somali army and “Al-Shabaab,” it becomes evident that the battle for control of the central region of the country is fraught with numerous challenges. Some of these challenges are associated with military planning, the mobilization of military forces, and the role of local militias loyal to the government. This complexity arises because “Al-Shabaab” is determined not to relinquish control of its areas of influence easily, particularly after swiftly regaining control of these areas through a series of violent operations.

Here, it becomes clear that the withdrawal of “Al-Shabaab” elements from conflict zones during the advance of military forces was a tactical maneuver. This withdrawal allowed them to regroup and launch attacks without incurring human losses by relying on defensive positions within their controlled territories.

In general, the ongoing battle of the Somali army in the central region of the country appears to impede the initiation of the second phase of military operations towards the south. Consequently, the central region’s conflict may serve as an objective for “Al-Shabaab” to keep the Somali army occupied within specific geographic boundaries, thereby preventing the expansion of operations into the southern regions. The insurgent movement has also attempted to demonstrate its capacity to execute terrorist operations in multiple geographic areas simultaneously. During the attacks in the “Galguduud” state, they carried out assaults in proximity to the capital, within Kenyan territory, and in southwestern areas of the country.