At the onset of 2023, Somalia entered a milestone in counter-terrorism in its confrontation with the Al-Shabaab movement. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud announced a strategy of comprehensive confrontation that has mobilized regional and international support, and expanded its influence and control. However, over the past two years Al-Shabaab has responded by increasing its operations, indicating that it has accumulated funding and logistical potential. 

Operational orientations 

The Somali government has been escalating its operations to counter Al-Shabaab on more than one level by engaging in operations after the return of US forces to Somalia, and through regional coordination efforts. The government has also coordinated with several Somali clans to counter the movement and address its funding activities. Identifying the main dimensions of Al-Shabaab’s activities between 1 January – 14 February, 2023 can be used to counter their operations.

To identify these dimensions, one must first survey the movement’s operations within a specific time frame on Shihada’s social media accounts. Shihada is the official account that promotes the movement’s activities and releases its statements. It also translates speeches by Al-Shabaab leadership from Swahili to Arabic. 

1. High levels of activity since last year: According to the statistics by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED, Somalia experienced around 2,553 out of a total of 6,859 violent events recorded in the African continent in 2022; an increase of 23% when compared to the number of total violent events recorded in Somalia in 2021. According to the Africa Center for Strategies Studies, violent incidents in Somalia account for 37% of violence on the African continent, second to the Sahel region which combines several states, and where violent incidents have reached 40% of recorded levels of violence in Africa. 

Following his election in May 2022, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud’s declared a comprehensive war against Al-Shabaab. However, violence increased during the second half of last year, approaching 1,400 violent events, mostly linked to Al-Shabaab, with limited operational activity of ISIS cells in Somalia.

The high rates of violence associated with Al-Shabaab have continued since the second half of last year and into the first 45 days of 2023. According to data from Shihada, Al-Shabab’s PR account, terrorist activity attributed to Al-Shabaab total approximately 220 incidents of violence.

2. A focus on targeting military forces: The year 2022 witnessed an increase in the number of civilian casualties caused by violent incidents linked to terrorist organizations, primarily by Al-Shabaab, that surpassed 2020 and 2021 figures. However, the number of operations targeting civilians was significantly lower than the incidence of terrorist activity against military and police forces, which reached around 1,000 attacks during the first half of last year, and exceeded the 1,200 mark, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

In view of the Somali Government’s efforts to crackdown on Al-Shabaab activity, and expel its elements from areas controlled by the movement, special emphasis is expected to be placed on the Somali military during the current year. Since early 2023, 194 out of 220 operations have targeted the military, according to the following scheme:

By looking at Al Shabaab’s target selection, several key observations can be found in the nature of their objectives:

1. Increased targeting of Somali forces: In view of the deployment of foreign forces in Somalia to support the national army’s counter-terrorism efforts, it is evident from the distribution of the rate of operations against the military that terrorist activity is targeting Somali forces as the following chart shows:

2. The most prominent pattern of targeting civilians: With the exception of collateral damage of Al-Shabaab’s terrorist activity against military, police, or militia, Al-Shabaab targets civilians based on two main patterns. The first is assassinations of prominent figures in different regions, and the second pattern focuses on government institutions which are staffed by civilians, such as the attack on the presidential palace compound and Parliament during the month of January.

Notwithstanding the wide gap between the two civilian targeting patterns, the capital, Mogadishu, is the region with the highest civilian targeting rate, with 14 out of a total of 20 civilian targeting operations, against no recorded activity in the central Somali region within the outlined time frame, as illustrated in the following chart:

3. Emphasis on police headquarters attacks: By analyzing Al-Shabaab’s operations that target Somali police elements, it is clear that the three recorded operations are mainly linked to police posts, as opposed to patrols or roadblocks, with two operations in Hiran and a third in the capital, Mogadishu, and have employed explosives, as opposed to direct attacks.

4. Militia leaders’ assassinations: Several clans increased their resistance against Al-Shabaab during the second half of last year. In response, and according to statements by Shihada, the movement directly targeted these militias in three operations, two of which were leadership assassinations. Also notable were confrontations with militia groups during the movement’s attempt to control parts of Hiran in central Somalia.

Despite the limited number of operations against militias loyal to the government of Somalia compared to other targets, it is important to note the importance of the clashes between Al-Shabaab and those militias, especially in view of the latter’s involvement with Somali army forces in its operations.

3. Intensified targeting of military bases: Al-Shabaab intensified its focus on the targeting of military bases within the specified time frame. Ninety-one out a total of 194 operations against military attacks targeted military bases, followed by the targeting of military patrols and military units amounting to 55 operations. The following chart illustrates the distribution of Al-Shabaab’s operations against different military targets:

A scan of military targets by Al-Shabaab reveals several observations:

1. Repeated targeting of the same military bases: Although Somalia has established several foreign and national secret military bases, the intensity of Al-Shabaab’s focus on targeting military bases indicates repeated targeting given that they have achieved 91 military base attacks within 45 days.

