Can an Expanded Presidential Council End Libya’s Turmoil? – The Arab Wall
Can an Expanded Presidential Council End  Libya’s Turmoil?

Can an Expanded Presidential Council End Libya’s Turmoil?



Political entities in Libya are facing a problem of political legitimacy, and years after the fall of the Ghaddafi regime, they have been unable to achieve unity in a divided country. Some even consider these entities themselves an obstacle to achieving that goal. Given the failure of the transition process led by the Unity government, Libya’s parliament decided to instate a new government with Fathi Bashagha at the helm. This move has created new problems, with frictions between the government appointed by Parliament based in Sirte, and the dismissed government based in Tripoli. A new proposal has been put forth as a means to end the current dilemma, which is to expand the mandate of the Presidential Council, led by Mohamed Al-Menfi. This new proposal faces several challenges, the refusal of the government to hand over power, and opposition from several armed militias. The erosion of legitimacy and the conflict between the many players in Libya raise questions regarding the feasibility of this proposal.

Mohamed Al-Menfi, President of the Libyan Presidential Council, declared in an interview in the city of Mistrata that he will intervene at the appropriate time to end the current instability. Local reports have indicated that he is in the process of creating an expanded presidential council and that he is in talks with different political forces and the UN Mission for that purpose. 

Misrata’s Centrality

During his tenure as president of the Libyan Presidential Council, Al-Menfi’s policies were seen as balanced, as he was not aligned with any political party, and he coordinated politically with the UN Mission and with the unity government. He argued that the government functions within the framework of the transitional phase outlined by the mission. Accordingly, he did not coordinate with Parliament regarding the Bashagha government, nor did he issue a presidential decree regarding the government of Abdul Hamid al-Debeiba. However, as the end of the transitional period approaches, he may turn his focus to doing so. It is of note that Al-Menfi made these statements from Misrata, seen as the center of political decision-making in the Libyan West. This was perhaps a smart move, especially given many of the armed militias of Misrata announced that they will not engage in the conflict. Conversely, observers believe that if the announcement had come from Tripoli, the capital, it would have had better political symbolism, especially in light of the competition between Misrata and Benghazi. As for the timing, the announcement comes in the final month of the mandate of both political bodies (the Presidential Council and the Unity Government) as the transitional phase set to conclude at the end of June.

The stances of stakeholders

As previously noted, Al-Menfi did not reveal the nature of his plan to end this state of division, however it is believed he is coordination with the Mission in this context. Consequently, the Mission, or rather Washington, may see Al-Menfi as a way out of the crisis, rather than attempting to resolve the dispute between the two governments. It also appears that the western Libya Chief of Staff, Mohamed Al-Haddad, may support the Al-Menfi’s proposal, especially since Al-Haddad has repeatedly stated he does not want to involve the forces in western Libya, affiliated to the Presidential Council, in the political crisis. At the conclusion of the term of office of the Debeiba government, which retained the defense portfolio during the transitional process, Al-Haddad will no longer be under the command of that government. At that stage, his forces will only be answerable to the Presidential Council. However, the Presidential Council  itself must enjoy the support of the UN Mission if it is to survive as a political entity after the end of the transitional period.

As for the armed militias, those in Misrata refused to get involved in the crisis, given that both Debeiba and Bashagha hail from there, and therefore their involvement would mean conflict within Misrata. It is important to note, however, the arrival of Abdul Hakim Belhaj and Shaaban Hadiya to Tripoli, with calls that Tripoli should be ruled by its own people. This implies that the armed militias in Tripoli will move in support of the Debeiba government, not against Bashagha, but rather against the forces led by Khalifa Haftar and the parliament led by Aqila Saleh. The rise of calls for Tripoli to be ruled by its own appears also to be an attempt to undermine the pivotal position that Misrata has enjoyed, and move the center of political decision making to Tripoli. This will have notable consequences, in that these militias that have forcefully brought themselves to the fore on the political scene, strongly oppose the expansion of the Presidential Council.

Numerous Challenges

Al-Menfi’s proposition faces a number of obstacles, that include:

  1. The de facto government’s refusal to hand over power:  While the Debeiba government has refused to cede power, a parallel development has taken place, with  the Bashagha government commencing working from the city of Sirte , and Parliament  moving there to hold budget sessions. This revealed Aqila Saleh’s influence, as he had proposed this during the 2020 Geneva negotiations, with Sirte representing a compromise between east and west regions of Libya. However, the implementation of this idea in the context of the existence of two competing governments diminished the effectiveness of the compromise. Sirte will likely be viewed as a rival to Misrata. Moreover, the Dabaiba government is likely to continue to operate out of Tripoli beyond the end of June, if the political situation remains unchanged, as it has announced it would only hand over power to an elected government. Each of the two governments seeks to win the support of the US. Bashagha hopes to do so by announcing, on May 11th , the reopening of oilfields. The General Military Command gave him the power to do so after pressure from the American ambassador, Richard Nollard, on all parties in Cairo. On the other hand, Dabaiba hopes to win over the US with the idea of elections and is aligned with the Mission in this matter.
  2. Conflict between political entities with little legitimacy: Meetings held in Montreux, Switzerland, aim at resolving the status of the various political entities after the end of June, but will not necessarily succeed in doing so, in light of Aqila Saleh’s opposition to the dissolution of the Presidential Council. Some of its members are in revolt, demanding the dissolution of Parliament, and calling for collective resignations. The Supreme State Council is also facing rebellion from the faction led by Saad bin Sherada, which argues the need for the two councils to come together and confirm the Bashagha government as a transitional solution. Council head Khaled Al-Meshri believes that this situation may lead to a political vacuum in the country.

In conclusion, it is unlikely that the proposal for the expansion of the Presidential Council will become a plausible scenario, or a way out of the current conflict between the two governments, even if the UN Mission backs it. None of the competing political elites have an interest in relinquishing their position. Most likely, Libya will once again fall into a state of political division, which will compound the Mission’s inability to create consensus on a political plan for the post- transitional phase.