The intensified presence of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, particularly in the provinces of “Abyan and Shabwa,” is a clear indication of their efforts to disrupt the operational plans of security forces as they pursue the organization’s members. Furthermore, their objective is to create turmoil within the structure of these security forces by targeting prominent leaders in relatively short intervals. This strategy is driven by the desire to maintain the organization’s influence in these two provinces, especially in the aftermath of the “Saham Al-Sharq” operation, which aimed to expel the organization’s elements from their safe havens. In addition, the organization seeks to exploit the connections between different factions in the southern region and to establish closer ties with certain tribes or, at the very least, attract new members.

The Yemen branch of Al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility for targeting two security leaders in separate operations in the southern region of the country during the first week of October. This indicates the organization’s intent to escalate its targeted operations against prominent security leaders actively engaged in countering the organization.

Despite the organization’s prior announcements over the past few months, particularly since last quarter of the previous year, regarding their targeting of high-profile security leaders, significant developments have occurred in the two operations conducted in October. Notably, these attacks were not accidental outcomes of armed clashes between the organization’s members and the security forces in the south; they were deliberate and calculated actions.

Nature of Operations 

Let’s explore the nature of the organization’s activities aimed at targeting security leaders in southern Yemen, considering the claimed responsibility for these operations during the period from January 1 to October 8, 2023. The analysis reveals the following key points:

1. Targeting Frequency: Upon examining the organization’s claimed operations targeting security leaders in southern Yemen, we observe fluctuations in their operational activity. The organization has struggled to maintain a consistent pace for these operations. The peak activity occurred in the months of February, June, and July, with two operations each. Notably, the organization claimed responsibility for two operations during the first week of October, matching the highest operational rate seen in these months. This trend is illustrated in the following chart:

Considering the organization’s recent escalation in targeting leaders at the beginning of October, it’s possible that there will be an increase in the rate of such operations for this month, potentially signaling a trend of heightened activity in the near future.

2. Targeting Strategies: The changes in the organization’s approach to intensifying its operations against security leaders in southern Yemen extend beyond increased activity. Notably, the two recent operations, unlike the majority of the organization’s documented actions, were intentional and premeditated.

In general, most of the operations the organization has claimed responsibility for, targeting security leaders, occurred in the context of direct skirmishes and confrontations during security forces’ attempts to raid the organization’s strongholds, particularly in the provinces of “Abyan and Shabwa.” There has been a total of seven recorded operations aimed at security leaders, with an increase to two operations at the end of the preceding month of September, followed by two deliberate targeting operations, as depicted in the chart below:

Deliberate targeting signifies the organization’s emphasis on this particular approach for taking down prominent security leaders. This method involves meticulous planning, the formation of dedicated groups, and the activation of intelligence cells to monitor and track the movements of the targeted security leaders.

3. Tactics in Execution: In the context of the deliberate targeting of security leaders, the organization has shown a diversification in its execution tactics. This includes the use of explosive devices, drones, and mortar shell attacks on the residences of certain leaders. Conversely, some of the leaders’ deaths or injuries, as announced by the organization, have occurred incidentally during military operations conducted against the organization’s members. The organization focuses on targeting specific leaders during these military operations.

Notably, deliberate targeting of security leaders became more pronounced starting in May of the previous year, while no such operations were recorded from the beginning of the current year, with incidental targeting operations continuing during military operations against the leaders.

4. Targeting Scope: Although the organization had previously conducted intentional operations to target security leaders in southern Yemen, particularly in the province of Aden, it’s currently concentrating its deliberate targeting efforts solely on the provinces of “Abyan and Shabwa.” There is no recorded expansion of these deliberate operations beyond these two provinces, based on the organization’s data since the beginning of this year.

Whether the targeting is deliberate or incidental, it’s worth noting that the province of Abyan has experienced a higher frequency of these operations compared to the province of Shabwa, as illustrated in the chart below:

Interconnected Reasons for Intensification

Considering the nature of the targeting operations carried out by the “Al-Qaeda” organization’s branch against security leaders in southern Yemen, their geographical focus, and the chosen execution tactics, we can identify several interconnected reasons for the heightened intensity of these operations and their deliberate nature. The most prominent factors include:

1. “Decapitation” of Security Forces’ Leadership: Western literature on countering insurgency and terrorism has emphasized the strategy of decapitating leadership as a crucial component in dealing with insurgent movements and terrorist organizations. This approach aims to weaken the capabilities of such groups by disrupting their leadership hierarchy, potentially leading to internal structural crises. Al-Qaeda, which has employed this tactic by targeting its prominent leaders over the past decade, may be applying a similar strategy to the security forces in the southern region of the country. It’s important to note that the impact of eliminating security leaders differs from the decline experienced by the Al-Qaeda branch in Yemen.

