The Center for the Arab World for Research and Advanced Studies has organized in Cairo on the 30^th of April 2022 a listening session under the title of “The Line of Fire: The Regional Implications of the Armed Clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces”. The center played host to Dean Sameer Ragheb, the head of the Arab Institute for Development and Strategic Studies as the main speaker in the session. Joining in the session as well were a number of experts and researchers in various fields including: Professor Mohamed Ezz El Arab, Mohamed Abbas Nagy, Amr Abdelatty, Hussein Maloum, Hamdy Beshier, Karam Saied, Mohamed Elfiky, Haitham Omran, Mohamed Omar and Nevien Elmahdy. 

The Main Variables

Ragheb pointed out the main variables in the current Sudanese conflict and the armed clashes between the Sudanese armed forces, under Abdelfattah Borhan, and the Rapid Support Forces under Mohamed Hamdan Daqlo Hamedity, most notable they were: 

1. A Conflict of Many Levels and Outcomes: The current conflict between the Sudanese armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces is not just a military one, but it includes several other aspects. Namely it is a military-on-military conflict, a civilian vs military conflict during the current transitional phase through the potential that the forces for freedom and change party might support the rapid support forces, a tribal element through the rapid supports ethnic roots that cross Libya and Chad and finally an ideological one through the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, of these factors point to a complicated scenario in the current crisis 
2. The Problem in the Current Political Transition: Over the past few years, Sudan has experienced a political transition and democratization that is faltering to a pint. The issue is compounded in the post military phase as the army desires democratization and the progress of the country, but fears of handing over power to anyone who might not rule the country honestly and fairly.  There is also a crisis related to the status of the army commanders on the day after the handover of power, will they be prosecuted in the cases of violence that occurred during the transitional period? This leads to fears of handing over power with no guarantees that will ensure the handover of power with no prosecutions of the military cadre.

Another area of concern is the attempts by the Freedom and Change party to exclude all those they deem unworthy of sharing rule. This has prompted parties to reject the framework agreement in the stages of the democratic transition as they see that ambitions should not be high. Therefore, a clash in Sudan is seemingly more of a benefit for some who reject the agreement.

3. The anticipation of an armed conflict: An armed clash between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces was expected for some time, and the crisis is not related to the dispute over the integration of their forces into the army. Whether in two, three, or even 10 years, there is a certain point perhaps where the leaders of both sides wish to continue in the position of power, as the army commander has become the head of the Sovereign Council, and thus possesses power, and the leader of the Rapid Support Forces also has ambitions and does not wish to submit to the authority of the military establishment, after becoming deputy head of the Sovereign Council.

In general, the Rapid Support Forces during the past two weeks have had movements that may have been of reconnaissance of the Sudanese army to plan and prepare their move against those forces, and thus preparing step aimed airports and military sites.

4. The Potential of a Civil War: The clash between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces cannot be classified as a military coup against the transitional authority represented in the Sovereign Council, Led by the army commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The movements of the Rapid Support Forces are not those of a battalion or component within the Sudanese army, this conflict can be classified rather as a “rebellion”.  Although the situation in Sudan is not classified as civil war at this stage, it really depends on the Sudanese army and their ability to exert control over Khartoum. Thus the stationing of the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur where it can find support, may be impacted by the overall outlook in Sudan.

The Rapid Support Forces’ attempt to trim the army’s control in the capital cannot be overlooked, although the army controls most states, as it is evident from the first day of the conflict, the Rapid Support Forces’ desire to neutralize the air force, was an attempt to neutralize the Airforce prior to the continuation of the conflict and a further attempt by the Rapid Support Forces to equalize the situation on the ground between them and the Army.

A Complicated Scenario

Ragheb noted that the armed conflict in Sudan has reverberations on the region and extend to the global community as well as a result of the complex interests and relations: 

1. A Noticeable involvement from the Arab World: For the first time, a crisis within an Arab country in Africa has led to a more prominent Arab presence than the African Union. This is a remarkable twist given the extent of the involvement of the three main powers: Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.  All three powers are vying for their interests in Sudan, despite their varying differences all of the three powers realize that the interests of one country does not affect the other within their framework of relations between the three powers.

On the other hand, there is no prominent presence of the African Union in Sudan at the moment in contrast to the movements of IGAD, Ethiopia or South Sudan The influence of the Arab countries in the course of the Sudanese crisis is more relevant and their links span across economic, social, political and military interest whether it is Egypt, Saudi Arabia or even the UAE.

2. A Complex Web of Involvement: The neighboring countries of Sudan have complex entanglements that have determined their position in the crisis, and thus their bias towards either side of the conflict. Egypt has taken a neutral stance considering the issue an internal matter and has presented a ceasefire initiative in cooperation with South Sudan. 

South Sudan, Hamedity has influence given his support of President Salva Kiir given his support for Kiir in any rebellion against him. The current evidence, however, does not support that South Sudan will support Hamedity.

Chad has officially announced its support for Al-Burhan in the armed clash, but this is at the official level. On the other hand, there are tribal dimensions that may support Hamedity given his tribal links.

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea are expected to be closer to Hamedity, Ethiopia in particular given their Renaissance Dam and their desire to control the disputed Al-Fashqa region.

3. The Current Polarization of the Global Community: The current global stance is that of international polarization given the Russian-Ukrainian war. The US and its allies want to besiege Russia, by expanding NATO towards Russia’s borders, but Russia took the step of invading Ukraine, surprising the US and the EU, and Russia has also expanded its foothold in Africa. This is evident after 25 African countries refused to condemn Russia in Ukrainian conflict. Russia also relies on Wagner, which is present in Sudan, Libya, Central Africa Republic, and Chad, thus the repercussions of polarization of the global community are expected to be reflected in the Sudanese crisis.

Russia wishes to establish a military base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea, this has led to the US sending a destroyer the region to prevent any attempt by Russia to establish a military base. This is in an attempt to prevent a surprise of Russian presence, as was the case in Mali.

The conflict in Sudan is also part of the conflict in the “Indo-Pacific” region, as the key is the Gulf region and the Arabian Sea, and therefore Russia wants to strengthen its presence in Sudan, to link up with its base in Tartous, Syria, allowing its naval vessels to move freely and stop to refuel, supplies and other supplies. Logistics.

As for the EU, it is critical to prevent the expansion of Russia in Africa, but at the same time it may not want to take a position against Hamedity given his ability to confront waves of illegal migrants and the Sudanese army’s loss of control over their own border guards.

Several Scenarios of the Outcome

The head of the Arab Institute for Development and Strategic Studies refers to the multiplicity of scenarios of armed clashes between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces whether through the reaching of an agreement between the two parties during the coming period, or the possibility of a meeting between Al-Burhan and Hamedity in the neutral country. Another possibility is the continuation of the conflict and the escalation of violence on the ground which could lead to the exit of the Rapid Support Forces from Khartoum towards its strong base in Darfur. There it can increase its support leading to a new stage in the crisis given that there are 8 armed groups in Darfur that can announce their support for the Rapid Support Forces. 

Ragheb did not rule out that one of the parties supporting Hamedity would provide multiple forms of support, whether military or political, if the Sudanese army made progress on the ground. On the other hand, parties may intervene in favor of Al-Burhan if the Sudanese army retreats during the armed confrontations. At the moment it is not necessary for regional parties to be supporters of either party, in light of the state of polarization in the global community and its repercussions being reflected in Sudan.