The recent renewed calls for the dismissal of the government of Ibrahim Raisi and the escalating tensions between the government and the Shura Council can be explained based on several factors. The most notable ones include the approaching 2024 parliamentary elections, the growing divergence between the conservative factions supporting Raisi and Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, and the government’s accountability for exacerbating the recent protest crisis.

Despite the calming of the internal crisis caused by the protests that occurred from mid-September for over five months, and the resumption of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia under Chinese sponsorship for economic purposes, a new campaign has been launched against President Ibrahim Raisi’s government. The campaign followed the summons of Minister of Industry, Mining, and Trade, Reza Fatemi Amin, for questioning by the Islamic Shura Council. The request was signed by 40 members of parliament, and the minister is expected to face the inquiry within ten days.

Numerous Motivations

The renewal of the campaign calling for the resignation of President Ibrahim Raisi’s government can be explained in light of numerous motivations, the most prominent of which are:

1. The upcoming parliamentary elections are drawing nearer, scheduled for February next year. As a result, some significant factions within the conservative and traditionalist camp, especially the group loyal to the President of the Consultative Assembly, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, known as “the new fundamentalists,” have increased their criticisms of the government. Their goal is to strengthen their voter base before the election and communicate to voters that their faction’s parliamentarians are dissatisfied with the government’s economic performance. The economy has failed to contain the crisis that is worsening steadily, as exemplified by the national currency’s value collapse, surpassing 50,000 tomans per US dollar.

2. The “Paydari” front, which is the political wing supporting President Ibrahim Raisi within the parliament, attempted to exclude its opponents. It initiated a campaign before the June 2021 presidential elections to bolster Raisi’s chances of winning. Additionally, the “Paydari” front launched a campaign to prevent Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf from becoming the parliament speaker, which was unsuccessful. The conservative fundamentalist movement factions, represented by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, emphasized the need for a balance of power between the factions, preventing the campaign’s success.

The “New Principlists” faction, which supports Qalibaf, is currently attempting to promote the idea that the “Paydari” faction is responsible for the ministerial appointments in Ebrahim Raisi’s government. This government failed to implement its adopted economic program, which led to the resignation of two ministers, including the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and the Minister of Transportation. Additionally, other ministers, including the most recent Minister of Industry, Reza Fatemi Amin, have been summoned for questioning.

Undoubtedly, this campaign is connected to the various factions within the conservative Principlist movement’s attempts to control the upcoming Parliament session. Doing so will enhance their ability to select the Council’s presidency during its new term, and potentially play a role in the 2025 presidential elections.

3. Although the main institutions in the system agreed that the protests which began in mid-September last year, due to objections to the death of 20-year-old Kurdish girl Mahsa Amini, were orchestrated and planned by external entities to undermine the pillars of the Iranian regime, they still strongly criticized the measures taken by the government regarding the enforcement of wearing the hijab. This criticism does not negate the necessity of adhering to wearing the hijab. In other words, these institutions believed that the recent crisis imposed by the protests could have been avoided if the government had utilized other mechanisms in monitoring compliance with wearing the hijab, similar to the methods used in the past. These measures included sending text messages to women who do not comply with the rules of wearing the hijab, warning them of the possibility of facing punitive measures if they continue to do so.

This means that ultimately, the regime attributed the responsibility for the crisis to the government and provided an opportunity for external forces, which it claimed orchestrated the protests and aimed to destabilize the Iranian system and create chaos, to infiltrate Iran’s borders and support the protesters. According to this view, such support played a role in prolonging the protests for over five months, despite the authorities’ efforts to quell them.

4. It is possible that the recent criticisms of the Iranian government’s economic performance and enforcement of the hijab policy are linked to efforts by conservative factions to prevent President Ibrahim Raisi from seeking reelection in 2025. This would break the tradition of the president serving two consecutive terms, which has been in place since the establishment of the Islamic Republic system in 1979.

Partly, this can be attributed to the extremist vision held by certain factions, particularly the “New Principlists,” who believe that the pro-“Resistance” faction has managed to solidify its grip on parliament and influence the appointment of specific individuals in the government. They fear that this trend will continue in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 2024 and 2025, respectively.

Possibly, the “new conservatives” are attempting to pave the way for the Speaker of the Shura Council, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, to become President. Qalibaf has tried to secure this position multiple times before but has faced various obstacles, including pressure during the last election to increase Ebrahim Raisi’s chances of winning.

The Beijing Test

The current internal conflict in Iran is not limited to domestic issues; it also extends to external matters, particularly the “Eastward orientation policy” towards China and Russia. The opposition wing in parliament has criticized this policy, arguing that it could pose a threat to Iran’s interests. They believe that the policy will expose Iran to external interference that may not be in its favor, giving China and Russia the leverage to exert pressure on Iran in case of disagreements over certain issues.

The agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran is a specific example. It was signed under the auspices of China on March 10th last year but does not appear to have full support within Iran. It may become a focal point in the upcoming election race between the pro-government faction and the opposing faction. The former sees potential gains in the agreement, while the latter views it as potentially imposing significant concessions on Iran, particularly because China has the power to impose penalties on the non-compliant party. This reduces Iran’s freedom of movement to deal with regional issues of mutual interest, such as the Yemeni conflict. This suggests that Iran may face internal problems in the future as it continues to implement the agreement with Saudi Arabia.