It is clear that targeting military bases is a priority for Al-Shabaab, from countering patrols and military units, to barricades and barracks, and military campaigns.

2. Military base targeting has most often employed attacks: In 76 cases, the form of military targeting involved launched attacks, indicating that Al-Shabaab has accumulated operational capabilities despite counter-operations by Somali and foreign forces. Indeed, that Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its ability to mobilize its elements and coordinate attacks military bases that house a small number of personnel, as illustrated in the following chart.

3. Attacks are mostly targeted at military bases in south Somalia: A survey of Al-Shabaab’s military targets reveals a geographical concentration of 99 operations in southern Somalia, where Al-Shabaab holds strong influence and control. Notably, the central region is ranked third with 26 operations, behind the capital, Mogadishu, as illustrated in the following chart.

4. The importance of targeting military leaders: A key observation in the distribution of terrorist activity shows a priority in assassinating prominent military commanders in the Somali army. Assassinations ranked third with 22 operations, ahead of the number of attacks on barricades, barracks and campaigns by the Somali army. These assaults by Al-Shabaab are ongoing despite military attempts to restore areas under the control and influence of the movement.

4. Various operations in northern Kenya: Al-Shabaab’s operations in neighbouring states have not been recorded, although the Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as Somalia, have been engaged in coordinating counter-terrorism efforts and establishing mechanisms, with the exception of Kenya, since Shihada indicated that elements of the movement have carried out about 21 operations, mainly against the military, as follows:

An analysis of the military targets in Kenya that were concentrated in its north-eastern territory makes it clear that Al-Shabaab is focused 10 of its operations on targeting military bases, with eight operations assaulting military patrols and units. The month of February witnessed only two operations, compared to 19 last January.

Advanced confrontation

In an attempt to explore the nature and trends behind Al-Shabaab’s activities since mid-last year, the motives for intensifying the targeting of military bases within the specified time frame can be identified as follows:

1. Push-back on counter-terrorism efforts: Al Shabaab intensified its activities in response to the Somali govenrment’s counter-terrorism clamp down. Since last May, military bases have sent out campaigns to prosecute elements of the movement, which keeps those military bases under constant threat. Indeed, the objective behind repeated attacks on military bases within a short period of time is not to destroy those bases, but rather to undermine Somali forces, and limit the launch of campaigns that counter any attacks by elements of the movement, facilitating operations that counter Somali forces.
2. Pressure on foreign forces: Although the targeting of military bases with foreign forces is second behind military bases of the Somali army, increased targeting of foreign forces is an attempt to push back external pressure, particularly as neighboring states take steps to counter the repercussions of Al-Shabaab’s activity and expansion over the past two years after the exit of U.S. troops as decided by former US President Donald Trump, and ratified by current US President Joe Biden, once he arrived at the White House.

The targeting of foreign forces and their designated bases is expected to escalate in the coming period, following the regional summit hosted by Somalia early this February, to coordinate cooperation mechanisms to counter terrorism, especially the Al-Shabaab movement.

Foreign forces are engaged with Somali forces to scale up counter-terrorism against Al-Shabaab’s activity, and thus targeting foreign bases is an attempt to put psychological pressure on forces involved in operations against Al-Shabaab.

3. Securing influence in central and southern Somalia: Al-Shabaab’s concentrated efforts to target military forces in particular in southern Somalia, indicates its desire to maintain control and influence in that area, and force out Somali and foreign forces as well as pro-government militias. It also shows an unwillingness to withdraw, particularly during the second half of last year after pro-government militias expelled some of the movement’s elements from strategic locations. 

While some reports and estimates have indicated that Al-Shabaab has withdrawn from some areas over the past few months, the withdrawal may carry operational and tactical dimensions by terrorist elements hoping to minimize losses and protect recruits given the return of US drones to Somali airspace.

4. Al-Shabaab attacks undermine military base ability to support campaigns and patrol: An analysis of operational activity targeting military bases shows that they are coordinated attacks that monitor patrols or barricades and barracks, to the extent that they demonstrate the movement’s capabilities to organize simultaneous attacks on more than one target. It also reflects Al-Shabaab’s desire to disrupt support supplies from those bases to patrols, barracks, and military campaigns, thereby limiting the military’s ability to secure the south and central Somalia.

Parting ways

Finally, Al-Shabaab’s intense operational activity in the first month and a half of 2023, and the overall escalation of activity over the past year, especially during the second half of 2022, shows that the movement has advanced its operational capabilities, enabling it to persist despite an increase in clashes with Somali forces, who have coordinated with pro-government militias, as well as the US who have returned to provide military training. However, the next few months will determine the movement’s resilience, and the timeline for the escalating tide of violence, as the Somali government constricts terrorist funding, increases coordination with pro-government militias, and harnesses regional and international support.