On April 5th, the Turkish Ambassador to Tunisia, Kajlar Fehri Shakir al-Ab, visited the Tunisian Parliament, marking the first such visit since the new parliament convened under the leadership of Ibrahim Bouderbala, who is considered close to President Kais Saied. The visit aimed to consolidate recent developments in bilateral relations across various fields. During the visit, the Turkish ambassador emphasized the importance of promoting cooperation between Ankara and Tunisia in the parliamentary field, particularly by intensifying the exchange of experiences and expertise. He also handed Bouderbala a written message from his counterpart, Mustafa Sentop, the Speaker of the Turkish Parliament.

Observers estimate that despite Turkey’s opposition to the exceptional measures taken by Tunisia on July 25, 2021, and the negative stance of Turkish official media towards these measures, the Turkish ambassador’s recent visit to the Tunisian parliament indicates a noticeable change in Ankara’s position. It suggests that Turkey may be abandoning its support for the Ennahda movement in exchange for strengthening relations with the ruling elite in Tunisia.

Simultaneous Contexts

The Turkish ambassador’s visit to the new Tunisian parliament and his meeting with its newly elected president, Ibrahim Bouderbala, coincided with a number of developments that can be explained as follows:

1. The escalation of Western pressure on Turkey and Tunisia coincided with the Turkish ambassador’s visit to the Tunisian parliament and his meeting with the newly elected president, Ibrahim Bouderbala. While Washington and European powers criticized Turkey for opposing Sweden’s accession to NATO and increasing pressure on Ankara for refusing to participate in sanctions against Moscow, the scope of disagreements between Tunisia and Western powers is also expanding.

This was evident in the condemnation by the US State Department on April 5 of the judiciary’s handling of investigations against opposition politicians and their concern about the detention of political figures. Similarly, the European Parliament called on March 16 to halt Tunisia’s campaign against civil society and to suspend EU support programs directed towards the Ministries of Justice and Interior.

2. The Turkish ambassador’s visit to the new Tunisian parliament occurred amidst significant political changes in Tunisia. Many political groups within Tunisia have declared their full support for President Kais Saied’s policies. Moreover, pro-Saied groups have a dominant presence in the new parliamentary session and back the measures he is taking to strengthen his grip on power.

3. The visit of the Turkish ambassador to the new Tunisian parliament and his meeting with its president Bouderbala came amidst Turkey’s belief that the Ennahda movement’s presence in Tunisia has declined since President Qais Saied took control. Through the ambassador’s visit, Ankara may be indicating that it has shifted away from the Ennahda movement, which has ties to Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, in exchange for recognizing the legitimacy of the new parliamentary authority in Tunisia. Additionally, the visit suggests that the Ennahda movement was merely a tool that Turkey used to advance its interests in Tunisia, and that it is now an ineffective one.

4. Common approach towards regional conflicts: The meeting between the Turkish ambassador and the newly elected Tunisian Parliament Speaker took place in the context of a joint approach between the two countries towards some of the regional conflicts, particularly the Syrian conflict. Tunisia’s President, Kais Saied, decided on February 9th to elevate his country’s diplomatic representation with Syria after a ten-year-long hiatus, and on April 3rd, he directed the initiation of procedures to appoint a new ambassador to Damascus. Similarly, Turkey is moving towards restoring its relations with the Syrian regime and normalizing diplomatic ties, with Russian mediation managing to resolve a wide range of contentious issues between Ankara and Damascus.

Diverse Objectives

There are many considerations behind Turkey’s new move towards the ruling authority in Tunisia at this time, and these can be explained as follows:

1. The purpose of the Turkish ambassador’s visit to the Tunisian parliament was to strengthen the partnership between the two countries and explore opportunities for increased cooperation, particularly in the economic field. Tunisia is currently facing an unprecedented economic crisis, and negotiations with the International Monetary Fund have stalled. The Turkish ambassador aimed to promote the partnership between Turkey and Tunisia, expressing Turkey’s willingness to continue investing in Tunisia, support trade exchanges, diversify and increase imports of Tunisian goods, and inject more Turkish investments into the Tunisian market. Italy is also leading external efforts to support Tunisia financially and economically. The meeting between the Turkish ambassador and the Tunisian parliament speaker carries a message that Ankara is willing to change its position towards the situation in Tunisia to preserve its interests in the country.

It is worth noting that there has been a significant development in trade relations between Ankara and Tunisia. While the volume of trade exceeds more than a billion dollars, the trade balance leans towards Turkey, as their exports to Tunisia totaled about $1.113 billion by the end of August 2022, whereas their imports from Tunisia only amounted to around $156.2 million.

2. During the visit, Turkey aimed to strengthen coordination with Tunisia on the Libyan crisis and emphasize the importance of the relationship between the two countries in securing Turkey’s presence in Libya. Tunisia has demonstrated notable movements regarding the Libyan scene, such as the visit of the Turkish ally of Dbeibah to Tunisia at the end of December last year and Tunisia’s representation in the consultative meeting of Arab foreign ministers at the ministerial level in January last year. Tunisia is also engaging with Algeria and Rome to build a unified vision to address the Libyan crisis.

Turkey realizes that Tunisia is a strategic priority in the Libyan issue, and it views Tunisia as an important platform for protecting its presence in western Libya. With the decline of the Ennahda movement, it is important to establish new alliances with the current Tunisian authorities to attract them to Turkey’s vision in Libya. This visit sends a message from Turkey to emphasize these points.

3.  Turkey seems to be using its relationship with Tunisia as a means to strengthen its influence in North and West Africa, especially given the ongoing tensions between Paris and the Arab Maghreb countries, as well as the desire to end French presence in West Africa. Tunisia is a priority for Turkey in enhancing its presence in Africa, particularly as the American presence declines and African countries grow increasingly wary of the risks associated with Chinese lending policies.

It is clear that Turkey views Tunisia as a strategic anchor point for its policy on the African continent. Therefore, Turkey’s efforts to secure its political relations with Tunisia are understandable. The aim is to utilize this relationship as a winning card to affirm Turkey’s pivotal role in Africa.

4. The Turkish ambassador’s recent move towards the new Tunisian parliament is part of Turkey’s efforts to minimize disputes with its regional neighbors. The aim is to neutralize the pressure created by domestic developments in Turkey and prevent the political opposition from using tensions with neighboring countries as an electoral tool.

The ruling party in Turkey believes that redefining its relationships with regional countries, including Tunisia, may help bolster support in the upcoming elections on May 14. The competition is expected to be fierce between President Erdogan and his party and the opposition, which has gained significant ground in Turkish politics recently. Therefore, enhancing support from neighboring countries could prove crucial for the ruling party’s electoral success.

Regarding the Renaissance Movement

In conclusion, the visit of the Turkish ambassador to the new Tunisian parliament speaker, Ibrahim Bouderbala, is a clear indication of Ankara’s efforts to secure its interests in Tunisia and solidify its influence and role in North Africa. This comes in coordination with the new Tunisian authority, especially in light of the decline of the Renaissance Movement.

Turkey’s stance may exacerbate the crisis within the Renaissance Movement, which previously relied on Turkish support to ensure its anti-Qais Saied authority movements. Consequently, the Renaissance Movement may be forced to compromise with the ruling authority in Tunisia or, at the very least, reconsider its calculations in the near future.