The inclusion of individuals from the Haqqani network in the interim Afghan government led by Mullah Muhammad Hassan Akhund has raised questions regarding the role the network will play under the rule of the Taliban. The Haqqani Network has a political and military presence on the Afghan scene and has been awarded four important ministerial portfolios: Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Immigrant Affairs, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Communications and Technology, by virtue of its role as a leading military force for the Taliban. This was met with great international criticism, since the Haqqani Network is classified as a terrorist organization by the United States.

Despite the historical relations between the Taliban movement and the Haqqani network, new conditions, both domestic and international, are likely to shape and influence the role of the Haqqani network in the near future. The role of the Haqqani network will therefore be determined by a number of factors, including the following:

1. Relations with the Taliban: Even though the Taliban and Haqqani Network have strong historical ties, there are tensions between them. During the Taliban’s first rule over Afghanistan, there were differences between the two organizations over cabinet formation, as the Taliban kept most government posts for its members. The most notable dispute, however, related to military performance during the battle of Mazar Sharif in 2001, between the United States & NATO forces on one side and the Taliban and the Haqqani Network on the other. This battle resulted in the defeat of the Taliban and the fall of the capital, Kabul, to the NATO forces.

It is therefore likely that relations between both parties will be subject to differences in opinion, which could affect the governing of Afghanistan. There have already been numerous reports of tensions, accompanied by verbal altercation and physical clashes, between Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader and Khalil Rahman Haqqani, and their followers. Baradar later denied these reports during a state television interview, which was posted on Twitter by the Taliban office in Doha on September 16^th,2021.

 However, there are signs that this relationship will be strained on the long run. There are tensions between two different approaches, the first adopted by Abdul-Ghani Barader, stressing the importance of diplomatic discourse, and the second adopted by the members of the Haqqani Network, who argue that the current success is due to military operations and attacks against the Afghan government and NATO forces in the last two decades, and therefore advocates for the continued use of this militant approach to establish control and support the current government. 

Moreover, it seems that nepotism, rather than established rules and institutional frameworks to govern the relationship between the government and the military arm of these organisations, has been the guiding principle in the formation of the government, which is likely to cause friction. Abdul Ghani Barader, the acting deputy prime minister, is the brother-in-law of the founder of the Taliban movement, and a personal friend of the current leader of the movement. The acting defense minister, Mawlawi Yaqoub, is the eldest son of the founder of the movement. On the other hand, Serajuddin Haqqani, the acting Ministry of Interior, is the son of the founder of the Haqqani Network, and Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, the acting Minister of Immigrant Affairs, is the brother of the founder of the network.

2. Pakistani support: It has been suggested that the Haqqani network acts as Pakistan’s intelligence arm in Afghanistan. This is based on the nature of the operations carried out by the network, its internal structure, and its fighting and movement techniques, which suggest its members have received special training and are getting expert support experts and receive special support which is likely provided by Pakistani intelligence.

Due to the geographical proximity between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the network contributed to securing the Pakistani borders during Soviet rule over Afghanistan, while Pakistan provided a haven for the members of the Haqqani Network after the US invasion. Pakistan perceives that supporting the Haqqani Network ensures protecting its own interests in Afghanistan and allows it to balance the growing Iranian and Indian influence there. Therefore, the future weight of the Haqqani network in Afghanistan is linked – in part – to the continuation of the financial and logistical support it receives from Pakistan.

3. The network’s relations with Al-Qaeda: Although the Haqqani Network declared that it would sever ties with terrorist organizations, as per the agreement between the Taliban and the United States, there may be a period of tacit cooperation and coordination with Al-Qaeda.  The relationship with Al-Qaeda is strong and long-term, built on similar extreme religious ideology, and has proved fruitful for both sides. The Haqqani Network is part of the broader umbrella of the Taliban movement, with distinct leadership and operational structure. According to a May 2021 report by the Security Council, it undertakes coordination between the Taliban and regional terrorist organizations, and is the primary channel of communication between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Based on the desire of al-Qaeda to restore its influence and confront the spread of ISIS after the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, and given the militant approach favored by the Haqqani Network, it is likely that Al-Qaeda will seek to revive its ties to the Haqqani Network. The Haqqani Network on its part may be receptive to this coordination, as it may wish to enhance its own military weight within Afghanistan, to balance the growing political and diplomatic weight the Taliban has been gaining.

4. The ISIS dilemma: The relationship between ISIS and the Taliban movement as a whole will be decisive in determining the future of the latter. This applies to the Haqqani movement in particular, due to its ambiguous relationship with ISIS, and their coordinated attacks against government and foreign forces in Afghanistan. Many members of ISIS Khorasan were formerly members of the Haqqani Network, and other organizations affiliated to it.

There have been suspicions that the Haqqani network turned a blind eye to the attack launched by the organization at Kabul Airport (August 26, 2021). On one hand, the attack was well-planned, and took place in an area that was supposed to be guarded by Haqqani Special forces. On the other hand, the attack serves the network’s interests in accelerating the evacuation of foreign forces and diplomats and justifies the continuation of Haqqani military presence on the ground, under the pretext of establishing security and protecting local and foreign property.

Developments on the ground will reveal whether the Taliban and the Haqqani network will form one front against ISIS-K, or if there will be hidden coordination between the Haqqani network and ISIS. The second scenario is made likely by the similarities they have in common, which distinguish them from the Taliban. The two adopt a regional and international strategy, that places foreign operations among its priorities. This is unlike the Taliban, which adopts a local strategy and does not seek to operate outside the borders of Afghanistan. There are also similarity in the operational tactics between the Haqqani network and ISIS, as both combine suicide and immersion operations, and both use beheadings and mutilation to instill terror.

Moreover, the agreement reached by the Taliban with the US in 2020, threatens the influence of both the Haqqani network and the ISIS Khorasan, as both are classified as terrorist organizations, while the Taliban isn’t. This means the Taliban may, on the long run, attempt to remove the Haqqani network both politically and militarily, from the scene, under the pretext of implementing the agreement, in order to become the sole power in Afghanistan.

In sum, the scenario that will be adopted by the Haqqani Network will depend, to a large extent, on the choices the Taliban will make, and whether it will choose to monopolize power and gradually decrease the network’s role, in order to gain international recognition and support for its government. On the other hand, the Taliban may decide it cannot dispense with the network’s military support in the face of rising ISIS activity, and possible domestic unrest and protests. In all cases, the network will remain a problematic ally to the Taliban, in view of its political aspirations.