The swearing in of the National Unity Government headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, in Tobruk east of Libya on March 2021, has ushered in a new political phase between the East and West of Libya. However, the political gains made thus far in Libya have not advanced to the same extent on the level of security , which could be a deal breaking issue when it comes to completing the transitional phase that ends 2021. This issue has been fomenting for the last decade, and has led to the complete militarization of Libya.
A Growing Problem
Different regions in Libya have witnessed rising use of violence, and this trend can be summarized as follows:
1- Deteriorating Security Conditions: the positive political outcomes have not extended to the security situation, which has been affected negatively, not only in the west, but in the east. Several incidents have occurred lately, including the assassination of a leader in the Libyan National Army Major Mahmoud El-Warfally on the 24th of March 2021, who was gunned down in Benghazi. Unknown gunmen kidnapped the Security Chief of the city of Zawara, which is 120km west of Tripoli. Sources have also revealed the killing of the head of the “Al-Sumood” Militia Mohamed Damona, in the Kareema region of the Capital Tripoli in late March 2021.
The targeting of security and military leaders, including the heads of some of the militias, reflects the dangers of the current security situation. There have also been kidnappings, disappearances as well as forced evictions. In the city of Murzuk to the south of Libya, over 5000 families have been forced to flee as a result of tribal clashes, that has left many Libyans dead and wounded. The head of the Libyan Presidential Council Mohamed Al-Menfi has vowed to improve the security situation in the south.
2- Rise of Militias in the West: with the hand over of power to the new National Unity Government, there has been a rise in militia activity in the west of Libya, especially with the escalation of hostilities between militias loyal to the previous government and those loyal to the new one. Fighting has broken out for example between the Tajura Lions and the Daman Battalion east of the Capital Tripoli.
In early April 2021, the “444 militia” executed several civilians on public roads or whilst performing their government jobs in the capital Tripoli, as well as in a number of other cities in the west of Libya. Militias have also threatened t oil installations in the west of Libya, even closing one down on the 7th of April 2021. These incidents and others represent demonstrations of power and acts of defiance against the National Unity Government, which is a clear obstacle to the success of the transition in Libya.
3- Political Support to the Militias: there have been renewed calls both regionally and internationally for expelling foreign mercenaries from Libya as one of the main priorities during the current phase. These have has received support from the National Unity Government , and Dbeibeh has described the mercenaries as a knife in Libya’s back. The Libyan Foreign Minister Najla EL Mangoush has also pressed various parties to remove foreign mercenaries out of the country immediately.
However, the head of the High Council of State, Khalid Al-Mishri, whose allegiance is to the Muslim Brotherhood, has taken a different stance, and has refused to remove the foreign mercenaries located in the west of Libya till all other mercenaries leave the country. He argues that the forces that in the west of Libya came at the request of the previous government, and therefore their presence is legitimate . The position of Al-Mishri highlights that some militias receive political protection and support, whether from Turkey or some political factions within Libya.
4- Efforts to Legalize Militias: some foreign powers are seeking to legitimize irregular forces in Libya. Turkey, for example, is playing a clear role in that respect by providing training to these forces. Ankara announced in April 2021 the graduation of a class of soldiers that completed their training in anti-terrorism in the city of Elkhams east of Tripoli.
The Turkish Ministry of Defense declared last March that it will continue to train some of the armed forces as per the Memorandum of Understanding for Security and Training Cooperation that was signed between Ankara and the government of Fayez Sarraj in November 2019. These movements by Ankara seek to undercut the National Unity Government in their attempt to rescind both the security and naval agreements.
Dbeibeh attended the graduation of one of these new classes in the Tripoli Military Academy on the 6th of April 2021. This was a problematic because it included graduates that belonged to extremist militias, including some who were part of the Revolutionary Shoura Council of Benghazi. The graduation was also attended by the head of the Abu Salim militias Abdel Ghani Al-Kikli, who faces international charges of committing violence against civilians, including kidnapping, and forced disappearances, among other crimes. Al-Kikli was invited to pin new ranks on some of the graduates.
A Window of Opportunity
Despite these complications, there is a window of opportunity and several tools that can help to resolve the security issue, which include:
1- Supporting the joint military committee: the 5+5 committee, that was created as a direct outcome from the Berlin conference to deal with the security and military situation in Libya, represents a major key to overcoming the deteriorating security situation.
The committee has taken several important steps within the context of a consensus on the need to register the size, names, nationalities and locations of these foreign mercenaries in preparation for their removal from the country. However, some Turkish elements are strategically placed in the country, and the whole issue and the whole issue has not been decisively settled. This will require the National Unity Government to look for more international support, especially from the Biden administration, in order to close this issue once and for all and ensure a successful transition in Libya.
2- Restructuring Security Institutions: the proposal to merge the militias into the security apparatus appears illogical , especially as several regional and international actors do not support it. Added to this is the strong objections by the Libyan National Army considering that some militia members seek to avoid international charges through embracing this option of integration into the regular military forces. Libyan national security should be protected by not integration extremist or terrorist elements into the new national forces.
The Head of the Mobilization Department in the Libyan National Army, General Khaled Mahgoub, confirmed in April 2021 that there are international agreements in place that affirm the need to have the militias broken up, especially that some of them include criminal elements that cannot be included in the military. He did not rule out the integration of militias, but on a conditional basis, extending only to those that did not take part in violence and have records free of crimes or terrorist activities.
3- Creating a Regular National Army: The National Unity Government can take advantage of the relative consensus that is regarding the National Libyan Army and the Tobruk Parliament in order to take a unified stance against any foreign presence in Libya as this will have a negative impact on the political process and the elections scheduled to take place in December 2021.
The head of the current government holds the position of defense minister, although there is not at present a regular army under his command. This should give impetus to the drive to push for the unification of all Libyan institutions, especially unifying the Libyan armed forces. The regional and international contexts can help the National Unity Government end the chaos that has been in place for almost a decade, and bring into being a more regular armed force that can express the free will of all of Libya regardless of their affiliation.
4- Putting the Libyan State Center Stage: the past decade in Libya has seen the decline of the role of the state, and its absence from the political, security and social spheres, while armed actors in various forms dominated an unstable political environment, and foreign interference was rampant.
There is at the moment a clear window of opportunity for the National Unity Government to have the state take the lead in Libya once again by facing up to violence, neutralizing the militias, and to make the Libyan National Army the building block of a proper national army that represents all Libyans. Foreign support must be used to remove all foreign mercenaries. These represent essential conditions that can help the National Unity Government successfully and peacefully conclude the transitional period. In conclusion, there is no denying the progress made in Libya at this point in time, especially in view of political breakthroughs between the eastern and western factions, and the relative consensus on several contentious issues. The National Unity Government, while assuming as neutral a stance as possible, must seize the moment, and deploy its legitimate position, domestically and internationally, to resolve Libya’s current security conundrum, through a gradual and balanced approach. It must pursue this without overlooking any possible negative reactions, using firm measures to return the state to its rightful place in Libya, avoiding a return to chaos and laying the grounds for the return of stability in the foreseeable future.