Following the issuance of a military intervention threat by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) towards Niger, the Nigerien authorities took the step of closing their airspace on August 6th. In response, Algeria has expressed caution against resorting to the use of force. Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has firmly stated that the resolution of the Niger crisis should be sought through reasoned dialogue, rather than through coercive measures.

Algeria’s perspective can be better comprehended within the context of the mounting apprehension that Niger might descend into violence, potentially becoming a new focal point of instability in the African Sahel region. This region has long grappled with instability due to recurring coups, the looming specter of transnational crime, and the escalating operations of terrorist organizations. Consequently, Algeria seems to harbor concerns about the potential emergence of what could be described as a “Crisis Arch” right within its immediate geographical proximity.

Considering the potential security and humanitarian consequences, it is evident that the crisis stemming from the coup in Niger and the ousting of President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26th of the preceding year presents immediate challenges to neighboring nations, notably Algeria. Algeria shares a border with Niger that spans up to 1000 kilometers and fosters economic ties intended for investment, thus bolstering its strategic stance. This stands as one of the outcomes stemming from the eruption of the Russo-Ukrainian war on February 24, 2022.

Multiple Motivations

As the world’s gaze remained fixed on the aftermath of the Russo-Ukrainian war and its implications for the international order and the forces that steer its course, the African continent surged into global attention via its customary gateway: internal conflicts and military coups. Amid the persisting strife in Sudan from mid-April of the preceding year, involving clashes between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, Niger assumed a prominent role. This came about due to the military coup and the subsequent removal of President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26th of the same year.

In the face of the threat of military intervention in Niger posed by regional actors, particularly nations within the ECOWAS organization, Algeria has voiced its opposition to this approach and highlighted its potential ramifications. This position is grounded in several factors, with the most notable ones being:

1. Disruption of Bilateral Strategic Projects: Algeria’s considerations encompass the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project, an initiative interwoven with its strategic interests. The aim is to shield Niger from the repercussions of potential military intervention by ECOWAS member states, backed by regional players including France. Algeria foresees that such intervention could potentially trigger a surge in security disruptions and regional instability. The significance of this project for Algeria has markedly intensified in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian war, driven by the pursuit of European nations to amplify their energy imports from African partners. This juncture has afforded Algeria an opportunity to solidify its position as a principal energy supplier for these nations in the forthcoming phase. Notably, agreements in this realm have already been forged with diverse European countries, including Italy.

2. Sonatrach” Oil Discoveries: The economic interplay between Algeria and Niger transcends the confines of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, which traverses Niger. It extends to the oil discoveries unearthed by Algeria’s “Sonatrach” company in northern Niger during 2018. The company unveiled its inaugural finding of heavy crude oil within its exploration block in the region. As underscored by the former CEO of Sonatrach, Abdelmoumen Ould Kaddour, in a statement dated April 25, 2018, this discovery serves as a harbinger of forthcoming revelations.

Evidently, the company is progressively advancing its engagements in Niger, notably in the wake of its subsidiary entity (BVI SIPEX) sealing a pact with Niger’s Ministry of Petroleum, Energy, and Renewable Energies on February 13, 2022. The objective of this contract is to jointly exploit the “Kafra” oil field. Subsequent drilling efforts conducted in 2019 have substantiated that this field harbors reserves approximated at 400 million barrels of oil.

3. Asylum and Irregular Migration Challenges: The reverberations of instability in Niger are poised to affect not just Algeria’s stakes in oil, gas, and burgeoning economic alliances, but also usher in an additional layer of complexity. This complexity is further compounded by the instability that permeates Algeria’s contiguous zones, encompassing Libya, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Consequently, Algeria has embraced a well-calibrated policy in response. While it unequivocally decried the military coup that unseated President Mohamed Bazoum, it concurrently embarked on endeavors to bolster initiatives that strive for a political resolution to the crisis. The overarching goal is to circumvent the necessity of resorting to the military recourse that Nigerien authorities seemed poised to embrace, as evident from their decision to enforce airspace closure on August 6th.

In this context, Algeria does not rule out the potential that employing the military option could inadvertently give rise to a fresh crisis along its southern borders. Such a scenario could potentially fuel the escalation of the asylum and irregular migration phenomenon. This concern is particularly pertinent since certain criminal factions orchestrating these illicit migration networks regard Algeria as a pivotal conduit for reaching the shores of European nations. The European countries, in response, are endeavoring to tackle this challenge by bolstering security cooperation with Mediterranean nations. This issue has markedly ascended in priority within the interactions between these two sides.

4. Escalating Threats of Terrorist Organizations: Algeria envisions that this scenario could be exacerbated if the military option is employed to address the crisis in Niger. The adoption of such a strategy could inadvertently create an opening for terrorist organizations and armed factions to amplify their activities and broaden the expanse of territory under their sway within the border triangle encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This potential development might contribute to the transformation of this region into one of the most precarious terrorist hotspots. Prominent terrorist entities, most notably ISIS and Al-Qaeda, have been gravitating towards these areas due to the setbacks they encountered in previously controlled zones, particularly within Iraq and Syria.

Negative Impacts

Within this framework, it becomes apparent that military intervention carries the potential for heightened security disruptions and instability – a prospect that evokes apprehension in Algeria. This unease is particularly pronounced given that such intervention could conceivably trigger the emergence of a civil conflict, mirroring the Libyan scenario that is geographically proximate to Algeria. As a result, Algeria’s steadfast refusal of any military intervention in Niger is motivated not only by the anticipated “adverse economic repercussions” on Algeria and its multifarious projects but also by the security repercussions of such a course of action. These security implications pivot primarily on the formation of a contiguous belt of unstable states surrounding Algeria, notably encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso, Libya, and Niger.