On April 7th, the Sudanese judiciary released leaders of the dissolved National Congress Party (NCP), including party head Ibrahim Ghandour. Ghandour and 12 other leading figures in the party had been detained for 22 months, facing accusations of undermining the constitutional system, financing terrorism, the assassination attempt on former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, Wajdi Saleh and Salah Mannaa, the bombing of the Empowerment Committee and the Barri thermal plant. Their release came with the announcement that there was no evidence supporting the accusations against them. It is worth noting that the Sudanese authorities had released Ghandour in November, then arrested him once more.
The Sudanese judiciary’s decision to release Ghandour and the others took place in the context of unprecedented turmoil and instability at the political, economic and security levels in Sudan, including:
Continued protests: The decision to release party leaders came just one day after millions rallied on April 6th, in a protest organized by the Forces for Freedom and Change, Popular Resistance Committees, and the Sudanese Professionals Association, in the context of a schedule of peaceful protests set last March to demand the military hand over power to civilians. The army’s rejection of these demands prompted continued protests and popular demonstrations, despite the use of excessive force and violence to suppress them by transitional authorities, indicating continued political instability in the country.
Clear political divide: A large number of active political parties on the Sudanese political scene – led by the National Umma Party – have refused to participate in any government under the army’s control, with many of them still refusing to participate in dialogue with the army while it participates in the current transitional authority. A number of political forces, led by the Charter or Accord group, however, splintered from the Forces of Freedom and Change, and expressed willingness to deal with the army and supported its continued hold over power. Moreover, several factions allied with the army signed an agreement to form a transitional technocratic government, Parliament, judiciary, and electoral committees to prepare for the upcoming elections in 2023, thereby strengthening the army’s control over the transitional authority.
Worsening economic crisis: Sudan’s transitional authorities have failed to resolve persistent economic problems, or to reverse the decline in foreign direct investments due to the ongoing political crisis. Sudan lost foreign support worth USD 2 billion as a result of the army’s continued control of the transitional authority, including a USD 500 million grant from the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) allocated to the healthcare and electricity sectors. This is in addition to a further USD 1 billion from the World Bank and IMF, and financial aid authorized by Congress worth USD 1 billion, as well as a USD 500 million grant from the World Bank for the family support program. The Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) and the IDA were also in the process of investing USD 2 billion in the country, as part of a plan that would eventually reach USD 8 billion.
Political Implications
The decision to release members of the NCP carries a number of important political implications, the most prominent of which are:
The return of counter-revolutionary figures: Those opposing the acquittal of the leaders of the dissolved NCP believe the decision is a bid to hinder the achievement of the goals of the popular revolution that toppled the previous regime in 2019, while paving the way for the return of the symbols and supporters of the former political regime to power. This is confirmed by the issuance of judicial decisions to reinstate those dismissed from their jobs because of their affiliation with the dissolved NCP and the Muslim Brotherhood, in accordance with the suspended decisions of the Disempowerment Committee.
Politicization of the judiciary: Some political parties and forces opposed to the military rule, led by the Forces of Freedom and Change, believe the decision to acquit Ghandour and other leaders of all charges against them came within the framework of the politicization of the judiciary in order to obtain the support of the largest number of factions and forces. This would enable the military faction to remain in power until the end of the current transitional period, which is scheduled to end through parliamentary elections that will result in the formation of an elected national government. These forces believe that the released NCP leaders should have been given prompt and fair trials,while supporters of the NCP believe the decision reflects the integrity of the Sudanese judiciary, given that the accusations were leveled against the released party leaders by the Forces of Freedom and Change that controlled the political scene before October 25th.
Restructuring NCP: The release of the NCP leaders would enable them to reorganize their ranks in preparation for participation in political life in the post-transitional period. The Sudanese Professionals Association has issued several statements in which it referred to recent secret meetings held by party members. This is supported by the many statements issued by Ghandour after his release, which included a call to launch a political project and national vision by the party to achieve stability in Sudan.
Expanding political participation: The decision to release NCP leaders came within the framework of the strategy adopted by the military to expand political participation to all active political parties and forces in Sudanese society. This contradicts previous statements by Lt Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, that all political parties would be allowed to participate except for the dissolved NCP. There are suggestions that the party will now be allowed to participate, with the release of its leaders, and reports it intends to file a lawsuit to cancel the decisions banning its activity. Dozens of former officials loyal to al-Bashir and members of the NCP have been allowed to return to their positions in government, in the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs, as well as the run state media after October 25th. Ghandour declared following his release that he would proceed to carry out his political activities in a normal fashion.
Exploiting differences between the military and civilian factions: The decision to release the NCP leaders reflects the success of the campaign by the party to pressure transitional authorities to reconsider the accusations and release the individuals under detention in light of the lack of sufficient evidence. In the pursuit of this goal, the NCP have successfully exploited the differences and tensions between the army and the Forces of Freedom and Change , and their most notable success has been the reinstatement of those dismissed from their jobs following the events of October 25th.
The fragility of Sudanese state institutions: The decision also reflects the apparent fragility of state institutions, given it came after the army overthrew the previous transitional government and excluded the Forces of Freedom and Change from the transitional authority on October 25th. Prior to this, these leaders remained in prison in light of the accusations leveled against them, and the Forces for Freedom and Change and the Revolutionary Resistance Committees’ conviction of the need to hold them judicially accountable for their misdeeds during the al-Bashir era. This reveals that state institutions have been used to serve the views of the ruling component of the authority, whether civilian or military.
Possible Repercussions
The reactions of the various political forces in Sudan to the release and acquittal of some of the NCP leaders indicate that there will be repercussions on Sudan’s political stability. The possible consequences of these developments include:
Continued protests: The release of NCP figures has left revolutionary forces and many citizens increasingly frustrated, feeling that the goal of the popular revolution that overthrew the former regime, to bring about radical political change has not been achieved. This will push the Revolutionary Resistance Committees and the Forces of Freedom and Change to continue mobilizing against the existing transitional authorities headed by the military.
Legal challenge: The Forces for Freedom and Change and the Revolutionary Resistance Committees will undertake legal action to challenge the release decision. Some lawyers affiliated with the Forces for Freedom and Change note that the ruling for the release is preliminary, with four remaining stages of appeal. This means there is a possibility of filing lawsuits for these individuals to be re-tried, as some believe the acquittal was hasty. This could unleash heated political confrontations between the NCP and its political opponents.
Engagement and reintegration: It is likely that the leaders of the dissolved NCP will start to pursue measures that would allow the party’s to power, such as removing the party from the blacklist of banned political parties. They will also continue their media campaigns through affiliated news sites and social networking sites such as Facebook, as well as attempts to preserve its electoral base through providing social services. Many party leaders who have maintained a low profile are likely to resume public activities, as they believe they will not now face legal charges.
In sum, the release of leaders of the dissolved NCP ushers in a new political reality , which will change features and characteristics of the political scene. It will allow the NCP to gradually return to Sudanese political life, suggesting that the party will participate in the upcoming elections scheduled for 2023.