Baghdad Has Few Options to Limit Turkish Military Incursions – The Arab Wall
 Baghdad Has Few Options to Limit Turkish Military Incursions

 Baghdad Has Few Options to Limit Turkish Military Incursions



The Iraqi government strongly condemned the military attack on a touristic resort in Zakho, the region of Kurdistan, which took place on July 20th. Iraq attributed the attack to Turkiye, which the latter denied. The Federal government of Iraq headed by Mostafa El Kazmy was quick to convene the Ministerial Council as well as the National Security Council of Iraq, both of which condemned the attack in unprecedented terms, declaring it a breach of Iraq’s sovereignty. 

Among the measures taken by the Iraqi government was the decision to submit an official complaint to the UN Security Council, recalling the Iraqi Charge d’affairs in Ankara for consultations, putting on hold plans to name a new Iraqi ambassador to Turkiye, as well as summoning the Turkish Ambassador in Iraq. Turkiye, on its part, called on the Iraqi government not to be hasty in reaching conclusions, denied any involvement in the attack, and offered to cooperate with the Iraqi investigation of the incident. The situation has raised questions regarding the future of bilateral relations between the two countries.

The condemnations of the attack by the Federal Iraqi Government went further than the stance taken by the Regional Government of Kurdistan, which appealed to the Iraqi Federal government to prevent attacks on the region. Nechirvan Barzani, president of the Kurdistan region, did not directly hold Turkiye responsible for the attack, but placed it in the context of clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army. He expressed his objection to the continued confrontations and clashes between these two parties on Kurdistan’s territories.

Observers have noted the differences between the stances of the Federal Iraqi Government and that of Kurdistan’s Regional Government regarding the attack. This has been attributed to their different level of relations with Turkiye. In recent years, economic and political ties between Kurdistan and Turkiye have grown, while the latter’s relations with Baghdad have been characterized by growing contention. Baghdad has been objecting to the wide deployment of Turkish troops in Iraq’s north, under the pretext of fighting the PKK, which it has labelled a terrorist organization, then expanding that deployment under the pretext of fighting ISIS. Differences over water supplies between the two sides have also been exacerbated lately, as Turkiye has built more dams and decreased the flow of water to Iraq.  

Although there is general consensus in Iraq that Turkiye is responsible for the attack, and that it likely came from the Turkish base of Mount Khakir, strong Iraqi condemnations are unlikely to change the status quo for several reasons, including: 

 The Security Accord between Iraq and Turkey. This security agreement allows Turkey to move freely on Iraqi territory to fight the PKK. The agreement dates back to the 1990s, and was reformulated by former Iraqi prime minister Nuri Al Maliki in August 2007,  in the guise of “ the Security Document”, which gave Turkiye a free hand in this respect. Al Malaki argued at the time that this agreement came in the context of growing joint interests, as Turkiye played a growing role in developing oil infrastructure and the electricity grid. 

However, behind the scenes, another factor influenced Maliki’s stance, which was his growing differences with Masoud Barzani, head of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Turkiye at the time accused the regional government of supporting the PKK,  while Masoud Barzani worried that Turkish incursions into northern Iraq would have geopolitical ramifications. However, the situation has now changed, and Kurdistan has in fact stronger relations with Turkiye.  

 The fragility of the political situation in Iraq. Turkiye has been using this as an excuse to intervene in Iraq militarily for decades. Al Maliki even affirmed this by justifying his security agreement with Turkiye as necessitated by the fact that his government could not secure the country’s borders.  The situation was exacerbated by the crossing of ISIS into Iraq from the Syrian borders in June 2014, a few months before the end of Maliki’s second term. This allowed for more Turkish incursions to take place which included action in the Syrian theater of combat against the Kurdish YPG. 

It is to be noted that Iran has also conducted incursions into northern Iraq, one a few days before the Zakho attack.  Iran has also repeatedly attacked Kurdish positions with missiles and drones, under the pretext that Israel had established a presence in the region. Although the Iraqi government condemned Iran’s incursions, emphasizing the transgression against Iraqi sovereignty, the condemnation was less severe than that directed against Turkiye. Kurdistan’s regional government, on the other hand, took a much stronger stance against Iran.  All this further complicates the political crisis in Iraq, as each party takes a stance more consistent with its own interests. 

Turkiye insists on a military presence in Iraq. The strongest impediment to a change in the status quo is Turkiye’s adherence to its policy of refusing to withdraw from areas under its control in Syria, Iraq, or Libya. In this respect, Turkiye ignores objections from either governments or international parties, or whether there is any legitimacy to its military presence. It continues to uphold the pretext of fighting the PKK, as well as introducing other issues, such as protecting the Turkmen in Iraq, to whom it refers as the “Iraqi Turks”. On several occasions, Turkish diplomats have raised the political ire of Iraq by claiming that Kirkuk is Turkish and basing Turkiye’s military presence in this area suggests an intention the intention to stay. There are many Turkish military bases and intelligence centers in Iraq in which the PKK is not present. 

International stances. International stances on the issue of Turkish military presence in Iraq will be predicated on the effectiveness of Iraqi action in the UN Security Council. This action is unlikely to be effective in view of the result of similar moves regarding Syria and Libya, especially as there is a bilateral security agreement. Moreover, it is unlikely that international powers would be interested in entering a confrontation with Turkiye at this point, in view of the Russian – Ukrainian war, and pragmatic calculations regarding their own interests. Even if Iraq were to receive international support, it would most likely take the form of condemning   attacks on civilians, without holding any particular party responsible. 
In conclusion, the attack on Zakho is unlikely to figure as a pivotal moment in Iraqi-Turkish relations. All the Iraqi parties are likely to shape their response in accordance with their own interests, while Turkiye will continue to assert its rights to intervene militarily. There may be some aspects to this attack that have not been revealed yet, given that Turkish President Erdogan visited Tehran on July 18th, and participated in a summit with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, and Iranian President Ibrahim Al Raisi. However, any developments resulting from this summit is unlikely to fundamentally change Turkish policies in Iraq.