On March 18, the President of the Turkish Defense Industries Corporation, Ismail Demir, announced his country’s launch of ground tests for the Hurjet jet developed by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI). This follows the announcement by the Head of ASELSAN Elektronik Sanayi that Turkey, “may not need Russia’s S-400 missile defense system”, adding that his country was working to develop its own Siper missile-defense system. 

Under Pressure 

The continued Western embargo on the export of military equipment and major arms to Turkey, on which Ankara had relied on for its defense industries, as well as the removal of Ankara from the F-35 project, has made fifth-generation Turkish stealth aircrafts and the production of a domestic missile defense system a strategic necessity for Turkey. Turkey’s announcement of the development of its domestic defense industries comes as Turkish military operations continue in northern Iraq and northeastern Syria, targeting the PKK, which is one of Turkey’s main objectives.

Several considerations

There are important indications behind the announcements by Turkish defense companies of their new military developments. These include:

1. Mobilizing Turkey’s internal security forces ahead of the presidential elections: The Turkish regime is indicating that it is able to support Turkey’s development in the upcoming period, securing a spot in the ranks of arms-producing countries. Employing these defense systems aligns Turkish interior forces with the AKP, which stands on the cusp of the elections scheduled for May 14. The elections coincide with a clear decline in the popularity of the AKP, owing to the continuing economic crisis of rising inflation and devaluation, as well as growing opposition who have joined forces to nominate one presidential candidate, Kamel Klejdaroglu. Moreover, significant ineptitude by Turkish agencies in dealing with the events of the February 6 earthquake that struck areas of southern Turkey, which President Erdogan acknowledged early this March, further contributed to the decline in confidence in both him and the AKP.

2. Softening American and Western positions in contentious issues: The development of local defense systems may aid Turkey’s in opening up negotiations, and obtaining concessions from Western powers in contentious issues. As illustrated by Hallock Georgon’s statement, President of ASELSAN Elektronic, Turkey may have no need to acquire a second S-400 deal from Russia, the first of which prompted Washington to impose sanctions on the Turkish defense sector.

Tensions between Ankara and Washington began to rise after Congress imposed restrictive conditions on Ankara’s acquisition of the new model of F16 aircrafts, in response to Ankara’s agreement to Sweden and Finland’s entry into NATO membership, as well as its rejection of Western sanctions on Moscow for its military intervention in Ukraine. Tension also escalated as the Biden administration continued to support the SDF, particularly the US Chief of Staff’s visit on March 4 to northeastern Syria, which angered Ankara.

In this context, it is likely that Turkey will leverage its orientation towards building its own domestic defense system, rather than importing from Russia, to relieve the strain on its relationship with Washington, and work towards completing the new generation F16 deal, or at least lift sanctions imposed on Turkey’s defense sector. This coincides with the U.S. Defense Secretary’s assertion on March 16 that, “Turkey is an important partner,” adding that, “we will continue to do our utmost to strengthen relations.” These statements were preceded by Washington’s leeway over Turkey’s acquisition of F-16s, as confirmed by the Turkish Defense Minister in his remarks on March 12, when he said that his country’s talks with the Pentagon on the provision of F-16s had reached a “positive point.”

3. Avoiding external pressure on Ankara: Turkey’s announcement of its new generation of military capabilities in domestic defense is inseparable from its inclination to avoid external pressures. A number of Western companies continue to ban the sale of certain military components to the Turkish defense industries. For example, since the end of 2020, Austria’s Rotax 914 has decided to suspend the export of drone engines to Turkey and, since April 2021, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Ministry has cancelled export permits related to drone technology to Turkey, after being used in Nagorno-Karabakh. Such an embargo undoubtedly harms Turkey’s defense sector, prompting the country to rely on itself in developing its armaments to avoid the West’s defense embargo.

4. Support programs for defense exports: Turkey’s announcement of the launch of the stealth aircraft tests, and the development of the domestic Siper missile defense system, comes in the context of Turkey’s desire to enhance its image and support programs for its defense exports. According to estimates by the World Peace Institute, Ankara ranked 12th in global arms exports between 2018 and 2022, with exports reaching about 1.1%, reflecting an increase of about 0.5% in Turkey’s share. In contrast, Turkey’s share of global arms imports declined between 2018-2022 from 2.4% to 1.3%.

5. Confronting military capabilities of adversaries: Tensions between Ankara and Athens are on the rise, as demonstrated by the latter’s quest for F35 jets and the signing of a deal with Paris in September 2021, under which it acquired a number of French Rafale aircrafts. On September 17, 2022, Washington announced the lifting of years-old restrictions on arms exports to Cyprus. In this context, Turkey’s announcement of a new generation of aircrafts and domestic defense systems is linked not only to the assertion of its place in the territory, but also to the demonstration of its capabilities to keep up with the arms race towards a surplus of domestic power that will ensure that it balances the tremendous development in the military capabilities in Greece and Cyprus.

Several indications 

In conclusion, announcing the launch of new generation warplane testing, as well as the development of domestic defense systems in Turkey demonstrates its inclination to strengthen its domestic defense programs in the coming period, particularly as efforts to resolve contentious issues with Western powers are stalled, and Western companies continue to ban the sale of military components to Turkey. It is also partly linked to the ruling regime’s desire to win the elections scheduled for May 14, which coincides with the continuing state of societal polarization and political fragmentation that has become a prominent headline on the Turkish scene.