At a time when Sudan is suffering from multiple economic problems, most notably inflation and high prices of basic commodities, a crisis has erupted in eastern Sudan which resulted in the closure of the roads linking this region with other parts of the country, seriously imperiling the availability of basic commodities. The crisis erupted on September 18^th, when the High council of Beja Nazirs (Chieftains) announce d the closure of the roads leading to the eastern Sudan region’s three states, Red Sea, Kassala, and Al Qadarif, in addition to halting maritime navigation and closing the Port Sudan Airport. Members and followers of the Beja Optical Council cut off roads at five separate points, in addition to closing the port in Port Sudan, stopping sea navigation, and cutting off movement at Port Sudan Airport.

The announcement triggered a series of hostile reactions. For its part, the Supreme Civil Administration Council in eastern Sudan, which is opposed to the High council of Beja, declared its categorical rejection of these actions, describing such disruption as a crime against the Sudanese people, which aims to undermine the democratic transition and bring about the return of totalitarianism and tyranny. The Council also held the transitional government responsible for the chaos and lawlessness, viewing them as a product of the government’s weakness and acquiescence to blackmail. It stressed the importance of employing the force of the law and rejected any attempt to negotiate with those responsible for blocking roads.

Given the extremely dangerous economic dimension of the crisis, many parties have expressed grave concern over the consequences of this closure. According to the Federation of Sudanese Chambers of Transport, the number of trucks moving from eastern Sudan to the rest of the country ranges between 300 and 400 trucks per day. The issue is made more urgent by the fact that the country is expecting the arrival of the third batch of US food aid and other shipments of wheat imported from abroad, which must be properly stored as soon as possible to avoid damage.

Causes of tension in the region

The eastern Sudan closure crisis came as a result of a number of domestic and external causes, including:

1. Rifts within the transitional administration: Following a statement by head of the Hadendoa Tribe Muhammad Al-Amin Tirik, the Supreme Peace Council held a meeting to discuss possible solutions to avoid the crisis resulting from the closure of roads in eastern Sudan and the isolation of the main ports of Port Sudan and Suakin from the rest of the country. However, the meeting witnessed confrontations between civilian and military members of the Council, with civilian members insisting on upholding citizens’ right to peaceful demonstration, while military elements stressed the importance of issuing a full authorization to take all necessary measures to disperse any gatherings blocking main roads in the region.
   
2. The stalled peace track in eastern Sudan: Less than a year after the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement in October of 2020, issues from Sudan’s peripheral regions continue to pose challenges. The Abdel Wahid Nur and Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu factions remain outside the scope of the agreement, while the Eastern track has been unable to respond to the demands of different groups. In his recorded speech, which preceded the eastern Sudan road blockage, Tirik announced he was in the process of taking exceptional measures, forced by the failure to reach an agreement with the transitional government within the framework of the eastern Sudan peace track, especially with mounting disagreements over the distribution of wealth.

3. Inability to respond to previous demands: This is not the first crisis in eastern Sudan during the now two-year transitional period. During September 2020, the High Council of the Beja, independent actors, and political and civil forces organized a conference for peace and development in Sankat locality, Red Sea State, bearing the slogan “Confirmation of the Beja’s historical rights”, which rejected the aspects pertaining to their region in the peace agreement, because it did not include all of the main political and social forces in this region. The participants in the conference demanded autonomy for the region based on the 1956 borders, with the formation of the National Parliament of the Beja in eastern Sudan, to represent the demands of the region. On October 3, 2020, the High Council of Beja rapporteur Abdullah Obshar announced that Beja had closed the national road for an indefinite period, with protesters partially closing the port of Port Sudan, the only seaport linking Sudan to the world, on October 5, before reopening after days of tension.

4. Meddling by elements of the previous regime: Figures linked to the fallen previous regime in Sudan were an active element in all confrontations between the High Council of Beja and the Sudanese transitional government. In January 2021, mobs loyal to Tirik stormed the headquarters of the Disempowerment Committee in Port Sudan to support Muhammad Al-Taher Ella, the last Prime Minister during the era of President Omar Al-Bashir. Tirik called on his followers to support Ella, as he is a member of the same tribe. Tensions in eastern Sudan constitute fertile ground for subversive action on the part of actors linked to the previous regime, making this region highly susceptible to relapse.

5. Long-term impact of the Tigray conflict: There have been repeated warnings that the continued conflict in the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia would spill over to the entire Horn of Africa through a number of mechanisms, including imitation of tactics. The blockage of roads linking  internal regions and the ports on the eastern coasts was employed in Ethiopia a few weeks before being used in Sudan.  Protesters from the Somali region, located in eastern Ethiopia, cut off the road and railway line leading to the capital, Addis Ababa, in protest against acts of violence towards the group’s members at the hands of the Afar in a region disputed by the two parties. The conflict in Tigray also created a high-tension regional environment, especially with Eritrea siding with the Ethiopian federal government, and the escalation of armed clashes on the Al-Fashqa border area between Sudan and Ethiopia. The conflict has also provided a conducive environment for activities by armed groups, such as the Afar, who carried out two major operations in the city of Tajura in Djibouti this year.

6. Growing international competition: The impact of growing international competition on gaining a foothold in this region cannot be ignored. In the last months of his rule, former President Omar al-Bashir made arrangements for a Russian military presence in Port Sudan, as well as a Turkish presence in the Suakin Peninsula. The situation radically changed following his ouster, however. With the resumption of Sudanese-American relations after decades of estrangement, the US successfully changed the orientation of the transitional government regarding foreign military presence on the Red Sea. International competition increases eastern Sudan fragility, in light of the government’s weakness and the interest by several international parties to gain a foothold, thereby fueling recurrent tensions in this strategically important region.
   

A structural crisis

In conclusion, it can be argued that recurring crises in eastern Sudan are symptoms of the many structural problems from which Sudan suffers during the transitional period. These include deep divisions between the transitional government stakeholders, and the inability so far to reach inclusive arrangements within the framework of the peace agreement, which focuses on the armed factions affiliated with the Revolutionary Front, as well as the failure to reach substantive resolutions to the governance problems facing relations between the center and the peripheries in Sudan. While many circumstantial factors suggest that the current crisis will be gradually contained, as was the case last year, the situation in eastern Sudan remains volatile in a  to a degree  that could threaten the unity of the Sudanese state, more so than Darfur and South Kordofan.