Concerns are growing in the Arab region due to the escalating hostilities between Israel and Palestinian factions following the “Al-Aqsa Storm” operation, which began with an attack on Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. Countries in the region are worried that these confrontations could escalate into a larger regional conflict if the situation in Gaza is not brought under control.

If Israeli airstrikes on Gaza persist and preparations for a ground operation continue, the conflict may expand to involve other parties beyond the Palestinian factions. One potential area of involvement is the Syrian region, especially given the Syrian regime’s support for Palestinian factions and the presence of Iranian militias on Syrian soil. These circumstances could be exploited by the “ISIS” organization in the near future.

Indicators of Tension 

Despite assurances from various regional and international parties to contain the escalation and prevent the involvement of other regional actors in the Israel-Palestinian faction confrontations, there are indicators that raise concerns about the potential for the conflict to expand. These indicators, particularly in the Syrian arena, merit discussion, though they do not provide a definitive prediction of the overall escalation in the region. Here are the key points:

1. Repositioning of Iran-Affiliated Militias: It has come to our attention that Iran-affiliated militias, operating within Syrian territories, have initiated a process of repositioning themselves in the early stages of the “Al-Aqsa Storm” operation. This repositioning coincides with the withdrawal of some militia elements from areas such as Deir ez-Zor, Al-Bukamal, and Al-Mayadeen. Unfortunately, precise details regarding their new locations remain elusive. Additionally, media reports suggest that Hezbollah has withdrawn its personnel from their Syrian positions, shifting them toward the Syrian-Lebanese border. In addition, there have been reports circulating that Iranian militias in Syria have offered financial incentives to approximately a thousand volunteers from their areas of influence in Syria.
2. Intermittent Shelling on the Syrian Border: In addition to the tensions along the southern Lebanese border, characterized by mutual shelling between Hezbollah, some Palestinian factions on one side, and Israel on the other, the Syrian front has also witnessed sporadic tensions, albeit to a lesser extent. Unknown parties have launched mortar shells towards the Golan Heights, prompting Israeli artillery shelling in response, targeting the sites from which the shells were launched.
3. Israeli Ground Operation Intent: From the early days of the confrontations between Palestinian factions and Israel, Israel commenced a military buildup along the Gaza Strip borders, summoning reserve forces in preparation for a potential ground military operation. These preparations encompassed the deployment of military vehicles and intensive aerial bombardments in the northern Gaza Strip. While Israel has not yet initiated the ground operation, statements from Israeli officials strongly indicate their intention to proceed with its execution.

4. Regional Rejection and Iranian Warnings: Several regional and international parties are exerting pressure to de-escalate the situation and dissuade Israel from launching a ground operation, employing various diplomatic channels. Among these parties, the United States has declared its unwavering support for Israel. U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, embarked on visits to regional countries to discuss the ongoing developments and stressed the necessity of a ceasefire to prevent the conflict from expanding and to avoid the involvement of additional parties.

Concerns are also focused on Iran’s actions through its regional proxies, whether in Lebanon or Syria, aimed at targeting Israel and potentially escalating the crisis into a broader regional conflict. This is particularly noteworthy in light of Iran’s warnings regarding the potential consequences of a ground operation. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, who made visits to Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq and held phone conversations with counterparts in various countries, stated, “Iran will not remain passive if aggression against Gaza persists.”

Numerous Gains

While the previous indicators do not definitively predict an expansion of the conflict in the Middle East, they do suggest a rise in regional tensions due to the ongoing Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip. If the armed conflict were to widen, the “ISIS” organization could benefit from this scenario in several ways:

1. Relative Freedom of Movement: With the repositioning of Iranian militias in Syria towards the Syrian-Lebanese border or the Golan Heights, in preparation for potential operations or attacks against Israel, “ISIS” may find an opportunity. This opportunity arises from the vacuum that these militias might leave in their previously concentrated areas. As Iranian militias become occupied in potential confrontations with Israel, “ISIS,” with its presence in regions where some Shia militias are stationed, particularly around Deir ez-Zor and the Syrian desert areas, could take advantage of the reduced numbers of these militias. This situation could grant “ISIS” more space and freedom of movement for its members.

2. Possibility of Increased Operational Activity: Despite a decline in the operational activity of the organization in Syria during the current year, based on various indicators, whether from data released by the organization or confirmations from the U.S. Central Command in April of the previous year, the outbreak of extensive confrontations in the region and Syria’s potential involvement in a conflict with Israel may contribute to an upswing in the organization’s operational activities.

However, it’s essential to note that an increase in the operational activity rate of the organization, in the event of the conflict expanding, doesn’t necessarily imply its capacity to carry out attacks and gain control over extensive areas in the Syrian region. This is especially pertinent given the organization’s struggle for survival over the past two years in what has been termed a “fight for survival” phase.

3. Reduction of Pressure from One Confrontation Front: If Iranian militias in Syria are engaged in confrontations with Israel, it results in decreased pressure on the “ISIS” organization from one of the conflict fronts in Syria. The primary fronts include two key players: the first is led by Russia, Syrian militias, and the Syrian army, while the second is represented by the international coalition to combat “ISIS,” led by the United States and the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) militia.

With the reduction of pressure from one of these critical fronts, the organization may shift its focus towards directing its operations into the areas controlled by the “SDF” in northeast Syria. This move is especially likely due to the organization’s desire to achieve a significant intermediate goal related to the release of its members held in prisons, detention facilities, and camps under the control of the “SDF.” This was evident in the attempt to storm the Ghuweiran prison in January 2022. The liberation of the organization’s members has become one of its most paramount objectives in recent years, as they serve as a crucial driving force in attempting to re-establish operational activities in Syria since the Battle of Baghuz in 2019.

4. Reconfiguration in Specific Geographic Areas: ISIS operates across vast geographic regions, notably in the Syrian Badia region, spanning multiple provinces. However, these areas are characterized by arid, rugged terrain and low population densities. With the withdrawal of certain Iranian militia elements from their strongholds, the organization may shift its geographical focus towards regions with higher population concentrations. This strategic move would enable them to potentially expand their influence, secure logistical support, and impose levies on these local communities.

Attempts to Cease the Opportunity

The potential for a significant escalation in the region, particularly originating from the Syrian front against Israel, amidst confrontations with Palestinian factions in Gaza, could provide an opportunity for ISIS to exploit. However, it’s important to note that changes occurring on the northeastern Syrian front, marked by Turkish military escalation and support from Ankara-affiliated militias, may also weaken the forces that are applying pressure on ISIS. As a result, there might be an attempt by the group to reinvigorate its operational activities, especially with the primary goal of liberating its members from prisons and camps.