While efforts to reach political settlements for crises in the Middle East have failed to render significant results, there are indications of a momentum towards de-escalation. Conversely, Central Asia and the Caucuses appear to be headed for a period of instability. There are various factors behind these changing trajectories. In the Middle East, a change in the balance of power in favor of some parties, in Syria for example, and the continued implementation of a political roadmap for the transitional period, despite setbacks, to hold elections in Libya, as well as the move by several regional powers to reduce tensions and reach understandings, have all created a general atmosphere of relaxation of tensions. 

In Central Asia and the Caucuses however, the Taliban’s rise to power in mid-August continues to worry neighboring countries, who are closely monitoring developments there, amidst fears of a new rise in terrorist activities in the region, especially in light of the defeats terrorist organizations have lately faced in the Middle East. Moreover, the crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues, despite efforts to calm the situation by some forces concerned with the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan are also tense, as Iran objects to the growing Israeli presence on its borders. 

It can be argued that there is in fact a direct link between developments in the two regions, especially given that the same powers, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the United States, are playing major roles in both regions. These links, and the escalations in Central Asia and Caucasus crises can be explained in the light of the following considerations:

Turkey’s setbacks in the Middle East: Turkey has failed to achieve its agenda regarding several issues in the Middle East. It failed to achieve its objective to overthrow the regime in Syria, after the latter garnered support from Russia, Iran, and its allied militias. Turkish intervention in Libya put it on a collision course with several international and regional powers. This has resulted in significant pressures on Ankara, giving rise to domestic debate and objections by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s opposition. This situation may have prompted Erdogan to seek some foreign policy victories elsewhere, hence Turkey’s more active involvement in the Caucasus, supporting Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Reports suggest Turkey transferred its allied mercenaries and militias from Syria and Lebanon, to participate in armed confrontations against Armenia.

The absence of a viable settlement: Although the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan calmed to a certain extent following clashes lasting six weeks, from September 27^th to November 10^th, 2020, which resulted in 6,500 deaths, it continues to periodically flare up. This can be attributed to the lack of a viable political settlement. The ceasefire agreement, which was announced on November 10^th, 2020, does not appear to have clear support from some stakeholders in the crisis, especially Armenia. This was illustrated by the renewed clashes on November 16^th, in which six Armenian and seven Azerbaijani soldiers were killed. Many are of the view that regional stakeholders: Russia, Turkey, and Iran, were not in fact keen on supporting a lasting settlement to the conflict, as its continuation allows them scope to enhance their presence in a strategically important region.

The expansion of Iran-Israel tensions into the Caucuses: The escalation between Iran and Azerbaijan in the first half of October cannot be separated from the rising tensions between Iran and Israel in the Middle East. Many are of the view that Iran believes Israel is trying to establish a presence on its borders through its strong relations with Azerbaijan, in response to the Iranian presence in Syria and Lebanon, which Tel Aviv sees as directly threatening its security and stability. During his participation in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit in the Turkmen capital Ashgabat on November 29^th, Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi called on the countries of the region to solve the region’s problems on their own, warning that “the presence of foreigners complicates the situation.” Meanwhile, Israel is exerting significant efforts to direct the attention of international powers involved in the Vienna negotiations on the nuclear agreement with Iran towards the necessity of imposing severe restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities and expanding the scope of negotiations to include the ballistic missile program and the regional role.

Divergence in dealing with the Taliban: There has been divergent approaches by the major players in Central Asia and the Caucasus towards the Taliban. Russia is expanding the scope of its engagement with the Taliban to a level of “quasi recognition”.  Iran, on the other hand, continues to link relations to Taliban’s domestic policies, especially towards different ethnic communities in Afghanistan. Iran may at some point decide to intervene in Afghanistan in support of certain ethnic groups, even if this impacts negatively on the channels of communication with the Taliban established even before its rise to power.

 The threat of rising terrorist activities: Some terrorist organizations, especially ISIS, may try to strengthen their position in Central Asia and the Caucasus, to compensate for their weakened presence in the Middle East, following significant material and human losses there. This move may be facilitated by the Taliban’s return to power. It is of note that Russian authorities announced at the beginning of October they had thwarted an explosive attack planned by a militant in the North Caucasus region and had foiled another attack in the Stavropol region in the North Caucasus on the 22^nd of October. This parallels the activities of the ISIS-affiliated Khorasan group operating in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s accession to power. Such terrorist activities pose a direct threat to the security and stability of the countries of the region.

In conclusion, it appears that Central Asia and the Caucasus are likely to witness a further escalation of ongoing crises, especially in view of disagreement and tensions among external players that have involved themselves in these regional conflicts. In addition to the involvement of neighboring countries, such as Turkey, Iran and Israel, international powers, such as China, India and Russia are keen to establish a presence, following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The varying interests and agendas of these often-competing powers is likely to complicate the process of settling regional conflicts.