For the first time since the outbreak of conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)P in mid-April, the President of the Sovereign Council and the Commander of the Sudanese, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, has embarked on a regional diplomatic tour. This indicates an attempt to align with the Arab world in the course and future of the conflict. It is worth noting that Al Burhan’s diplomatic tour included three of Sudan’s neighboring states (Egypt, South Sudan and Eritrea), as well as Qatar. This means that one objective of this round is to raise an awareness of the overspill of the Sudanese conflict on neighboring states. This is in addition to attracting support and seeking new partnerships, as part of Al Burhan’s assertion of authority as the de facto ruler in Sudan.

There is more than one motive for the Sudanese Army Commander’s foreign tour, the most important being:

Multiple Dimensions

1. Demonstrating the authority of the Army Commander as governor of the Sudan: One of the motives behind Al-Burhan’s foreign tour, as well as his internal tour within Sudan preceding his visit to Egypt, appears to have been to break the political isolation over the past months, and to assert his authority as the de facto ruler of Sudan. It is no coincidence that Al Burhan announced a constitutional decree repealing the RSF Act of 2017 and its amendments of 2019 on September 7, immediately after his return from Doha to Sudan.

It seems that regional and international talks have contributed to Al Burhan’s tour to investigate the potential fate of the Sudanese conflict, especially since this regional tour followed Al Burhan’s internal campaign Khartoum, where military bases and installations were inspected in Omdurman amid weeks of fighting. 

2. To affirm Al Burhan’s legitimacy in the international community: The dissolution of the Sovereignty and Ministers’ Chambers and the declaration of a state of emergency in the country in October 2021 declared Al Burhan, as President of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, the effective ruler of Sudan. However, Al Burhan’s regional tour of four countries to date, have been aimed at affirming his legitimacy in the regional and international community through de facto jurisprudence.

Indeed, Al Burhan’s newfound diplomacy coincided with the exit of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Commander of the RSF at the 27 August initiative, which included a comprehensive solution of his vision towards building a Sudanese state on new foundations. Although the Dagalo’s initiative was a response to Malik Aqar, who became Vice-President of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, replacing Dagalo, the simultaneity of Al Burhan’s foreign tour with the RSF Commander’s initiative indicates the attempt to confirm Al Burhan’s legitimacy.

3. Setting the stage for a caretaker government: Al Burhan’s recent diplomatic activity demonstrates attempt to arrange framework for an interim government in order to avoid slipping into civil war. This much was clear in Al Burhan’s statements following his visit to Egypt, where he remarked that “the Sudanese army is eager to put an end to war in the country,” stressing his commitment to “establish a transition period leading to free and fair elections”.

It seems that the government will start operating in Port Sudan. Since Sudanese provinces that are safe and free of conflict require running civilian institutions in order to improve the tragic situation in the country. Indeed, the conflict has killed around 5,000 people, and displaced 4.8 million within and outside the country.

4. Building a unified regional position for the solution of the Sudanese conflict: As the conflict continues, neither side has been able to hold an upper hand in terms of military power. Thus, it appears that Al Burhan is seeking to leverage Egypt and Qatar, regionally and internationally, in order to coordinate a strong Arab position on the conflict in Sudan, as well as southern Sudan and Eritrea, who both hold a stake in the Sudanese crisis.

Al Burhan’s visits are an attempt to get these states to mediate across regional and international actors, and explore possible pathways of ending the war and initiating political dialogue between parties to the conflict in Sudan. Indeed, Al Burhan’s tour suggests that the visits are aimed at seeking quick wins for a political settlement that will help to save the situation in the country.

5. Attracting regional support and seeking new partnerships: The four states visited in Al Burhan’s tour all support the Sudanese army, even if such support is unofficial or indirect, as is the case for Egypt. Additionally, Al Burhan’s visit to Eritrea, coincides with Sudan’s decision to open borders and crossings, as well as the presence of a number of Sudanese political entities in Asmara to explore ways to find a solution to the ongoing conflict in Sudan. 

Hence, Al Burhan’s visits confirm and demonstrate support for the Sudanese army by these regional players, while attempting to seek new partnerships and operationalize bilateral protocols and agreements, whether in the political and economic fields, or in areas of security and defense. This means that Al Burhan is trying to exercise Sudan’s sovereignty through these regional tours.

6. Raising the issue of national security in Sudan’s neighboring states: Al Burhan is fully aware of the importance of establishing a centralized state in Sudan, and how that affects its three neighboring states (Egypt, South Sudan and Eritrea) and their national security and strategic interests.

Thus, as the conflict in Sudan evolves, the military situation on the ground indicates that the the security of neighboring states is at risk. One of the most important motives behind Al Burhan’s diplomatic tour is to express that the national security of these lies in its support for the Sudanese military, or at least to invite these regional actors to mediate a solution for the conflict in the pursuit for a political settlement.

Core axis

In this context, it can be said that the recent tour led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, although based on multiple and interrelated motives, aims to build an aligned regional and international concerning the future of conflict in Sudan. The continuation of military conflict is likely to lead to civil war, disintegrate Sudan’s political institutions, and spiral into tribalism and chaos. Naturally, this would attract extremist and terrorist groups to the country.

However, this does not preclude a desire by Al-Burhan to obtain material and moral support for the Sudanese army, or accept any regional initiative that is compatible with the military’s vision to remove the RSF, or minimize the integration of the remainder of these forces into the Sudanese army.