The organization’s choice to focus on high-ranking and prominent leaders is evident when examining their recorded operations targeting security figures. For instance, in the current month of October, they targeted Salem Sal’an, the commander of the Shuqrah sector, with an explosive device in the Mudiyah district of Abyan province. Another operation involved an attempt to assassinate the commander of the Special Forces in Zinjibar city, Abyan province, using a car bomb. Reports from the media suggest that the latter survived the assassination attempt.

2. Disrupting Security Force Plans in the South: The organization’s targeting of security leaders in the southern region serves, in one aspect, as an attempt to disrupt the security forces’ plans aimed at establishing security and stability. It also aims to hinder their ongoing efforts to pursue and eliminate the organization’s members within the framework of the “Saham Al-Sharq” operation.

This is particularly evident in the deliberate targeting of security leaders who have recently assumed their positions. This tactic not only aligns with the organization’s goal of undermining the internal structures of the security forces but also puts pressure on the newly appointed leaders taking on senior roles within these security units.

For instance, the attack on the convoy of Brigadier Abdul Latif Mohammad Bafqeeh Al-Sayyid, the commander of the Security Belt Forces, in the Mudiyah district of Abyan province by Al-Qaeda, has raised speculation in some media reports. It is suggested that this targeting occurred shortly after his appointment as the commander of the Security Belt Forces in Abyan province.

3. Sustaining Influence in “Abyan and Shabwa”: By examining the organization’s choice of geographical targets among prominent security leaders in southern Yemen, specifically in the provinces of “Abyan and Shabwa,” and the absence of similar operations in Aden, it becomes apparent that the organization is striving to preserve its remaining influence in these two provinces. This effort is particularly significant in the wake of a series of operations conducted as part of the “Saham Al-Sharq” campaign.

The “Saham Al-Sharq” operation took place more than a year ago with the goal of purging the organization’s strongholds in the rugged valleys of Abyan province and eliminating its presence. In light of this, the Al-Qaeda branch in Yemen seeks, through these targeted operations against prominent leaders, to demonstrate adaptability and retain whatever influence it still possesses in these provinces.

Moreover, deliberate targeting operations are a response to the security forces engaged in operations against the organization. They aim to undermine its influence and areas of control in southern Yemen. This shift occurred towards the end of 2021 when there was a reorientation from prioritizing border areas with the “Houthis” to a renewed focus on operational activity in southern Yemen.

4. Efforts to Build Alliances with Tribes: In the past two years, the Yemeni branch of Al-Qaeda has been actively working to establish alliances with the tribes in southern Yemen, perceiving these regions as historically influential areas. Through multiple statements and various means, the organization has attempted to cultivate relationships with these tribes, asserting that it shares common cause with them and has fought alongside them against Houthi forces.

This strategic maneuver serves to complicate the already unstable situation in southern Yemen by capitalizing on the interplay between different factions. The organization seeks to demonstrate its capacity to forge alliances with certain tribes or, at the very least, attract some of their members to join its ranks. This is achieved by conveying a sense of oppression experienced by the southern tribes in the context of the prevailing political dynamics in the southern part of the country.

Ongoing Threat

Despite the relative success of the “Saham Al-Sharq” operation in reducing the influence of the Al-Qaeda branch in Yemen over the past few months, the organization, drawing on its historical experience in Yemen, demonstrates a capacity for adapting to changing circumstances. It can seek to establish alliances and attract new recruits from tribal communities, capitalizing on the evolving landscape and interconnected dynamics in Yemen over the years. This tendency has grown in recent years, particularly as the interests and objectives of entities aligned with the government have converged in the southern regions of the country.

The organization’s recent activity, as evidenced by its targeting of prominent security leaders, suggests a continuation of the same pattern in the near future, whether at the current pace or with an escalation in targeting rates. This is especially true in light of their reliance on explosive devices and car bombs. Additionally, there is significant involvement of clandestine cells in executing these operations, given the security forces’ limited success in countering these covert units. This situation underscores the need for a heightened focus on intelligence and information efforts to dismantle these cells.